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In my first essay, I theoretically and quantitatively examine the role of nonbank 
financial institutions in the monetary transmission mechanisms. First, in accordance 
with Bernanke’s proposal (2007), I theoretically explain the effect of restrictive 
monetary policy on the behavior of both banks and nonbank financial intermediaries 
through their balance sheet conditions, which is a medium for the two kinds of lenders 
to shrink their loan supply. Second, if this theoretical explanation is correct, empirically 
we should expect the net worth and the intermediated loans of both kinds of lending 
institutions to fall in response to a tight monetary shock. Employing the traditional OLS 
and the VAR methodology, I find that nonbank financial institutions respond by 
shrinking their net worth, and they subsequently reduce their loans in the same ways 
banks do. This evidence suggests that nonbank financial institutions may play an 
important role in amplifying the effect of monetary policy on output, providing some 
explanation of the existing puzzles.  
In my second essay, I provide more evidence on the behavior of small and large 
firms, employing the Flow of Funds data, the QFR data and other sources. The 
empirical test to examine behavior of small and large firms is conducted in two ways: 
(1) by different episodes, tight monetary policy episodes and business cycles episodes 
and (2) by different time periods, Pre-1990 periods and Post-1990 periods. 
 iv 
 
First, I find that a monetary shock and an NBER recession shock differently affect 
firms’ short-term financing behavior. During recent periods, after a contractionary 
monetary shock, large firms increase their short-term debt more than small firms, 
whereas after an NBER recession shock, large firms decrease most balance sheet 
variables (including short-term debt) more than small firms. These findings suggest that 
small firms are more credit-constrained after a monetary policy shock, whereas large 
firms are more credit-constrained after an NBER recession shock. Second, I find that, 
after a contractionary monetary shock, during earlier periods, large firms decrease their 
short-term debt less than small firms, whereas during recent periods, large firms 
increase more than small firms. Although these findings appear to be contradictory, 
they are consistent in that small firms have continued to be more credit-constrained than 
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Most economists would agree that monetary policy influences the real economy in 
the short run. Yet, they would disagree on precisely how monetary policy influences the 
real economy (see Bernanke & Blinder 1992; Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Evans 1996a, 
1996b; Romer & Romer, 1989, for empirical evidence). Such different ways of how 
monetary policy influences aggregate demand and output is referred to as monetary 
transmission mechanisms. According to the conventional interest rate channel, the 
actions of monetary authority influence consumption and investment spending through 
changes in interest rates, therefore ultimately affecting the real economic activity. In 
this interest rate channel, the effectiveness of monetary policy depends on interest-rate-
sensitive components of aggregate expenditure. However, empirical studies have faced 
enormous difficulty in identifying the quantitatively strong effect of interest rates on 
real variables, such as aggregate output and employment, in terms of purportedly 
interest-rate-sensitive components of aggregate expenditure 1  (see Friedman, 1990; 
Shapiro, Blanchard, & Lovell, 1986, for such difficulty in empirical studies).  
The shortcomings of the conventional approach led a number of economists to 
search for other complementary explanations, one of which is known as the credit
                                                          
 
1 In other words, the estimated macroeconomic responses to policy induced interest rate changes are 
substantially larger than those inferred by conventional estimates of the interest rate sensitivity of 




channel of monetary policy. It puts emphasis on the role of credit market imperfections. 
In a situation where borrowers have more information about the quality of their projects 
than do lenders, such asymmetric information can trigger a premium in the cost of all 
forms of external finance over the cost of internal funds. This premium, known as an 
external finance premium, compensates lenders for the costs of mitigating the problems 
of moral hazard and adverse selection―e.g., the costs incurred in monitoring borrowers 
and a lemon premium that results from asymmetric information problems. According to 
the credit channel thesis, the impact of monetary policy on interest rates is magnified by 
endogenous changes in the external finance premium. The external finance premium to 
borrowers depends inversely on their financial conditions, measured in terms of 
indicators such as net worth and liquidity. For example, a borrower who has a stronger 
financial condition faces a lower external finance premium because the stronger 
financial condition mitigates the borrower’s potential conflict of interest with a lender. 
As a result, endogenous changes in borrowers’ financial conditions may increase the 
persistence and amplitude of business cycles and make stronger the influence of 
monetary policy. The credit channel therefore suggests that monetary policy can 
influence the cost and availability of credit by more than implied by the conventional 
movement in the interest rate channel alone.2 
How do monetary policy actions affect the external finance premium in the credit 
channel? Bernanke and Gertler (1995) explain two possible effects: the balance sheet 
channel and the bank lending channel. First, according to the balance sheet channel, 
monetary policy can influence the external finance premium of borrowers (especially 
                                                          
 
2 The credit channel of monetary policy is a magnification effect that works in tandem with the 




small firms) by changing their balance sheet conditions (Bernanke & Gertler 1995; 
Gertler & Gilchrist 1991, 1993, 1994). For example, contractionary monetary policy 
that increases interest rates deteriorates borrowers’ balance sheet conditions because an 
increase in interest rates raises their debt services and drops the value of their 
collateralizable assets. The weakening of borrowers’ financial conditions increases the 
external finance premium, thereby reducing borrowers’ ability to access credit. Second, 
according to the bank lending channel, monetary policy can influence the external 
finance premium of borrowers (especially small firms) by shifting the supply of bank 
loans away from small firms. For example, contractionary monetary policy that drains 
reserve-backed deposits makes some banks unable to raise nondeposit source of funds 
to continue their lending. If small firms are shut off from bank loans and are forced to 
find a new lender, they must incur some costs (i.e., an increase in the external finance 
premium) in establishing new credit relationships (Bernanke & Gertler, 1995). 3  
Through either channel, contractionary monetary policy increases the external finance 
premium of small firms who are subject to capital market imperfections. The effect of 
the monetary policy action is amplified by endogenous changes in the external finance 
premium.  
                                                          
 
3 The example shown here illustrates one way of operating the bank lending channel; tight monetary 
policy influences the supply of bank loans by changing the external finance premium of nonfinancial 
firms. However, tight monetary policy can also influence the supply of bank loans by weakening the 
balance sheet conditions of financial firms―and thus by changing the external finance premium of 
financial firms. Such a way of operating the bank lending channel is shared by many other papers. 
Because banks must borrow uninsured funds in order to lend, they must pay the external finance premium 
just as ordinary firms do.  
As banks’ balance sheet conditions become weak after contractionary monetary policy, banks must 
pay the higher external finance premium to continue lending, thus being forced to reduce their loan 
supply. In this case, the bank lending channel is the balance sheet channel as applied to the operations of 
banks. The bank lending channel essentially operates through banks’ balance sheet quality that results 
from either changes in bank reserves or changes in bank equity after monetary tightening (See Bernanke 
& Blinder 1988; Kashyap & Stein, 1995, 2000; Stein, 1998, for bank reserves and  see Kishan & Opiela, 




My research is motivated by the unsatisfactory explanation of the conventional view 
of monetary transmission mechanisms. In my dissertation, I therefore examine the 
behaviors of lenders and the behaviors of borrowers more closely to find possible 
explanations for the empirical difficulty we have faced. On the lenders’ side, I consider 
the behavior of nonbank financial institutions―which previous studies fail to take into 
account in the mechanism of monetary policy―as one possible contributing factor to 
the sharp decline in output following tight monetary policy. Nonbank financial 
institutions (NBFIs hereafter), which also provide credit to borrowers in credit markets, 
may cut back on their credit to borrowers in a similar manner to banks if tight monetary 
policy affects the behavior of both kinds of lending institutions in a similar way.  
Chapter 2, entitled “The Role of Nonbank Financial Institutions in the Monetary 
Transmission Mechanism: Theory and Evidence,” theoretically and quantitatively 
examines the role of NBFIs in the transmission of monetary policy. First, as suggested 
by Bernanke (2007), I theoretically explain how contractionary monetary policy affects 
the quantity of loans of banks and NBFIs through changes in their balance sheet 
conditions, particularly net worth. Second, I empirically test whether the net worth and 
the intermediated loans of banks and NBFIs fall in response to a contractionary 
monetary policy shock. Employing the OLS and the VAR methodology, I find that 
NBFIs respond by shrinking their net worth, and they subsequently reduce their loans in 
the same way as banks. This evidence suggests that the presence of nonbank lending 
effect may make the existing lending channel stronger. It thus may provide a possible 





I also consider the behavior of borrowers―which the earlier studies do take into 
account in the monetary transmission mechanism―as a contributing factor that leads to 
the substantial reduction of production because borrowers are likely to face higher 
external finance premium after tightening monetary policy. An interesting question is 
which firm group (small or large firms) is more adversely affected when credit becomes 
less available and more expensive. Earlier research finds that small firms are more 
adversely affected than large firms after contractionary monetary policy because small 
firms are subject to credit market imperfections. In recent studies, however, new evidence 
has shown that, in contrast to the earlier findings, large firms are more adversely 
affected than small firms in relation to employment, sales, and short-term debt during 
recent recessions of the 1990, 2001, and 2007. So far, economic scholars have found 
mixed empirical results, depending on their different dataset and different types of 
episodes. The questions arise from such mixed results: Why do earlier findings show 
different results from recent findings? Do such different results arise from the fact that 
different scholars use different episodes in their historical event study? (i.e., tight 
monetary policy episodes versus business cycles episodes) Do such different results 
arise from the fact that different scholars use different time periods in their dataset? (i.e., 
Pre-1990 periods versus Post-1990 periods) 
Chapter 3, entitled “The Behavior of Small and Large Firms During Business Cycle 
Episodes and During Monetary Policy Episodes: A Comparison of Earlier and Recent 
Periods,” sheds light on the three questions raised above. I provide more evidence on 
the behavior of small and large firms, employing the Flow of Fund data, the QFR data 




monetary policy episodes and business cycles episodes, and (2) different time periods, 
Pre-1990 periods and Post-1990 periods. First, examining the behavior of small and 
large firms by different episodes, I find that a monetary policy shock and an NBER 
recession shock differently affect firms’ short-term financing behavior. After a 
contractionary monetary policy shock, large firms increase their short-term debt 
substantially more than small firms, whereas after an NBER recession shock, large 
firms decrease most of balance sheet variables (including short-term debt) significantly 
more than small firms―especially during recent periods. These findings suggest that 
small firms are more credit-constrained after a monetary policy shock, whereas large 
firms are more credit-constrained after an NBER recession shock. Second, examining 
the behavior of small and large firms by different periods, I find that, after a 
contractionary monetary shock, during earlier periods, large firms decrease their short-
term debt less than small firms, whereas during recent periods, large firms increase 
more than small firms. Although these findings seem to be contradictory, they are 
consistent in that small firms have continued to be more credit-constrained than large 
firms after contractionary monetary policy―at the time when demand for loans 
increases.  
Taken as a whole, my dissertation provides some possible answers for the puzzles 
existing in the effect of the monetary policy; it also sheds light on the transmission 
mechanisms between monetary policy shocks and NBER recession shocks. In my first 
essay, the main finding is that NBFIs shrink the quantity of loans in a way similar to 
banks after contractionary monetary policy. The evidence suggests that NBFIs play a 




well as banks in the monetary transmission mechanism. Incorporating NBFIs into the 
framework of monetary policy may provide a reasonable explanation for the current 
empirical problem. In my second essay, the important finding is that a monetary policy 
shock affects the short-term debt of (small and large) firms differently than an NBER 
recession shock. The evidence suggests that, after an NBER recession shock, the 
financial accelerator mechanism may operate through large firms, which are more 
financially constrained due to their higher leverage ratio at a cyclical peak―particularly 
during recent periods. Moreover, consistent with the previous studies, after a monetary 
policy shock, the accelerator mechanism may continuously operate through small firms, 
which face greater financial constraints due to the lack of access to credit lines and 
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THE ROLE OF NONBANK FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN  
 
THE MONETARY TRANSMISSION MECHANSIM:  
 




Over 50 years from 1959 to 2009, the market share of assets held by banks had 
significantly fallen from 55 to 27%, whereas the market share of assets held by nonbank 
financial institutions (hereafter, NBFIs) had dramatically increased from 45 to 73%.1, 2 
In spite of the increased important role of NBFIs, NBFIs have received little emphasis 
and are not treated at all in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. The main 
reason for such omission is that only banks, which are subject to reserve requirements 
and thus are under the direct control of monetary policy, have been in the center of 
debates about whether they are special types of intermediaries, as a theory of the bank 
lending channel would assert. According to the bank lending channel, banks are special 
because they are well-suited to deal with some classes of borrowers (especially small 
businesses) who pose severe asymmetric information problems in credit markets (see 
                                                          
 
1 The U.S. banking industry has declined and has lost its market share to NBFIs. See, for example, 
Edwards (1993), Edwards and Mishkin (1995), and Cole, Wolken, and Woodburn (1996). 
 
2 In this paper, a “bank” is defined as a depository institution such as a commercial bank, a credit 
union, or a saving institution. Also, a “nonbank financial institution” is defined as a nondepository 
institution such as an insurance company, a finance company, a mortgage company, a brokerage company, 
or a leasing company.   
11 
Bernanke & Blinder, 1988; Kashyap & Stein, 1994;  Kashyap, Stein, & Wilcox, 1993, 
for the bank lending channel). 
However, a number of researches suggest that, just like banks, NBFIs are also a 
special type of financial intermediaries. As financial intermediaries, they are also well-
suited to handle some types of borrowers who can pose severe asymmetric information 
problems.3 If different credit suppliers are specialized to different classes of borrowers 
in overcoming information problems, the natural reasoning is that financial 
intermediaries in general, not banks in particular, are special with respect to 
information. Like banks, for example, NBFIs overcome information problems by 
gathering private information about borrowers’ credit quality―through evaluating the 
riskiness of their proposed projects, screening of their projects, and monitoring their 
postloan behavior. Furthermore, not only banks but also NBFIs can produce their 
private information by making an ongoing customer relationship with borrowers. 
Through the information production, NBFIs may develop their own specialties and 
accumulate their own “information capital.” Because of their specialties in formation 
production, financial intermediaries as a whole are likely to have a comparative 
advantage over open-markets lenders who do not have such specialties.  
Numerous empirical studies support the reasoning suggested above. Carey, Post, 
and Sharpe (1998) find that finance companies are skilled at serving relatively riskier 
borrowers who have a high probability of default by originating asset-based 
                                                          
 
3 Just as banks, for example, are well-suited for making short-term business loans to information-
problematic borrowers (especially small firms), finance companies are well-positioned for making 
collateralized loans to information-problematic borrowers (especially riskier firms), and insurance 
companies are well trained for making long-term loans to information-problematic borrowers (especially 
midsize firms), and so on. 
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lending―which is tied to borrowers’ assets such as inventories, accounts receivable, 
and equipment. Carey, Prowse, Rea, and Udell (1993) and Prowse (1997) find that 
insurance companies are proficient at dealing with medium and large firms who pose 
somewhat “moderate” information problems by providing long-term bond-type 
loans―which are known as private placements.4, 5 Such long-term loans are made at 
fixed rates because insurance companies can easily match this debt with their long term, 
fixed rate liabilities. Preece and Mullineaux (1994) and Billett, Flannery, and Jon (1995) 
find that, just as capital markets react positively to the announcement of “bank-loan 
agreements,” the markets also respond positively to the announcement of “NBFI-loan 
agreements”―in particular, the announcement with debt-financing agreements with 
nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies or with nonbanking financial firms, 
such as finance companies and insurance companies. Similarly, employing a sample of 
293 private placements of public utility debt, Szewczyk and Varma (1991) find that 
larger sales of public utilities’ private placements have more favorable effects on their 
stock prices than smaller sales. 
We have seen that different financial intermediaries may specialize in supplying 
loans to different classes of borrowers. The next question is how monetary policy 
influences the loan supply of all financial intermediaries, banks and NBFIs. There is no 
                                                          
 
4 The private placement is a security issued by a firm. The private placement must be sold to a 
limited number of institutional investors such as insurance companies and finance companies. It is 
exempted from registration with the SEC, and its initial offering and secondary transaction is not allowed 
in the markets. 
 
5 According to Prowse (1997), “the private placement market is an information-intensive market that 
shares much with the more familiar bank loan market: borrowers and lenders typically negotiate lending 
terms, lenders evaluate and monitor borrowers’ credit risk, covenants are used to control risk and 
borrowers generally lack access to public debt market because they are too information-problematic for 
public market investors to evaluate” (p.12). 
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reason why monetary policy should selectively affect the loan supply of just banks. If 
instead monetary policy affected the loan supply of both banks and NBFIs in some 
general ways, then the loan status of all intermediaries may have influence on 
investment spending through intermediary-dependent borrowers. The linkage between 
monetary policy and the loan supply of banks and NBFIs can be justified by the 
following two procedures. First, according to the bank capital channel thesis (Van den 
Heuvel, 2002, 2007), monetary policy can influence the balance sheets, especially net 
worth, of these two kinds of lending institutions by way of a maturity mismatch of 
intermediaries’ assets and liabilities. For example, as interest rates sharply rise after 
tightening monetary policy, most intermediaries whose assets have a longer maturity 
than their liabilities will suffer a decrease in their profits. This is because intermediaries 
must pay higher interest rates to renew their short-term borrowings before they have an 
opportunity to supplant the fixed-interest income from their long-term assets. The 
discrepancy between their interest expense and income squeezes intermediaries’ profits, 
thus reducing their equity capital or net worth.  
Second, subsequent to monetary policy impact on intermediaries’ net worth, the 
ability of banks and NBFIs to raise uninsured external funds will be constrained 
because adverse selection becomes an issue in using uninsured sources of finance (Stein, 
1998). For example, after the reduction of intermediaries’ net worth, intermediaries 
must constantly make use of uninsured external funds to continue lending. In this 
situation, the lenders of uninsured funds would charge a higher lemon premium because 
an adverse selection problem would arise as a result of intermediaries’ shrunken net 
worth. The line of reasoning I have suggested so far is as follows. Tight monetary 
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policy deteriorates the financial conditions of all financial intermediaries by decreasing 
their net worth. Because the fall of intermediaries’ net worth makes their borrowing 
become less available and more expensive at the wholesale market, intermediaries may 
be forced to reduce the supply of loans to their own borrowers. If this reasoning is 
accurate, a fundamental tenet of the bank lending channel―which implies that banks 
play a unique role in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy―can and should 
be expanded to all private suppliers of credit. 
This research paper attempts to examine the role of NBFIs in the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, both theoretically and empirically. First, drawing from 
Bernanke’s (2007) general idea, I theoretically explain how contractionary monetary 
policy affects the quantity of loans of banks and NBFIs through changes in their balance 
sheet conditions, particularly net worth. If this theoretical explanation is correct, we 
should expect the net worth and the intermediated loans of both kinds of lending 
institutions to fall in response to a contractionary monetary policy shock. Second, 
therefore, I empirically test whether the net worth and the intermediated loans of banks 
and NBFIs decrease following tight monetary policy. 
Employing the traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) methodology and the 
Vector Autoregression (VAR) methodology, I find that NBFIs respond by shrinking 
their net worth, and then they presumably reduce the loans they extend to their clients in 
the same ways banks do. The reduction in the net worth of both banks and NBFIs is 
statistically significant in the traditional OLS model; nonetheless, the loan reduction 
made by NBFIs is not statistically significant, even though the signs of coefficients are 
in the expected negative directions. This evidence suggests that monetary policy, as the 
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theoretical explanation suggests, is likely to affect the loan supply of both bank and 
NBFIs through changes in their net worth; that is, NBFIs might be also influenced by 
monetary policy in the same manner as banks. More specifically, I then examine the 
behavior of aggregate loans and the behavior of components of loans―i.e., commercial 
and industrial (C&I) loans, mortgages, and consumer loans―following monetary 
tightening. I find that mortgages and consumer loans sharply decrease in response to a 
monetary policy shock, while C&I loans increase, which is consistent with the previous 
findings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 presents an 
overview of NBFIs in the United Sates; Section 3 describes two theoretical explanation 
which posit that monetary policy actions can affect both banks and NBFIs; Section 4 
describes the data and methodology employed in the study; Section 5 reports the 
empirical results of the study; and Section 6 summarizes and concludes the work.  
 
2.2 An Overview of Nonbank Financial Institutions 
Banks were the dominant financial institutions in the U.S. financial system. The 
majority of household savings were channeled into the traditional banks in the form of 
deposits. Yet, competition from NBFIs increased through financial innovation in the 
1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s. As a result of competition, banks lost advantages of their 
traditional lines of businesses―i.e., making longer-term loans and funding them by 
issuing short-term deposits. As the profitability of such line of businesses was 
considerably diminished, banks were compelled to seek the new lines of business that 
produce a higher rate of return. On the other hand, as NBFIs fitted themselves rapidly 
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into the new environments by creating new financial instruments, they gradually 
increased their market shares.  
 
2.2.1 Changes in the Structure of the U.S. Financial System 
Prior to the Great Depression, many financial service operations―such as 
commercial banking operation, investment banking operation, insurance services 
operation, and so on―were generally performed within one organization, particularly 
commercial banks. During the Great Depression years 1930−1933, however, the United 
States experienced an unprecedented number of bank failures (in all 9,000 failures), 
which caused serious problems in the stability of the economy (Mishkin & Eakins, 
2006).    
The occurrence of the Great Depression provided a compelling reason for reform of 
the banking and financial system. Policymakers divided organizations performing 
several financial service operations into numerous organizations. In an attempt to 
prevent the reoccurrence of the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the operations of various 
financial services were legally broken up after the Great Depression. This is because 
policymakers considered an “inappropriate” activity of commercial banks―specifically, 
the participation of commercial banks in the stock market―as a main cause of financial 
crises. As an important first step, the Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act) 
separated a commercial bank activity and an investment bank activity.6 Later on, the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 prohibited bank holding companies from 
                                                          
 
6 The Banking Act of 1933 prohibited banks from being involved in investment bank activities such 
as underwriting of new corporate stock and bond issues and limited banks from obtaining risky securities; 
likewise, it prohibited investment banks from engaging in bank activities such as accepting deposits or 
making loans (Mishkin, 2012). See also Mishkin (2012) for the major financial legislations in the United 
States. 
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participating in most nonbanking activities and separated further commercial bank 
activity and insurance activity. The bank regulations, in this manner, built up many 
barriers in the financial system and created many NBFIs that perform a narrow range of 
functions in the segmented market. The financial system of the early 1950s, therefore, 
was highly specialized. Commercial banks focused on the short-term business lending; 
thrift institutions such as savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, and 
credit unions specialized in long-term, fixed rate home mortgages; life insurance 
companies channeled most of their funds into the long-term corporate bonds; and 
investment banks handled the underwriting of new corporate stock and bond issues and 
the distribution of these securities to households (Sellon, 1992). 
Not only were commercial banks restricted to the scope of their activities, but they 
were also restricted to competition among banks to protect their profitability―either by 
establishing entry barriers or by restraining price competition (Edwards 1993). 
Specifically, the McFadden Act of 1927 prohibited banks from branching across state 
lines, only permitting national banks to branch within the state of their location. Such 
branching restrictions shielded banks to operate in competitively-insulated markets. In 
addition, the Banking Act of 1933 and 1935 (Regulation Q) forbade the payment of 
interest on demand deposits and authorized the Federal Reserve to set interest rate 
ceilings on time and savings deposits. By Regulation Q, banks were protected against 
losing their competitiveness because they were able to tap into a cheap source of funds 
from households. Up until the low inflation periods of the mid-1960s, such restrictions 
functioned smoothly for the benefit of banks.           
 Yet, those benefits did not last. As an economic condition changed to the high 
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inflation periods of the late 1970s, bank regulations, which were designed to keep the 
banking system safe by limiting their competition, became more burdensome to banks. 
During these periods, unregulated NBFIs identified a great chance to serve a group of 
savers and borrowers. Ironically, such a new environment opened up an opportunity for 
NBFIs to invent new means of attracting household savings and thus accelerated the 
progress of financial innovations.  
More specifically, in early 1978, the economic environment changed rapidly as 
inflation rose and market interest rates started to soar over 10%. At this time, the 
maximum interest rates payable on savings account and time deposits under Regulation 
Q were 5.5% (Mishkin, 2012). When the market interest rates, therefore, rose above the 
interest rate ceiling, households were strongly incentivized to withdraw their savings 
from banks and put these funds into higher-yielding securities through NBFIs. In 
particular, such transfer of household savings was feasible by the invention of money 
market mutual funds (MMMF) in 1971. This particular type of financial innovation 
allowed depositors, whose bank deposits were paying below-market interest rates due to 
Regulation Q, to enjoy higher market rates. 
In company with the rapid expansion of money market mutual funds, pension funds 
also grew explosively after World War II. At the end of World War II, there were a 
small number of pension plans. During the 1950s and the1960s, the majority of increase 
in pension fund assets was caused by the creation of new pension plans, as retirement 
benefits became an essential part of collective bargaining and other wage negotiations.  
Starting in 1970, the expansion of new pension plans began to slow down. During the 
1980s, the growth in pension assets was caused by an increased value of contributions, 
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or savings, rather than by growth of new plans (Sellon, 1992).  Favorable tax treatment 
was also a main factor behind the rapid growth of pension funds. By Federal tax law, 
employers were able to receive the tax deduction from their pension contributions. 
Employees were currently exempted either from the taxes on their contributions or from 
interest on pension assets, and taxes were deterred until employees’ retirement. 
Employers, thus, were significantly incentivized to pay benefits in the forms of pension 
contributions, and individuals were also encouraged to save through pension plans 
rather than through a taxable form of other savings (Sellon, 1992).  
Over the postwar period, as household savings shifted from traditional depository 
institutions (banks, thrifts, and credit unions) and direct holding of securities (stocks and 
bonds) to NBFIs―especially mutual and pension funds―these institutions became an 
important part of U.S. financial system.7 Such a shift of household savings led to the 
rapid growth of NBFIs. The significant expansion of NBFIs had profound effects on the 
U.S. financial system. Such expansion has essentially changed the intermediation 
process in the direction of the market-based intermediation8 and thus changed the role 
of the traditional banking industry. 
NBFIs have influenced the intermediation process toward the market-based 
intermediation by supporting the expansion of the “financial market.” For example, 
since the 1970s, money market mutual funds played a key role in boosting the growth of 
                                                          
 
7 According to Sellon (1992), “[i]n 1952, households held only 6 percent of their financial assets in 
pension funds and less than 1 percent in mutual funds. By 1991, however, households placed 27 percent 
of their financial assets in pension funds and nearly 10 percent in mutual funds.…Thus, direct holdings of 
stock fell from 32 percent of household financial assets in 1952 to 18.5 percent in 1991” (p.56).  
Households also reduced direct holdings of bonds by somewhat smaller amounts. 
 
8 Market-based intermediation is defined here as the intermediation associated with the financial 
market and with the securitization process, rather than the intermediation associated with the traditional 
banking industry. 
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the commercial paper (CP) market―by purchasing CP issued by finance companies. 
Prior to the 1970s, finance companies used bank loans more than CP as a source of their 
lending. However, since the 1970s, they have increasingly used CP much more, mainly 
due to the emergence of money market mutual funds as a main credit supplier of the CP 
market.9  
The change in finance companies’ main source from bank to CP market was 
associated with the large shift of household savings that resulted in the rapid growth of 
money market mutual funds. “Since the late 1970s and early 1980s, much of large 
inflow of household savings into money market funds has been channeled into the 
purchase of commercial paper” (Sellon, 1992, p. 65). In addition to purchasing CP, 
NBFIs have increasingly bought a large amount of stocks and bonds in the financial 
market. During the last several decades, while direct holdings of stocks and bonds by 
households have sharply diminished, indirect holdings of these securities by mutual and 
pension funds have significantly increased (see Sellon, 1992; Edward 1993).10  
NBFIs have also influenced the intermediation process toward the market-based 
intermediation by supporting the expansion of the “securitized loan market.” Similar to 
what happened to the CP market, since the 1970s, most of household savings that had 
been put into mutual and pension funds have been channeled into the purchases of the 
mortgage-backed securities. With the innovation of securitization, previously illiquid 
                                                          
 
9 In particular, the CP market actually exploded, growing from $121.6 billion in 1980 to $528 billion 
in 1991 (Post, Schoenbeck, & Payne, 1992). Edwards (1993) also notes that during this period, “finance 
companies alone accounted for almost two-thirds (or $322.8 billion) of the newly issued commercial 
paper in 1991” (p.26). 
 
10 “Households have been net sellers of stock in every year but one since 1958. In 1952 households 
held 91 percent of all corporate stock outstanding; in 1991 they held only 53 percent. During this period 
the share of total outstanding stock held by pension and mutual funds rose from 3 percent to 34 percent” 
(Edwards, 1993, p. 49). 
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mortgages loans held by banks can be transformed into marketable securities. These 
securities, in turn, can be freely sold to investors―without transfer of title of individual 
mortgages that was required previously (Allen & Santomero, 1997).11 In particular, 
institutional investors such as mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies 
purchased these mortgage-backed securities, meeting vigorously growing demand for 
such securities. The success of the mortgage-backed securities resulted in other types of 
securitization such as consumer loans, bank loans, automobile loans and credit card 
receivables during the 1980s. By purchasing a large amount of mortgage-backed 
securities and asset-back securities, mutual and pension funds have encouraged market-
based intermediation as well. 
While supporting the growth of the market-based intermediation, mutual and 
pension funds also changed the role of the traditional banking industry in the U.S. 
financial system. They undermined the profitability of banks’ traditional lines of 
business―i.e., making loans and funding them by issuing deposits. As noted earlier, the 
profitability of banks has been squeezed by direct competition with money market 
mutual funds, mainly due to the increase in banks’ cost of funding. In addition, mutual 
and pension funds supported the growth of the financial markets such as CP and bond 
markets, eroding the market share of the traditional bank lending business. For example, 
as the CP market grew rapidly due to the participation of money market mutual funds in 
the CP market, large firms were able to obtain short-term funds in the CP market more 
frequently instead of running to banks. Small firms also can borrow from finance 
                                                          
 
11  Specifically, the introduction of “pass-through” securities by Government National Mortgage 
Association (Ginnie Mae) played a key role in popularizing the securitization of mortgages in terms of 
the volume of transactions in 1970.  
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companies, which obtain much of their short-term finance in the CP market, as an 
alternative to bank lending. 
Banks’ lower profitability and loss of market share have been recuperated in the 
following two procedures. First, bank regulations have been gradually reduced since 
1980.12 Banks, thus, were able to compete more efficiently with NBFIs. To compete 
with money market mutual funds, banks were legitimately allowed to provide new 
financial instruments such as negotiable order of withdrawal (NOW) accounts and 
money market deposit accounts (MMDAs).13 Second, banks were forced to search for 
nontraditional financial activities―e.g., off-balance sheet activities―as a way of 
maintaining their profits. In particular, such activities were the expanding role of banks 
as dealers in derivatives products and as originators of securitization and thus were 
risker than traditional banking activities. Although banks were able to create more 
income with these nontraditional activities, they were exposed to substantial risk by 
carrying out these activities. In any case, these two procedures described above 





                                                          
 
12 Interest rate ceilings under Regulation Q were phased out and eventually eliminated for all deposits 
except demand deposits in March 1986. The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency 
Act of 1994 repealed the McFadden Act and permitted banks to establish branches nationwide by 
eliminating barriers to interstate banking at the state level. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
repealed the Glass-Steagall Act and allowed commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance 
companies to offer each other’s products for the first time since the Great Depression (Mishkin, 2012). 
 
13 NOW accounts are deposit accounts that pay interest; MMDAs are savings accounts that pay 
interest based on the current interest rates, similarly to money market mutual funds.   
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2.2.2 The Growth of NBFIs 
As NBFIs increased their profits in competition with banks, they also have 
substantially increased the market share of their businesses in the U.S. financial system 
since 1980. Table 2.1 shows this situation from 1959 to 2009. Over 50 years from 1959 
to 2009, the assets of banks had significantly dropped from 55.1 to 26.9% of financial 
sector assets. In contrast, during this period, the assets of institutional investors ―i.e., 
the sum of assets between mutual funds and pension funds―had considerably increased 
from 14.9  to 32.8% of financial sector assets; the assets of government sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs) and Federally Related Mortgage Pools had grown explosively from 
1.8 to 13.8% of financial sector assets. These figures clearly indicate that the assets of 
the traditional banking industry had sharply shrunk, whereas the assets of NBFIs had 
substantially grown.  
As noted in the previous subsection, this remarkable growth of NBFIs was 
associated with household savings that shifted away from the traditional banking 
industry to NBFIs, such as mutual and pension funds and other institutional investment 
pools. In competition with banks for attraction of household savings, mutual and 
pension funds became the biggest winners. Different factors contributed to each 
institution’s growth. The rapid growth of pension funds resulted mainly from changes in 
tax laws for pension funds, which provide some tax advantages for both employers and 
employees to their contributions or savings. On the other hand, the remarkable growth 
of mutual funds resulted from the new economic environment such as high inflation and 
bank regulations in the United Sates. To survive in such new economic environment, 





Table 2.1 Outstanding Assets Held by Financial Sectors  
(billions of dollars and percent) 
 
A. Amount Outstanding ( billions of dollar, at year end)    
 
1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2009 
Banks1 327.3 721.5 2150.6 4946.6 7563.2 16299.4 
Insurance Companies 2 135.1 237.5 581 1748.5 3937.8 6208.9 
Pension Funds 3 67.3 192.3 649.1 2634.1 7693.6 9481.2 
Mutual Funds 4 21.3 56.2 104.9 1066.8 6270.2 10454.1 
GSE& Federally Related Mortgage 
Pools 5 10.6 39.5 260.4 1323.7 4016.7 8390.2 
Issuers of Asset-backed Securities 0 0 0 209.8 1320.5 3376.1 
Finance companies 25.6 67.1 200.5 568.6 1016.7 1662.5 
Security Brokers and Dealers 6.2 15.4 32.7 236.6 1001 2084.2 
Others 6 0.2 3.6 6.3 249.3 1134.8 2695.5 
B. Percentage of Total Financial Sector Assets  
 Banks 55.1 54.1 54 38.1 22.3 26.9 
Insurance Companies 22.8 17.8 14.6 13.5 11.6 10.2 
Pension Funds 11.3 14.4 16.3 20.3 22.7 15.6 
Mutual Funds 3.6 4.2 2.6 8.2 18.5 17.2 
GSE& Federally Related Mortgage 
Pools 1.8 3 6.5 10.2 11.8 13.8 
Issuers of Asset-backed Securities 0 0 0 1.6 3.9 5.6 
Finance companies 4.3 5 5 4.4 3 2.7 
Security Brokers and Dealers 0 0.3 0.2 1.9 3.3 4.4 
Others 0 0.3 0.2 1.9 3.3 4.4 
Source: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States.  
1. Includes commercial banks, saving institutions, and credit unions. 
2. Includes life insurance companies, and property-casualty insurance companies. 
3. Includes private pension funds, state and local government employee retirement funds, and  
     federal government retirement funds. 
4. Includes money market mutual funds, mutual funds, and close-end and exchange-traded funds. 
5. GSE stands for government sponsored enterprises. 
6. Includes real estate investment trusts, and funding corporations.    
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household savings. 
The expansion of NBFIs is even more pronounced when viewed in term of 
holdingsof outstanding corporate equity. Table 2.2 shows the outstanding corporate 
equity owned by households, NBFIs, and others from 1959 to 2009.  Over 50 years 
from 1959 to 2009, while households had substantially decreased the direct holdings of 
corporate equity from 86.3 to 36.2% of financial sector assets, NBFIs had dramatically 
increased the holding of corporate equity from 11 to 50.1% of financial sector assets. In 
particular, during the same period, the assets of two major institutional investors, 
 
Table 2.2 Holdings of Corporate Equity 
(in billions of dollars and percent; amounts outstanding at the end of each year) 
 
    1959 1969 1979 1989 1999 2009 
 
A. Households 
     Amounts  $357,289  $667,356  $768,059  $2,147,477  $9,769,854  $7,247,382  
     Percent 86.4 79.4 66.9 56.3 50.4 36.2 
 
B. NBFIs* 
     Amounts  $45,604  $143,920  $319,101  $1,370,815  $8,063,790  $10,020,423  
     Percent 11 17.1 27.8 40 41.6 50.1 
                   Pension Funds & Mutual Funds 
      Amounts  $33,273  $115,593  $252,843  $1,180,978  $6,848,853  $7,750,265  
      Percent 8 13.8 22 31 35.3 38.8 
 
C. Others 
     Amounts  $566  $1,870  $2,566  $14,078  $66,885  $124,151  
     Percent 2.6 3.5 5.2 7.7 8.1 13.7 
       
* Note: NBFIs include pension funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, closed-end funds, 
exchange-traded funds, and brokers and dealers. Others include state and local governments, 
federal government, rest of the world, commercial banking, and savings institutions.  
Source: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States 
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mutual funds and pension funds, have exponentially grown from 8 to 38.8% of financial 
sector assets. 
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented here indicates that, as households shift 
their savings away from traditional banking industry to two major institutional investors 
(Table 2.1), households have sharply increased indirect holdings of stocks through these 
institutional investors, while they have sharply decreased direct holdings of stocks 
(Table 2.2). Consequently, we can see that the role of NBFIs in the financial 
intermediation significantly increased over the 50-year period. 
 
2.2.3 Market Share of Credit 
Employing the flow of funds data, I examine the market share between banks and 
NBFIs in the U.S. credit market.14 Before we examine the market share between these 
two kinds of institutions, Figure 2.1 exhibits the distribution of total credit (i.e., all 
financial institutions’ credit) by four different credit types from 1959 to 2009―bank 
loans, mortgages, consumer loans, and other loans and advances.15  
Of different types of credit, mortgages are the largest part of total credit provided to 
households and businesses, accounting for about 50 to 70% of total credit. The market 
share of mortgages continued to increase over 50 years at the loss of market share of 
bank loans and consumer loans. In 1959, for example, mortgages’ market share was 
52%, but it had substantially increased to 72% by 2009. Bank loans were the second  
                                                          
 
14 Credit here is defined as loans supplied to households and businesses excluding trade credit. 
 
15 “Other loans and advances" are loans of various types that do not fit into the categories of bank 
loans mortgages and consumer credit. They, for example, include credit supplied by financial institutions 
such as customers’ liability on acceptance outstanding, bank holding company loans, policy loans, 
government sponsored- enterprise loans, securitized loans issued by ABS issuers, finance company loans 




largest part of total credit supplied to businesses in 1959, accounting for 24% of total 
credit. By 2009, however, the market share of bank loans had significantly dropped to 
9%, which is a smaller than the market share of consumer loans. The market share of 
consumer loans had declined from 19% in 1959 to 12% in 2009, but the decline of 
consumer loans’ share is somewhat slower than that of bank loans. Other loans and 
advances, which are the smallest chunk of total credit, had slightly increased from 5% 
in 1959 to 6% in 2009. Overall, mortgages have become a larger share of total credit, 
while bank loans and consumer loans have become a smaller share of total credit 
between 1959 and 2009. 
Figures 2.2 to 2.5 exhibit the market shares between banks and NBFIs in total credit 
and components of loans. As shown in Figure 2.2, NBFIs had substantially increased 
the market share of total credit over 30 years. In the 1950s, they played a small role in 
the credit market. In 1959, for example, NBFIs provided only 17% of total credit with 










1959Q4 1969Q4 1979Q4 1989Q4 1999Q4 2009Q4
Figure 2.1 Distribution of Total Credit by Credit Type 
Consumer Loans Mortgages Other Loans and Advances Bank Loans
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Figure 2.2 Total Credit 















































































































Figure 2.3   Commercial and Industrial Loans 















































































































Figure 2.4 Mortgages 
Banks Nonbank Financial Institutions
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In particular, notice that the market share of NBFIs overturned that of banks in 1998. 
Figure 2.3 shows the market share between these two kinds of institutions in 
commercial and industrial loans (C&I loans). C&I loans are calculated as the sum of 
“bank loans” and “other loans and advances” at nonfarm nonfinancial corporations and 
nonfarm noncorporate businesses, as defined by the Federal Reserve Board’s flow of 
funds accounts.16 NBFIs had gradually increased the market share of C&I loans over 50 
years, eroding the corresponding market share of banks. In 1959, NBFIs accounted for 
16% of C&I loans; by 2009, they increased their share by 37%. As shown in Figure 2.4, 
the change of mortgage market is much more dramatic than that of the C&I loan market. 
During the same period, NBFIs have considerably increased the market share of 
mortgages. In 1959, NBFIs accounted for only 11% of mortgages. By 2009, however, 
they sharply increased to 65%. As shown in Figure 2.5, NBFIs lost market share of 
                                                          
 
16 For commercial banks, the data of C&I loans are collected in the form of “bank loans” in balance 
sheets of commercial banks. Yet, for NBFIs, the same data are gathered in the form of “other loans and 
advances” in the balance sheets of nonbanks financial institutions. This is because nonbanks’ business 
loans are classified in “other loans and advances.” Also, savings institutions and credit unions, which are 
















































































































Figure 2.5 Consumer Loans 
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consumer loans to banks by the mid-1970s, indicating from 34% in 1959 to 20% in 
1977. Then, they continued to increase to about 52% until the early 2000s.  
 
2.3 A Theoretical Explanation 
2.3.1 The External Finance Premium of Financial Intermediaries 
This section presents a justification of how monetary policy influences the financial 
condition of banks and NBFIs, which in turn reduces the loan supply to intermediary-
dependent borrowers. One explanation is the external finance premium of financial 
intermediaries suggested by Bernanke (2007). To describe the main theme of the 
external finance premium, consider this situation: All intermediaries, which retain a 
deficient internal source of funds (funds controlled by insiders), must turn to external 
sources of finance (funds from outsiders) to maintain their lending businesses. Under 
this situation, if a monetary tightening substantially reduces the intermediaries’ net 
worth, such a reduction makes them less creditworthy in the lenders’ eyes. As the 
lenders of external sources of finance see the intermediaries’ credit risk increase, the 
lenders’ concerns about intermediaries’ credit quality create an external finance 
premium or a lemon premium, which will be explained shortly. This premium makes 
external sources of funds more expensive and less available in the wholesale market. 
Therefore, all intermediaries that are constrained to raise funds must curtail their supply 
of loans to businesses, which can be thought of as intermediary-dependent borrowers. 
Essentially, the explanation presented above is based on a theory of the bank 
lending channel, which holds that the monetary policy influences, in part, the 
willingness of banks to lend. The bank lending channel is extended to nonbank lenders, 
who similarly provide credit to businesses, by introducing a concept of the external 
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financial premium. According to Bernanke (2007), “the idea underlying the bank-
lending channel might reasonably extend to all private providers of credit [lenders of 
NBFIs]” (Bernanke, 2007, n.p.). 
 
2.3.1.1 The Impact of Monetary Policy on All Financial Intermediaries 
If the idea of the bank-lending channel can be broadened to all suppliers of credit, as 
suggested by Bernanke (2007), questions naturally arise: How does monetary policy 
influence NBFIs compared to banks? What is a rationale behind his argument? 
According to Bernanke’s argument, monetary policy may be able to influence both 
banks and NBFIs when we pay attention to the financial condition of intermediary 
borrowers17 and its relationship with the cost of funds in the wholesale market. Such a 
main argument can be understood more clearly in the two sequential procedures: (1) 
Monetary policy actions must be able to shift the financial conditions of both banks and 
NBFIs; subsequently, (2) such a change in intermediaries’ financial condition should 
influence the cost of funds available to intermediary borrowers in the wholesale market. 
In the first procedure, monetary policy actions must be able to shift not only the 
financial condition of banks but also that of NBFIs. We may think that this procedure is 
initially problematic. The reason is that monetary policy, according to the conventional 
bank lending channel, affects the supply of loans from only depository institutions 
through changes in bank reserves. Hence, NBFIs that are not subject to reserve 
requirements cannot be influenced by monetary policy. To address this issue, we can 
introduce the idea of the bank capital channel (Van den Heuvel, 2002, 2007), which 
                                                          
 
17 The financial condition of borrowers can be “measured in term of factors such as [borrowers’] net 
worth, liquidity, leverage, and current and future expected cash flows” (Bernanke 2007, n.p.). 
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maintains that monetary policy affects the supply of bank loans, in part, through direct 
changes in bank’s equity capital (also called net worth). Since NBFIs must retain equity 
capital on their balance sheet, the bank capital channel thesis can be reasonably applied 
to NBFIs. Monetary policy, then, can influence all intermediaries’ balance sheet 
through its direct impact on their equity capital.18 
Van den Heuvel (2002, 2007) asserts that monetary policy can have a direct impact 
on intermediaries’ equity capital through changes in their profits. In banking theory, an 
important function of banks is maturity transformation, which can be described as “the 
transformation of securities with short maturities, offered to depositors, into securities 
with long maturities that borrowers desire” (Freixas & Rochet, 2008, p. 4). The same 
maturity transformation function is performed by NBFIs, such as financial companies, 
funding companies, and issuers of asset-backed securities (ABS). Although these 
institutions lack access to insured deposits, they can raise funds by issuing short-term 
debt in money market and make loans with longer maturities. So, we can reasonably say 
that financial intermediaries in general perform a maturity transformation function―i.e., 
borrowing short and lending long.              
 As a result of the maturity transformation, intermediaries are exposed to interest rate 
                                                          
  
18 The level of equity capital can be directly influenced by monetary policy in two ways: (1) through 
changes in intermediaries’ profits and (2) through changes in their stock prices. Although Van den 
Heuvvel (2002, 2007), as will be described shortly in this section, argues that monetary policy has an 
impact on intermediaries’ equity capital through changes in profits, I also suggest that monetary policy 
may be able to directly influence their equity capital through changes in their stock prices. A sharply 
rising interest rate (induced by tight monetary policy) is directly able to reduce the stock prices of 
intermediaries, according to the following two explanations: the severely discounted value of future 
stocks’ dividends and the increased expected returns on other financial assets (Bernanke, 2003). A larger 
number of  scholars empirically find that unexpected tighter or easier monetary policy is associated with 
an increase or decrease, respectively, in the overall U.S. stock prices (Bernanke, 2003; Bernanke & 
Kuttner, 2005; Rigobon & Sack, 2004; Thorbecke, 1997) In particular, English, Van den Heuvel, and 
Zakrajsek (2012) find that unanticipated changes in interest rate induced by FOMC announcement have 
large negative effects on bank stock prices. 
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risk.19 Changes in market interest rates induced by monetary policy actions can cause 
intermediary profits to fluctuate.  For example, as market interest rates sharply rise after 
tightening monetary policy, the “interest expense” from short-term debts grows more 
rapidly than the “interest income” from long-term assets. The discrepancy between the 
interest income and expense squeezes intermediaries’ profits, therefore reducing their 
equity capital. Such a reduction of net worth is more serious for financial intermediaries 
because they are highly leveraged institutions compared to nonfinancial firms. A small 
change in their profits may lead to a large fluctuation in their net worth.  
In particular, the thesis of the bank capital channel is empirically supported by the 
findings of Adrian, Estrella, and Shin (2010). According to the reasoning of Adrian et al. 
(2010), monetary policy affects the intermediaries’ equity capital through changes in the 
term spread and net interest margin (NIM). The term spread is the difference between 
the yields long-term and short-term Treasury securities. Under an assumption that the 
short-term interest rates accumulated and expected determines the term spread, Adrian 
et al. find that there is a negative relationship between changes in the Fed Funds target 
and changes in the term spread. Furthermore, they examine net interest margin, which is 
the difference between the interest income generated by intermediaries and the interest 
expense paid out to their lenders. 20  Exploring a hypothesis that the term spread 
influences the intermediaries’ net interest margin, Adrian et al. also find that a decrease 
in the term spread reduces net interest margin of large commercial banks from their Y-
                                                          
 
19 Interest rate risk is “the risk that the value of financial assets and liabilities will fluctuate in 
response to changes in market interest rates” (Hubbard, 2005, p. glossary A-7). 
 
20 The term spread exhibits the profitability of marginal loans that is increased to intermediaries’ 
balance sheets, whereas net interest margin (NIM) is a concept of averages about total assets and total 
liabilities. In other words, NIM is associated with the interest earned on loans and other assets on the 
asset side and the interest paid on borrowed funds on the liability side in a time period.  
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9C filings. Therefore, the evidence suggests that an increase in the short-term interest 
rate (caused by a monetary tightening) reduces the term spread of intermediaries, which 
in turn decreases their net interest margin, thereby squeezing the intermediaries’ equity 
capital.  
In the second procedure, subsequent to monetary policy impact on intermediaries’ 
financial condition, a change in intermediaries’ financial health should influence the 
cost of funds available to borrowers in the wholesale market.21 Why is the cost of funds 
closely associated with the financial health of borrowers? To shed light on this 
relationship, presenting a concept of an “external finance premium” is helpful. The 
external finance premium is defined as the difference between the cost of external funds 
(funds raised from outsiders) and opportunity cost of internal funds (the firm’s cash 
flows or funds controlled by insiders) (see Bernanke, 1993). In fact, external funds are 
always more expensive to the firm than internal funds because outside lenders cannot 
perfectly observe and control the risk associated with their lending to firms due to 
asymmetric information problems and thus must bear the cost of evaluating firms’ 
prospects and monitoring firms’ actions. 
Although such a concept is defined in terms of firms and is used in the firms’ 
balance sheet channel literature, the same concept can be applied to financial 
intermediaries as well. Just like nonfinancial firms, the information about intermediaries’ 
activities may be difficult for outside lenders to observe, which, in turn, can create for 
                                                          
 
21 Of course, for the second procedure to operate, both banks and NBFIs must resort to nondeposit 
sources of funding in the wholesale market. In particular, NBFIs that lack access to insured deposits must 
depend on nondeposit funds as a main source for their lending. Banks also have increasingly used the 
same nondeposit funds to supplement a traditional source of deposits (Feldman & Schmidt, 2001)―as a 
consequence of high competition for household savings from institutional investors. Thus, these two 
lending institutions have become increasingly dependent on nondeposit funds. 
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asymmetric information problems for intermediaries themselves when they must raise 
external funds. The idea of the balance sheet channel for intermediaries, which is that 
intermediaries may be subject to financial frictions in a similar way to nonfinancial 
firms, was suggested by many researchers such as Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Stein 
(1998).22 
In particular, of those researchers, Stein’s (1998) adverse selection model gives us 
some insight into how banks and NBFIs can be subject to the same financial frictions 
when using uninsured external funds. According to Stein’s model, if banks that mainly 
use insured deposits in their lending businesses are someway forced to tap into 
uninsured external funds, then their ability to raise these funds will be constrained. This 
is because the banks’ private information about the value of their loans creates an 
adverse selection problem, which makes the employment of uninsured external funds 
costly. On the other hand, insured deposits are an exceptional source of finance for 
banks, allowing them to avoid such problems. In this respect, similar to what happens to 
nonfinancial firms, insured deposits can be thought of as a form of internal funds, like 
cash flows, because there is no adverse selection problem between banks and depositors 
in the presence of deposit insurance (Jayaratne & Morgan, 2000). Yet, uninsured 
nondeposit funds can be thought of as a form of external funds because there is an 
adverse selection problem between banks and lenders to uninsured nondeposit funds. 
Because of such a problem posed by banks in uninsured external funds, uninsured funds 
are intrinsically more costly to banks than insured deposits. Likewise, since NBFIs pose 
the same adverse selection problem when using uninsured external funds, these 
                                                          
 
22  See, for example, Kashyap and Stein (1995), Houston, James, and Marcus (1997), Stein (1998), 
and Jayaratne and Morgan (2000). 
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uninsured funds are more expensive to them than cash flows. Therefore, NBFIs as well 
as banks, which pose the information problems to lenders of uninsured external funds, 
can fall into the adverse selection model.  
Importantly, the cost of uninsured external funds depends on the financial health of 
intermediaries, the creditworthiness of intermediaries to lenders. In the market for 
uninsured nondeposit funds, adverse selection becomes an important issue because 
intermediaries have more information about their loan quality than the lenders of 
nondeposit funds. Thus, uneasiness of lenders of nondeposit funds about the 
intermediary loan qualities creates an external finance premium, or a lemon premium, 
for intermediaries. The external finance premium is created by intermediaries in the 
same way as it is created by nonfinancial firms in the balance sheet channel. Essentially, 
the theory predicts that the external finance premium a borrower must pay should rely 
on the strength of the borrowers’ financial condition―the larger the borrowers’ net 
worth is, the smaller the external finance premium should be.23 So, intermediaries’ net 
worth affects their external finance premium and thus their cost of uninsured external 
funds.  
For example, if contractionary monetary policy reduces intermediaries’ net worth  
 
substantially and if intermediaries must turn to nondeposit external finance to maintain  
 
lending, then, the cost of nondeposit funds will significantly increase. The external- 
 
financial premium paid by financial intermediaries, in turn, will be passed in the cost of  
 
funds to intermediary-dependent borrowers. That is, financial intermediaries, who must  
                                                          
 
23 “Intuitively, a stronger financial position (greater net worth) enable a borrower to reduce her 
potential conflict of interest with the lender, either by self-financing a greater share of her investment her 
project or purchase or by offering more collateral to guarantee the liability she does issue” (Bernanke, 
1995, p. 35). 
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pay the higher external-financial premium, will respond by reducing the loan supply  
 
directly or by increasing the loan rate they offer customers at the retail market. 
 
2.3.1.2 Specialness of Intermediated Loans in General  
The argument for “specialness of intermediated loans in general” is essentially 
based on a theory of the bank lending channel. According to the bank lending channel, 
the shift of monetary policy influences the loan supply from banks through changes in 
bank reserves, ultimately affecting investment opportunities available to bank-
dependent borrowers. More detailed description is as follows: An open market sale 
conducted by a central bank reduces bank reserves in the banking system. Then, banks, 
which undergo a resulting reduction in reserve-backed deposits, must raise substitutable 
nondeposit funds to make up for these reduced reserve-backed deposits. When banks 
tap into nondeposit sources of funding to continue lending, (because nondeposit funds 
are more expensive than deposits), banks are forced to reduce the loan supply to bank-
dependent borrowers.24 Subsequently, the contraction of loan supply from banks may 
have different effects on different-size firms. While large firms can obtain funds 
directly from the public markets without going through banks, small firms cannot obtain 
substitutable funds and thus must reduce their investments. In aggregation, after all, this 
process leads to the reduction of investment in the economy.       
 In this bank lending channel theme, banks are special because they are well-
positioned to deal with some classes of borrowers, who pose severe information 
problems in the credit market. There is “asymmetric information” between lenders and 
                                                          
 
24 There are two conditions for the bank-lending channel to exist: (1) monetary policy must be able to 
shift the supply of bank loans, and (2) there must “exist” bank-dependent borrowers, who may not be able 
to obtain credit elsewhere (see Bernanke & Blinder, 1988; Kashyap & Stein 1994 ). 
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borrowers to the extent that borrowers have more information about the credit quality 
than lenders. Such borrowers―particularly households, farmers, and small firms―may 
be unable to obtain credit elsewhere owing to the information problems to lenders. In 
this situation, banks play a unique role in overcoming the information problems in the 
credit markets. They specialize in gathering information about borrowers’ prospects and 
in monitoring their postlending performance. The banks’ in-depth knowledge about 
borrowers allows information-problematic borrowers to obtain credit. Therefore, in the 
bank lending channel, only banks are a special type of financial intermediary that 
provide loans to these information problematic borrowers. 
A large number of economists, however, suggest that NBFIs, just like banks, are 
unique in the credit markets because they are also well-adapted to handle different types 
of borrowers. In that regard, it appears that other financial intermediaries are also 
specialized to different types of borrowers. Carey et al. (1998) suggest that finance 
companies specialize in the asset-based loans―loans based on borrowers’ accounts 
receivable, inventories, and equipment―because they deal with very risky borrowers. 
Carey et al. (1993) and Prowse (1997) suggest that insurance companies specialize in 
the long-term loans to the “medium to large borrowers,” who pose somewhat moderate 
information problems to lenders. Thrift institutions and mortgage companies may 
specialize in home mortgage lending to households. In contrast to credit supplying 
intermediaries, some financial intermediaries do not provide credit directly to 
businesses and households, but they may indirectly influence the credit supplied in the 
economy. For example, the fund managers of pension or mutual funds, who may have 
superior knowledge of future prospects for firms, may be good at picking up more 
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profitable securities such as stocks and bonds. So, they may indirectly influence the 
credit supply through changes in the prices of securities.25 Investment banks also play a 
somewhat different role in the intermediation process. Rather than attracting household 
savings and investing in different sectors of the economy, investment banks deal with 
the underwriting of new firm stock and bond issues as well as the distribution of such 
securities to individuals. 
Accordingly, our reasonable thought is that financial intermediaries in general 
specialize in overcoming information problems of different types of borrowers. By 
developing expertise in gathering material information, as well as by maintaining 
continuous relationships with customers, each financial intermediary may accumulate 
their own “informational capital.” This information capital allows intermediaries to 
address information problems about some classes of borrowers more easily than the 
financers of public debt market. For this reason, all financial intermediaries have a 
comparative advantage over the financers of public debt markets.26 In support of this 
view, a large number of researchers find that intermediated loans in general play a 
unique role in the credit markets, rather than that only bank loans do, as the theory of 
the bank lending channel would argue (see Szewczyk & Varma, 1991; Carey et al. 1993, 
1998; Preece & Mullineaux, 1994; Billett, Flannery & John, 1995). 
 
                                                          
 
25 For instance, if a firm’s profit is expected to increase in the future, fund managers will purchase 
the firm’s stocks or bonds and increase the price of these securities. Then, the higher prices in stocks or 
the lower interest rate in bonds makes the firm easier to finance, which in turn increases the credit 
supplied in the economy.  
 
26 Although financial intermediary loans in general are special to intermediary-dependent borrowers, 
bank loans, insurance company loans, and finance company loans are not likely to be identical. Each has 
its own specialty to different information-problematic borrowers.  
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2.3.1.3 Expansion of the Bank Lending Channel 
So far, the discussion about the NBFIs―the impact of monetary policy on all 
intermediaries and the specialties of intermediated loans in general―provides a 
reasonable explanation of how a monetary policy action can influence the loans 
supplied by intermediaries in general through changes in their net worth. To reiterate, 
tight monetary policy can deteriorate the financial condition of all intermediaries 
through the reduction of their net worth. (This mechanism operates through the bank 
capital channel.) Subsequently, when intermediaries must turn to uninsured nondeposit 
funds (in the wholesale market), the reduction of their net worth makes intermediaries 
less creditworthy. As the lenders of the uninsured nondeposit funds see the 
intermediaries’ credit risk increase, the lenders increase the external finance premium, 
or a lemon premium, to the borrowers. (This situation is justified by the adverse 
selection model). After all, intermediaries that are constrained to raise nondeposit funds 
should respond by reducing the loan supply to intermediary-dependent borrowers. 
Such an explanation can be thought of as a broad view of the bank lending channel 
because the bank capital channel―which is in the same line with the bank lending 
channel in that monetary policy can influence the willingness of the loan supply through 
changes in the quality of banks’ balance sheets―is applicable to NBFIs as well as 
banks. After tightening monetary policy, NBFIs, which undergo the shrinkage of their 
net worth, face the higher external finance premium in using nondeposit funds in the 
same way as banks. NBFIs, in turn, must reduce the supply of loans to borrowers just 
like banks. Because of the similarity between banks and NBFIs in the credit markets, 
the idea of the bank lending channel―the fundamental idea that banks play a special 
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role in the transmission of monetary policy―can be reasonably expanded to NBFIs. 
Bernanke (2007) describes the central idea of this mechanism in the following manner. 
Like banks, nonbank lenders have to raise funds in order to lend, and the cost at 
which they raise those funds will depend on their financial condition--their net 
worth, their leverage, and their liquidity, for example.  Thus, nonbank lenders also 
face an external finance premium that presumably can be influenced by economic 
developments or monetary policy. The level of the premium they pay will in turn 
affect the rates that they can offer borrowers.  Thus, the ideas underlying the bank-
lending channel might reasonably extend to all private providers of credit (Bernanke, 




2.4 Data Description and Methodology 
2.4.1 Data Description 
The balance-sheet data of financial intermediaries are available from various issues 
of the Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, hereinafter called the Flow of 
Funds Accounts or the FFA. The publication is issued quarterly by the Federal Reserve 
System.27 The data sets for the empirical test utilized in this study are collected from 
1954 Q3 to 2010 Q2. Because our purpose is to examine the question of whether or not 
NBFIs behave in the same way as banks do after a monetary tightening, the basic setup 
for handling the data should facilitate a comparison and contrast of banks and NBFIs. 
In the FFA, financial intermediaries are divided into 14 groups: Commercial 
Banking, Savings Institutions, Credit Unions, Property-Casualty Insurance Companies, 
Life Insurance Companies, Private Pension Funds, State and Local Government 
Retirement Funds, Government-Sponsored Enterprises, Agency- and GSE-backed 
Mortgage Pools, Issuers of Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), Finance Companies, Real 
                                                          
 
27 Data are available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm. Also, all FFA 
data are available via Data Download Program (DDP) at the Federal Reserve System. 
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Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), Security Brokers and Dealers, and Funding 
Corporations. To facilitate my analysis, I have organized those 14 financial 
intermediaries into two groups: banks and NBFIs. The category of banks includes 
depository institutions, which are the first three intermediaries (i.e., commercial banking, 
savings institutions, and credit unions), while the category of NBFIs incorporates 
nondepository institutions, which are the remaining 11 financial intermediaries. 
I have also created three categories of loans―C&I loans, mortgages, and consumer 
loans―across banks and NBFIs. Because the FFA provides the balance-sheet data for 
each of the 14 financial intermediaries, we can identify those three types of loans across 
these two groups by examining the items on the asset side of each of the 14 balance 
sheets. For example, to measure the total quantity of consumer loans for banks, I added 
up all consumer loans on the asset side of the balance sheets for commercial banks, 
savings institutions, and credit unions. Similarly, to measure the total quantity of 
consumer loans for NBFIs, I aggregated all consumer loans on the asset side of them for 
other remaining financial intermediaries. C&I loans and mortgages were aggregated in a 
similar manner across banks and NBFIs.  
 
2.4.2 Methodology 
This study has employed two approaches to measuring the impact of monetary 
policy on the aggregate loan, the components of loans, and net worth.  The first 
methodology that I have used is a traditional Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
model, following the analysis of Kashyap, Stein, and Willcox (1993)―hereafter 
identified as KSW. Following the analysis of Bernanke and Blinder (1992), I have 
utilized a vector autoregression (VAR) model as my second methodology. 
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2.4.2.1 A KSW-Style Approach 
To examine the relationship between money and real economic activity, Sims (1972) 
introduced the concept of Granger causality into the debate over the real effects of 
money in the economy. One variable X is said to Granger-cause Y if and only if the past 
values of X provide relevant and valuable information sufficient to predict the values of 
Y. KSW (1993) use this “Granger causality test” to examine the relationship between 
monetary policy and financial variables―i.e., to see if the past values of monetary 
policy provide important information to predict the values of financial variables. In 
other words, the Granger causality test is used to determine whether movements in 
monetary policy help forecast movements in financial variables. 
Following the analysis of KSW (1993), I employ the Granger-causality tests in two 
basic ways: a bivariate model and a multivariate model. In the bivariate specification of 
equation (2.1), I regress the change in intermediated loans (L) on eight quarterly lags of 
itself, eight lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP), and a constant. In the multivariate 
specification of equation (2.2), I add eight lags of the growth of real GDP to equation 
(2.1) because, according to KSW, the growth of real GDP should be added to the 
equation “in an effort to control for cyclical factors other than monetary policy which 
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These regressions test whether monetary policy Granger-causes financial variables. 
Such tests equate in fact to determining whether the βi coefficients equal zero in a 
regression. For example, in equation (2.1), we want to test whether the past values of 
monetary policy are useful in forecasting the quantity of loans. If these past values 
significantly improve the prediction of the loan quantity, we can say that monetary 
policy Granger-causes the loan quantity. To be precise, in order for monetary policy to 
Granger-cause the loan quantity, (1) the coefficients on the lags of monetary policy 
must be statistically different from zero “as a group”―i.e., β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + β5 + β6 
+ β7 + β8 ≠ 0―or (2) the significance of the βi coefficients on the lags of monetary 
policy must be statistically different from zero “jointly”―i.e., β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = 
β6 = β7 = β8 ≠ 0. Therefore, when either of these conditions holds, we can conclude 
that changes in the stance of monetary policy have some impact on the quantity of loans 
available in the financial system.  
More specifically, I used two null hypotheses to test Granger causality between a 
monetary-policy variable and the quantity of loans. The first null hypothesis is that the 
sum of the coefficients on the eight lags of monetary policy is zero: β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 + 
β5 + β6 + β7 + β8 = 0. In this case, a t test can be used to test the null hypothesis because 
we have a simple hypothesis, for which a “t test” approach is appropriate. To test, then, 
whether the sum of coefficients is zero, we can estimate equation (2.1) or (2.2) in the 
usual manner with an unrestricted regression. Once the values β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, and 




conducted by the t test in the formula.28  
The second null hypothesis is that the coefficients of the eight lags of monetary 
policy are conjointly zero: β1 = β2 = β3 = β4 = β5 = β6 = β7 = β8 = 0. In this case, we 
can use an “F test” to test the null hypothesis because now we have a joint hypothesis, 
for which an F test approach is appropriate. To test whether the coefficients on eight 
lags are conjointly zero, a test of the null hypothesis can be conducted by the F test of 
the formula in the usual way: all lags of the monetary-policy variable are 
simultaneously excluded from the unrestricted OLS equation (2.1) or (2.2) predicting 
the quantity of loans. 
If this null hypothesis―that is, monetary policy does not help forecast the financial 
variables―is rejected in the significant level with the calculated t statistic or F statistic, 
monetary policy Granger-causes the loan quantity. All empirical results in this study are 
reported in these two ways―a simple hypothesis and joint hypothesis. In addition to 
these two ways, a traditional OLS regression with each financial variable is estimated in 
either a bivariate model or a multivariate model, as shown in equation (2.1) and (2.2). 
The financial variables applied in this analysis are these: net worth, total intermediary 
loans, and the components of intermediary loans (i.e., commercial and industry (C&I) 
loans, mortgages, and consumer loans). In particular, to measure the effect of monetary 
                                                          
 
28 In the simplest case, for example, we can consider two lags rather than 8 lags. Then, we can say 
that the sum of the two coefficients is zero. That is, the restriction is β1+β2=0 instead of 


























where β1+β2= 0 under the null hypothesis and where the denominator is the standard error of )( 21
∧∧
+ ββ . If 
the calculated t value exceeds the critical t value at the significant level, the null hypothesis, which 
proposes that monetary policy does not Ganger-cause the quantity of loans, can be rejected. Also, this t 
test formula can be expanded to the sum of eight coefficients in this analysis. 
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policy on the components of loans, I estimate equation (2.1) or (2.2), replacing the 
intermediary-loan variable with the mortgage variable.         
 In this analysis, the Federal funds rate is used as an indicator of monetary policy.29 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) assert persuasively that changes in the Federal funds rate 
are a good indicator of monetary policy. According to their argument, changes in the 
Federal funds rate measure policy-induced shocks to reserve supply. However, “the 
funds rate would not be a good measure of monetary actions if its information content 
stemmed from shocks to reserve demand―arising from changes in the 
economy―rather than from shocks to reserve supply” (Bernanke et al. 1992, p. 914).30 
All variables except the Federal funds rate take the logged form. All variables, 
including the Federal funds rate, have been tested for stationarity with the Augmented 
Dickey Fuller test (ADF), and those variables turned out to have a unit root. Following 
the KSW, therefore, I determined that all variables are first-differenced in order to be 
transformed into stationary variables, and that 8 lags are applied to the regression.31 
 
 
                                                          
 
29 Also, Romer’s dummy variables have been frequently used as an indicator of monetary policy in 
the literature. Romer and Romer (1989) read the minutes of the FOMC and select some dates as markers 
of the beginning of an anti-inflationary tightening of monetary policy, or exogenous shocks. However, 
since “Romer dates” are not available after 1988, “Romer dates” are not applicable to the data from 1989 
to 2010. Therefore, I have employed only changes in the Federal funds rate as an indicator of the stance 
of monetary policy in this study. 
 
30 “For the funds rate to be a good measure of monetary-policy actions, it must be essentially 
unresponsive to changes in reserve demand within a given month” (Bernanke et al. 1992, p. 914). This 
means that the supply curve of nonborrowed reserves is extremely elastic at the target federal funds rate. 
Using both monthly and weekly data, Bernanke et al. (1992) find little effect of reserve demand shocks 
on the funds rate, which supports the idea that the funds rate is mostly driven by policy decisions. 
31 When 2 lags, 4 lags, and 6 lags are applied to the regression, the result of analysis is not materially 
different from 8 lags. 
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2.4.2.2 A VAR Approach 
A KSW-Style approach, which was employed in the previous section of this study, 
has been criticized because it does not distinguish between endogenous and exogenous 
monetary-policy actions. Endogenous policy actions are the actions of a monetary 
authority responding systemically to the developments of the economy, while 
exogenous policy actions consist of all other actions of the monetary authority.  In order 
to focus on the independent effect of monetary policy, we need to identify the 
exogenous monetary-policy shocks.  
To identify such exogenous shocks of monetary policy, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) 
found a variable, the Federal funds rate, whose innovations to the Federal-fund-rate 
equation can be interpreted as the exogenous shocks in a VAR. Specifically, rather than 
assuming the entire structure of the economy in detail as in a structural VAR, they 
employed a recursive VAR to identify the dynamic effects of the exogenous-policy 
shocks on various macroeconomic variables. 32  As a result, these researchers can 
measure the true structural response of the economy to exogenous monetary-policy 
shocks, a response that more accurately reflects the dynamic response of the economy 
to changes in the Federal fund rate. Examining the responses to a Federal-funds rate 
shock across financial variables and target macroeconomic variables allows us to “see” 
the monetary-transmission mechanism open up. Following their analysis, I have 
employed this recursive VAR model to measure the impact of monetary policy on 
financial variables.  
                                                          
 
32 In the recursive VAR, it is sufficient to identify one of the following assumptions; (1) there is no 
feedback from the economy to policy actions within the period, but policy actions affect the 
macroeconomic variable within the period―according to this assumption, the Federal funds rate is placed 
first―or (2) policy actions affect the macroeconomic variables with “only lags”―according to this 
assumption, the Federal funds rate is placed last. 
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To demonstrate the identification made by VAR, consider the following as the 
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Y is a vector of nonpolicy variables that capture economic conditions; it includes 
macroeconomic variables such as real GDP growth, consumer-price index, and other 
real financial variables. P is a vector of policy variables; it includes only the Federal 
funds rate. The symbols u and v are orthogonal disturbances, which mean that u and v 
represent mutually uncorrelated white-noise disturbance in the structure of the economy. 
The assumption embodied in equations (2.3) and (2.4) is that the current P does not 
enter the equation (2.3)―that is, that C0=0―so that the Federal funds rate affects the 
other macroeconomic variables with only lags, but macroeconomic variables affect the 
Federal funds rate within the period.  
This identification assumption is consistent with an ordering in the VARs that the 
Federal funds rate is placed last―especially in a Choleski decomposition of the 
variance-covariance matrix of the residuals. In particular, depending on the unit of data 
employed in our analysis, an identification assumption can be appropriately chosen. For 
example, if we use the annual data the assumption that monetary policy affects other 
macroeconomic variables within periods is more plausible. So, we place the policy 
variable “first.” On the other hand, if we use the monthly data, or quarterly data, the 
assumption that the actions of monetary authority affect macroeconomic variables with 
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only lags is more reasonable. So, we place the policy variable “last” (see Walsh 2003). 
However, regardless of the order of the Federal funds rate, if the residuals correlations 
turn out low, the impulse-response functions are not sensitive to the ordering of 
variables (see Enders, 2004). 
The VARs are estimated using the quarterly data from these sources: (1) the log of 
real GDP (RGDP), (2) the log of the consumer-price index (CPI), (3) the log of 
produce-price index (PPI), (4) the log of real financial variables, and (5) the Federal 
funds rate (FFR). Financial variables (4) are represented as net worth (NW), 
intermediary loans (L), commercial and industrial loans (CI), mortgages (M), and 
consumer loans (CL). I have included the Producer Price Index (PPI) in the VAR in 
order to resolve the existing “price puzzle” in the literature.  
The “price puzzle” refers to an unexpected finding that traditional economic theory 
would not lead us to expect; a tight monetary shock is followed by a rise, rather than a 
fall, in the price level. Although that effect is small and temporary, the phenomenon 
seems puzzling. The most common explanation for it is that the variables captured in a 
simple VAR do not spread out to the full information set in the real world; that is, the 
Federal Reserve has better information than the information captured in the VAR. 
Economists believe that the “price puzzle” arises from imperfect control of Federal-
Reserve-held information about future inflation. For this reason, inclusion of 
commodity or other asset prices in the VAR as an indicator of an expected inflation 
represents a solution to that problem. To mitigate the “price puzzle,” commodity or 
other asset prices are used in this study as a proxy for the unavailable additional 
information held by the Federal Reserve. 
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In the VAR I use in this study, each of the real financial variables―NW, L, CI, M, 
and CL―is entered into the model. For example, in order to assess the response of net 
worth to monetary policy, I place the variables in the system in this way: RGDP, CPI, 
PPI, NW, and FFR. Although this four-variable VAR provides a very simple 
description of the economy, it has advantages of retaining the minimum set of variables 
necessary for the study without loss of the available data set, and it produces reasonable 
impulse-response functions. 
After all variables―except the Federal funds rate―are seasonally adjusted and are 
logged, all variables are tested for stationarity for the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
test. All variables are found to be I (1); that is, they all contain a unit root. However, 
Sims (1980) argued that we should not difference the time series data to transform 
nonstationary variables into stationary variables. The reason is that differencing the data 
in such a way drops valuable information about the long-term relationship between 
variables in the system out of the equations. Therefore, in the procedures undertaken in 
this study, all variables are not differenced. In addition, the lag length in the VAR is 
determined by two factors: the Alkaike information criterion (AIC) and the final-
prediction error (FPE), whose determination was that 6 lags are optimal.33  
 
2.5 Empirical Results 
This section examines the behavior of banks and NBFIs separately following the 
shifts of monetary policy because an important question is whether NBFIs behave in the 
                                                          
 
33  In EViews, Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) selects 2 lags, Hannan-Quinn information 
criterion (HQ) selects 3 lags, and both Alkaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Final Prediction Error 
(FPE) select 6 lags (see Appendix A). Since 6 lags are mostly selected among different criteria, 6 lags are 
used in the VAR and reported in this paper. However, the results of the VAR in 2 lags or 3 lags generally 
demonstrate a result similar to those with 6 lags. 
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same way as banks do in these kinds of circumstances. As discussed in Section 1.3, the 
theoretical justification for how monetary policy influences behavior of banks is as 
follows: A monetary tightening reduces the net worth of banks and NBFIs; the fall of 
their net worth, in turn, causes the cost of wholesale funds to rise, thus reducing the 
supply of intermediated loans. So in this empirical test, I first examine the response of 
the net worth of intermediaries to a monetary policy shock; then I investigate the 
response of the intermediated loans to a monetary policy shock. 
 
2.5.1 The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Net Worth of  
Financial Intermediaries 
To test whether monetary policy has a significant impact on the net worth of 
financial intermediaries, I use the KSW-style methodology described in Section 2.4. 
From the equations (2.1) or (2.2), I replace an intermediary loan variable (L) with net 





                                                          
 
34 All variables, like the net worth and real GDP growth, have been transformed into the log form; 
only the variable that is used as an indicator of monetary-policy remains unchanged. Although we do not 
difference all of the variables in the VAR model, variables in this OLS model have been differenced so 
they enter the regressions in stationary form. These variables are log net-worth, the Federal funds rate, log 
real-GDP growth. 
 
35 To determine the length of lags, I have looked at three different kinds of the lag tests: Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC), and Hannan-Quinn criterion (HQ) 
(see Appendix B). In net worth, I report the results produced with 6 lags, which are shown as a baseline 
specification here. However, I report the results of 8 lags as well, which are chosen in testing the 
intermediated loans. (Refer to Appendix C for the result of 8 lags). Basically, the results of 8 lags are not 




































The net worth of financial intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and 
NBFIs, respectively―is entered into equations (2.5) and (2.6). If monetary policy 
Granger-causes the quantity of net worth, we can infer that monetary policy has some 
impact on the net worth of each group. 
Table 2.3 reports the results of equations (2.5) and (2.6), which represent bivariate 
model and multivariate models individually across groups. In the t test approach, entries 
in the βi sum report the sum of the βi coefficients from each regression, and the 
parenthesis shows the t statistic for the test of the sum. In this case, a large t value, one 
exceeding the critical t value, indicates that the sum of the βi coefficients is more 
reliable, and that the monetary-policy variable is important for predicting the behavior 
of net worth. In the F test approach, the entries in the exclusion report the marginal 
significance levels, or p value, from the hypothesis that all eight lags of the monetary-
policy variable can be excluded from the equation predicting the net worth of 
intermediaries. In this instance, a small p value indicates that movements in monetary 
 
Table 2.3 Responses of Net Worth 
 
 







β i sum Exclusion β i sum  Exclusion β i sum Exclusion 













Notes: In the bivariate model, the net worth of financial intermediaries―total financial institutions, 
banks, and NBFIs, respectively―is regressed against a constant, 8 lags of itself, and 8 lags of a 
monetary policy indicator (MP). In the multivariate model, 8 lags of GDP are added to the 
regression. All variables except MP take the logged form, and all variables including MP were 
differenced to the stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show the sum of coefficients on 
the lags of monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in parentheses. Entries in “exclusion” 
columns show the marginal significant level for the test that MP does not help forecast the net 
worth. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5 %, and 1%, respectively. 
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policy help forecast movements in net worth. 
Under the theoretical justifications provided in Section 1.3, we would expect the net 
worth of financial intermediaries to decrease in response to a monetary tightening. The 
results are strongly consistent with such a theoretical explanation. As shown in Table 
2.3, βi sum entries indicate that the net worth of total financial institutions―banks and 
NBFIs―decreases after a positive shock in the Federal funds rate in either the bivariate 
or multivariate model. After 1% increase in the Federal funds rate, banks decrease their 
net worth by 3% and NBFIs decrease by 2.7% in the bivariate model. Note that tight 
monetary policy has a somewhat stronger impact on the net worth of banks than on that 
of NBFIs: the βi sum for banks is −0.030 in the bivariate model and −0.044 in the 
multivariate model; for NBFIs the βi sum is −0.027 in the bivariate model, and −0.031 
for the multivariate model. The t values for those βi sums are statistically significant at 
the 2% level. All of these results are consistent with the theoretical explanation in 
Section 2.3. 
In addition, the exclusion entries show the joint significance of the βi coefficients 
for the null hypothesis that all lags of monetary policy do not have a predictive power 
for the variable of net worth. Surprisingly, all the null hypotheses are rejected as 
statistically significant at the 2% level. In general, an F value approach shows results 
similar to those of a t value approach at the statistically significant 2% level.   
 As we would expect, the behavior of aggregate data from total financial institutions 
is not much different from the behaviors of disaggregate data from banks or NBFIs. 
That is, for total financial institutions, the behavior of net worth declines following a 
monetary tightening at the statistically significant 2% level: the βi sum is −0.026 for the 
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bivariate model, and −0.035 for the multivariate model. Interestingly, the aggregate data 
show statistically higher t values than do disaggregate data. For total financial 
institutions, the t vales are 4.12 for the bivariate model and 4.95 for the multivariate 
model. For bank, the t values are 2.60 for the bivariate model and 3.20 for the 
multivariate model. For NBFIs, the t values are 3.39 for the bivariate model and 3.51 for 
the multivariate model. All these results are consistent with the theoretical prediction 
made in Section 2.3 that monetary policy affects the net worth of banks and NBFIs both. 
Alternately, I used the VAR methodology for this test. Figure 2.6 shows the 
behavior of net worth―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―in 
response to a one-standard deviation shock to the Federal funds rate. The VAR 
methodology produces very similar results to those of the KSW-Style methodology: 
The net worth of each group reduces significantly after a monetary contraction. 
Consistent with the previous results, tight monetary policy impacts the net worth of 
banks more strongly than that of NBFIs. The impact of a monetary-policy shock reaches 
its lowest level after approximately 12 quarters: −0.023 for total financial institutions, 
−0.043 for banks, and −0.014 for NBFIs. Although a monetary policy shock influences 
banks and NBFIs in the same direction, as shown in Figure 2.6, the strength of impact 


























   
   
   
   




























































2.5.2 The Impact of Monetary Policy on the Loans of  
Financial Intermediaries 
In this subsection, equations (2.1) and (2.2) from Section 2.4 are employed to test 
the theoretical arguments that all financial intermediaries reduce their supply of 
available loans after a monetary tightening.36, 37 
The loans of total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively, are entered 
in each of the equations (2.1) and (2.2). In this case, not only aggregated loans but also 
components of loans―i.e., commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, mortgages, and 
consumer loans―are regressed in the equations to examine the behavior of different 
components of loans. By using both the bivariate and the multivariate models, equation 
results are produced and are then reported in Table 2.4 and 2.5. Those results are 
reported in terms of different types of groups (in columns) and different types of loans 
(in rows). As in Table 2.4, the βi sum entries indicate the sum of coefficients within 
eight lags of each monetary-policy indicator, as well as the associated t statistic, and the 
exclusion entries indicate the result of the exclusion test. 
According to the theoretical justifications presented in Section 2.3, we would expect 
the supply of intermediated loans to decline in response to a monetary shock. We can 
examine the response of intermediated loans in two ways: the behavior of groups and  
                                                          
 
36 All variables are logged, excluding the variable used as an indicator of monetary policy. In the 
same way as in the equations (5) and (6), all variables ―such as log loans, the Federal funds rate, and 
log-real GDP―have been differenced so they enter the regressions in the stationary form. 
 
37 In the same way as before, I examine three kinds of the lag tests: AIC, SIC, and HQ (see Appendix 
D). Although all three criteria have chosen 2 lags as an optimum number of lags, it might be difficult for 
2 quarters to capture the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks to the quantity of loans. In the 
literature, the previous researchers―Kashyap et al. (1993) and Onliner & Rudebusch (1995, 1996)―have 
typically employed 8 lags in their empirical studies. Also, as we see Appendix D, all three kinds of tests 
show a noticeable tendency to decrease at 8 lags. Thus the previous researchers chose 8 lags instead of 2 
lags. In this subsection, I report the results of 8 lags. However, the results of 2 lags and 6 lags are also 
reported in the Appendix E to make comparisons among them (see Appendix E).   
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Table 2.4 Bivariate Model 
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Notes: In the bivariate model, aggregate loans (or components of loans) of financial 
intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―are regressed 
against a constant, 8 lags of itself, and 8 lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP). All 
variables except MP take the logged form, and all variables including MP were differenced to 
the stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show the sum of coefficients on the lags 
of monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in parentheses. Entries in “exclusion” 
columns show the marginal significant level for the test that MP does not help forecast the net 
worth. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
 
Table 2.5 Multivariate Model 
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Notes: In the multivariate model, aggregate loans (or components of loans) of financial 
intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―are regressed 
against a constant, 8 lags of itself, 8 lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP), and 8 lags of 
GDP. All variables except MP take the logged form, and all variables including MP were 
differenced to the stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show the sum of 
coefficients on the lags of monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in parentheses. 
Entries in “exclusion” columns show the marginal significant level for the test that MP does 
not help forecast the net worth. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, 
respectively. 
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the behavior of loan components. First, we can consider the behavior of each 
group―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs. As indicated in the first row of 
Tables 2.4 and 2.5, both banks and NBFIs reduce the supply of total available loans 
after a monetary tightening. Notice that banks reduce this quantity significantly more 
than NBFIs do in response to a monetary tightening, though the reduction is not 
statistically significant for NBFIs. So the βi sum for banks is −0.009 according to the 
bivariate model and −0.007 according to the multivariate model; and the βi sum for 
NBFIs is −0.001 according to the bivariate model and −0.002 according to the 
multivariate model. The t values for banks are statistically significant at the 2% level, 
whereas the t values for NBFIs are statistically insignificant. 
Additionally, the exclusion entries show results similar to the βi sum entries. As 
already indicated, the marginal-significance levels of banks are statistically significant 
at the 2% level, while those of NBFIs are statistically insignificant. Notice that a 
decrease in the supply of loans of total financial institutions is statistically significant at 
the 2% level. Specifically, for total financial institutions, the βi sum is −0.006 in the 
bivariate model and −0.005 in the multivariate model at the 2% significant level of t 
values. The marginal significance level of exclusion entries is statistically significant at 
the 10% and 5% level for the bivariate and the multivariate model, respectively.   
Second, together with the behavior of each group, I examine the behaviors of the 
components of the loans―i.e., C&I loans, real-estate loans, and consumer loans. As 
shown in Table 2.4 and 2.5, rows 2-4, the loan-component behaviors are somewhat less 
uniform, even though the behavior of total loans is always consistent in the predicted 
direction at the statistically significant level. For banks and total financial institutions, 
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the response of total loans, mortgages, and consumer loans displays significant declines 
at the statistically significant level―in both the bivariate and the multivariate model. 
However, the responses of C&I loans decrease in the bivariate model, but they increase 
in the multivariate model in a statistically insignificant way.38 In addition, although the 
responses of the aggregate-loan behaviors are overall significant, some responses of the 
component-loan behaviors are statistically insignificant. However, these results may 
reflect the fact that each financial institution manages its total quantity of loans more 
intensively, rather than individual component loans, in response to the monetary policy 
shocks. For NBFIs, the responses of the loan components are mixed in a statistically 
insignificant way: They are positive or negative depending on the models we select. 
Nonetheless, the response of total loans for those NBFIs is always the same, with 
negative reactions. In general, the t values, or marginal-significance levels, are 
statistically significant for banks, whereas they are statistically insignificant for NBFIs 
overall. 
In the similar way as I did in the net worth, I used the VAR methodology for these 
empirical tests. Figure 2.7 shows the behavior of total loans and the behavior of the loan 
components―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―in response 
to one standard-deviation shock to the Federal funds rate. 
The VAR methodology, in general, produces similar results to those produced by 
the KSW-style methodology. Following monetary tightening, the quantity of total loans 
and the components of loans declines significantly, except for C&I loans; in fact, C&I 
                                                          
 
38 The increase of C&I loans in the multivariate model is consistent with the empirical studies of 
previous researchers―such as Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro 




















































































































































































































































































loans increase in the opposite direction from the one taken by other components.39 
Furthermore, we observe that, consistent with the previous OLS regressions, the impact 
of monetary policy on total loans is stronger on banks than on NBFIs. More specifically, 
the impulse-response functions show that the quantity of total loans bottoms out after 12 
or 13 quarters―that point being –0.13 for total financial institutions, −0.17 for banks, 
and −0.08 for NBFIs. That quantity returns to its original level 24, 30 or 18 quarters 
after the initial shock. 
We can observe other interesting facts from a careful reading of Figure 2.7. First, 
the behavior of C& I loans is similar to the results we obtained with the multivariate 
model rather than with the bivariate model. The aggregated C&I loans undergo a long-
range increase in response to the shock of monetary tightening: the C&I loans of banks 
immediately increase, reaching a peak 15 quarters after the initial shock; the C&I loans 
of NBFIs decrease, initially, but then increase and continue to  increase up to 11 
quarters after the original shock. 
Second, the behavior of mortgages the VAR provides is consistent with the behavior 
of mortgages in the previous two OLS models. A monetary shock impacted these kinds 
of loans much more strongly for banks than it impacted them for NBFIs―the trough for 
banks is four times deeper than the trough for NBFIs.        
 Third, the VAR-revealed behavior of the consumer loans of banks is consistent with 
                                                          
 
39 The increase of C&I loans is parallel to Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Den Haan, Sumner, and 
Yamashiro (2007). Bernanke and Gertler (1995) mention that the “perverse” increase of C&I loans might 
be explained by the buildup of firms’ inventories to finance the cost of inventories during the period of 
tight money, which is an explanation of demand side. But, Den Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2007) 
could not find the evidence to support Bernanke and Gertler’s explanation. Alternatively, Den Haan et al. 
(2007) suggested that banks may change their portfolio of loans to manage their risk. In other words, to 
the extent that banks consider the long-term mortgages to be riskier than the short-term C&I loans, banks 
might substitute their portfolios from the long-term mortgages into the short-term C&I loans after a 
monetary tightening, which is an explanation of supply side.  
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the consumer-loan behavior of banks we saw in the previous two OLS models, but 
compared with those models, the consumer-loan behavior of NBFIs provided us by the 
VAR is somewhat ambiguous. In both the OLS and the VAR methodology, as to banks, 
the consumer loans decrease subsequent to a monetary policy shock. On the other hand, 
as to NBFIs, the previous two OLS models show that the consumer loans increase, but 
the VAR  indicates that the consumer loans does not show a clear pattern―that is , they 
undergo a slight increase, decrease slightly in an S-shape, then increase and continue 
increasing for the next 6 quarters. 
Overall, we see that the behavior of banks, or total financial institutions, is 
consistent with what we saw in the previous two models, whereas the VAR-indicated 
behavior of NBFIs is somewhat less consistent with the same behavior revealed in the 
previous two models. 
 
2.6 Some Supplementary Tests for Loans for NBFIs 
In the previous subsection, NBFIs’ net worth declines at the statistically significant  
 
level in response to contractionary monetary policy; however, NBFIs reduce their  
 
aggregate debt and components of debt at the statistically insignificant level even  
 
though they generally move in the same direction with banks. To address this issue, I  
 
conduct some supplementary tests to examine the responses of NBFIs to two different  
 
shocks: (1) a new measure of monetary shocks and (2) shocks to bank lending standards.  
 
Romer and Romer (2004) introduced a new measure of monetary policy shocks that is  
 
exempt from endogenous and anticipatory movements to large extent, compared to  
 
conventional measures. Lown, Morgan, and Rohatgi (2000) and Lown and Morgan  
 
(2002, 2006) used a measure of bank lending standards that are gathered by the Federal  
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Reserve when they forecast loan growth and output.  
 
2.6.1 A New Measure of Monetary Policy Shocks 
 In the previous section, we have used the nominal federal funds rate as an indicator 
of monetary policy. The federal funds rate has become the standard indicator of 
monetary policy in the literature. However, although the federal funds rate is generally a 
good measure of exogenous policy shocks, it is still subject to the problem of 
endogeneity. According to Romer and Romer (2004), changes in the federal funds rate 
are still contaminated by its endogenous movements to economic condition and its 
anticipatory movements by the Fed―i.e., the Fed’s reactions to the state of the 
economy.40 
 
2.6.1.1 A Problem with the Conventional Measure 
First, the federal funds rate that is conventionally used is contaminated by its 
endogenous movements to economic conditions. For example, the funds rate rise during 
an expansion when demand for credit increases, as the Fed accommodates to the 
increased demand for credit. Similarly, the funds rate falls during a contraction when 
demand for credit decreases, the Fed adjusts to the decreased demand of credit. Since 
such endogenous movements generate a positive relationship between the funds rate 
and the amount of credit, they may lead scholars to underestimate the negative 
relationship between monetary policy actions and real economic variables. Particularly, 
during an era in the late 1970s when the Fed did not target the funds rate, endogenous 
problems were likely to be more pronounced than the Greenspan and Bernanke eras 
                                                          
 
40 In a broad sense, the problems of both endogenous movements and anticipatory movements can be 
classified into the problem of endogeneity. 
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when the Fed targeted the funds rate.              
 Second, the federal funds rate is also contaminated by its anticipatory movements 
engineered by the Fed. The Fed devotes a great deal of resources to the forecasts of the 
possible performance of output, prices, and unemployment. By using these forecasts, 
the Fed frequently influences the funds rate in anticipation of the future economic 
conditions. As a result, movements in the funds rate are frequently reactions to 
information about future economic conditions, exhibiting the Fed’s endogenous 
movements. For example, the Fed is likely to cut the funds rate when it perceives a sign 
of a recession in the economy. In this situation, although the Fed reduces the funds rate 
substantially, credit is not likely to increase at this time. Nonetheless, such an action 
may mitigate the severity of the recession; otherwise, we would have had a worse 
recession. If such anticipatory countercyclical actions are regular, a regression may fail 
to find a negative relationship between increases in the funds rate and loan growth even 
if such a relationship in fact exists (Romer & Romer, 2004). 
 
2.6.1.2 The Derivation of a New Measure of Monetary Shocks 
To address the problems, Romer and Romer (2004) derived a new measure of 
monetary policy shocks that are free of the problems of endogenous and anticipated 
movement. Such a new measure is obtained in the following procedures. The first 
procedure is to derive a series on intended funds rate changes around the time of the 
meetings of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). For the sample period of 
1966 Q1 to 1996 Q4, Romer and Romer (2004) read both quantitative records, which 
are Weekly Report of the Manager of Open Market Operations, and narrative accounts 
of each FOMC meeting, which is the Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open 
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Market Committee. 41 By using the information about the quantitative and narrative 
records, they were able to keep track of changes in the Fed’s intended-funds rate. The 
resulting series on intended-funds-rate changes eliminates some short-term endogenous 
movements between the funds rate and the economic conditions and short-term 
noises―i.e., fluctuations of the funds rate from day to day.  
Although the first procedure circumvents endogenous movements and noises to 
some extent, the series (on intended-funds-rate changes) is still subject to the problems 
of the Fed’s anticipatory movements―i.e., the Fed’s reaction to the state of the 
economy. The Fed frequently changes the target funds rate in expectation of future 
economic development. In particular, the Fed makes use of internal forecasts of 
inflation and economic activity around each FOMC meeting and responds to 
information about future economic developments. 
The second procedure, therefore, is to eliminate the Fed’s anticipatory movements 
from the intended funds rate changes around the time of the meetings of the FOMC. For 
the FOMC decisions, the Fed makes use of internal forecasts, which are referred to as 
the Greenbook forecasts that are prepared by the staff of the Fed before each meeting of 
the FOMC. Romer and Romer (2004) used the Greenbook forecasts as a proxy for 
policymakers’ information about future economic developments―i.e., what will happen 
to prices, output, and unemployment. They take the regression of the intended funds 
rate changes around the time of the meetings of the FOMC on the Greenbook 
                                                          
 
41 Record of Policy Actions of the Federal Open Market Committee provides summaries of FOMC 
discussions. More detailed accounts are contained in the Minutes of Federal Open Market Committee and 
later renamed the Transcripts of Federal Open Market Committee in 1993. 
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forecasts.42 “The residuals from this regression show changes in the intended funds rate 
not taken in response to information about future economic developments. The resulting 
series for monetary shocks should be relatively free of both endogenous and 
anticipatory actions.”(Romer and Romer, 2004, p. 1056)  
 
2.6.1.3 Empirical Results 
For the sample periods from 1966 Q1 to 1996 Q4, I reestimate equations (2.3) and 
(2.4) using a new measure series in place of the nominal federal funds rate. These 
sample periods are employed because a new measure of monetary policy shocks is 
available only for such sample periods. For the same sample periods, I also reestimate 
the same regression using the nominal federal funds rate. The comparisons of the new 
measure and the conventional measure can show whether the new measure produces 
results that differ in important ways from those based on the conventional measure. 
 Figure 2.8 shows the response of total loans and components of loans (i.e., C&I 
loans, mortgages, and consumer credit) to one standard deviation innovation in the 
Romers’ shocks. The total loans of banks fall sharply through quarter 9 by 2.3% and 
then reach their initial level at quarter 23. However, the total loans of NBFIs decline  
                                                          
 
42 In the second procedure, the specific equation that Romer and Romer (2004) estimate is: 
Δ𝑓𝑓𝑚 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑓𝑓𝛽𝑚 + � 𝛾𝑖2
𝑖=−1





+ � 𝜃𝑖�Δ𝜋�𝑚𝑖 − Δ𝜋�𝑚𝑖−1,   𝑖� + 𝜌𝑢�𝑚𝑚 + 𝜀𝑚.2
𝑖=−1
 
“Δffm is the change in the intended funds rate around FOMC meeting m. ffbm is the level of the 
intended funds rate before any changes associated with meeting m. It is included to capture any tendency 
toward mean reversion in FOMC behavior. 𝜋� ,Δ𝑦�, and 𝑢�  refer to the forecasts of inflation, real output 
growth, and the unemployment rate. Both the forecasts for the contemporaneous meeting and the change 
in the forecast since the previous meeting are included because it is plausible that both the levels and the 
changes in the forecasts are important determinants of Federal Reserve behavior. The i subscripts refer to 
the horizon of the forecast: –1 is the previous quarter; 0 is the current quarter; and 1 and 2 are one and 












































































































































































































































































































































































































sluggishly through quarter 8 by 0.3% and then continuously increase through quarter 22; 
after that, they finally decline. The t values of total loans are over 2 between quarters 2 
and 14 and between quarters 18 and 25 for banks and NBFIs, respectively (see Table 
2.6). 
The C&I loans show a similar pattern between banks and NBFIs. The C&I loans of 
banks and NBFIs fall sharply and reach their trough around quarter 10 and then recover. 
The t value of C&I loans are over 2 between quarter 4 and 14 and between quarters 7 
and 16 for banks and NBFIs, respectively (see Table 2.7 and 2.8).  
Unlike C&I loans, mortgages and consumer credit exhibit somewhat different 
pattern between banks and NBFIs. Banks sharply decrease both mortgages and 
consumer credit by around quarter 10 and then increase them. The t values of mortgages 
and consumer credit are over 2 between quarter 2 and 12 both of loans for banks (see 
Table 2.7). In contrast to banks’ responses to mortgages and consumer loans, NBFIs 
increase these loans. NBFIs initially slowly decrease mortgages and then increase for 
quite a while, which shows a very similar pattern with their total loans. Interestingly, 
NBFIs steadily increase consumer credit through the quarter 20 by reaching its peak and 
then start to fall gradually. The t values of mortgages and consumer credit are over 2 
between quarter 16 and 25 and quarter 15 and 25, respectively (see Table 2.8).  
In general, the results of estimates have shown that the responses of both banks and 
NBFIs are statistically significant at some time periods. The responses of banks are 
statistically significant over the first half periods (i.e., periods between quarter 2 and 14), 
while the responses of NBFIs are statistically significant over the middle and later 
periods (i.e., periods between quarter 7 and 25). Such different patterns of the t values  
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error t value 
1 0 0 
  
1 0 0 
 2 -0.0024 0.0007 -3.72 
 
2 0.0005 0.0006 0.85 
3 -0.0056 0.0010 -5.36 
 
3 0.0006 0.0010 0.54 
4 -0.0098 0.0015 -6.36 
 
4 -0.0001 0.0014 -0.07 
5 -0.0129 0.0021 -6.09 
 
5 -0.0006 0.0017 -0.38 
6 -0.0167 0.0027 -6.10 
 
6 -0.0015 0.0020 -0.76 
7 -0.0197 0.0034 -5.80 
 
7 -0.0023 0.0023 -1.02 
8 -0.0216 0.0041 -5.29 
 
8 -0.0028 0.0025 -1.10 
9 -0.0232 0.0048 -4.85 
 
9 -0.0025 0.0028 -0.90 
10 -0.0231 0.0055 -4.24 
 
10 -0.0027 0.0030 -0.88 
11 -0.0224 0.0060 -3.72 
 
11 -0.0024 0.0032 -0.75 
12 -0.0210 0.0065 -3.22 
 
12 -0.0013 0.0033 -0.39 
13 -0.0188 0.0069 -2.72 
 
13 -0.0001 0.0034 -0.04 
14 -0.0166 0.0073 -2.29 
 
14 0.0017 0.0034 0.48 
15 -0.0140 0.0075 -1.87 
 
15 0.0036 0.0035 1.04 
16 -0.0114 0.0077 -1.48 
 
16 0.0052 0.0035 1.49 
17 -0.0090 0.0078 -1.15 
 
17 0.0068 0.0035 1.93 
18 -0.0067 0.0079 -0.85 
 
18 0.0083 0.0036 2.31 
19 -0.0048 0.0080 -0.60 
 
19 0.0095 0.0037 2.54 
20 -0.0032 0.0080 -0.40 
 
20 0.0103 0.0039 2.66 
21 -0.0019 0.0080 -0.24 
 
21 0.0108 0.0041 2.66 
22 -0.0009 0.0080 -0.12 
 
22 0.0109 0.0043 2.55 
23 -0.0002 0.0079 -0.03 
 
23 0.0106 0.0044 2.39 
24 0.0003 0.0079 0.04 
 
24 0.0101 0.0046 2.21 
25 0.0007 0.0078 0.09 
 
25 0.0094 0.0047 2.00 
26 0.0009 0.0077 0.12 
 
26 0.0086 0.0048 1.78 
27 0.0011 0.0076 0.14 
 
27 0.0076 0.0049 1.56 
28 0.0011 0.0075 0.15 
 
28 0.0065 0.0049 1.34 
29 0.0011 0.0074 0.15 
 
29 0.0055 0.0049 1.13 
30 0.0010 0.0074 0.14 
 
30 0.0045 0.0049 0.92 
 
Notes: The (adjusted) sample period is 1967 Q3– 1996 Q4. In each period, the t value is 
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Notes: The (adjusted) sample period is 1967 Q3– 1996 Q4. In each period, the t value is 
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Notes: The (adjusted) sample period is 1967 Q3– 1996 Q4. In each period, the t value is 




may reflect the different movements of the impulse response functions of each lending 
institution. That is, banks substantially reduce their components of loans in the 
beginning; on the other hand, NBFIs slightly reduce or increase their components of 
loans (except C&I loans) in the beginning, but they somewhat significantly reduce or 
increase them in the middle and later periods. To the extent that the moment of 
substantial loan movements is different between banks and NBFIs, the t value may 
reflect such different movements.  
Figure 2.9 exhibits the responses of total loans and components of loans (i.e., C&I 
loans, mortgages, and consumer credit) to either a federal funds rate shock or a new 
measure shock―for banks and NBFIs, respectively. The comparisons of the new 
measure and the conventional measure reveal that the VAR results using new measure 
(the right columns) shows somewhat stronger impact on total loans and components of 
loans than those using the conventional measure (the left columns). Overall, the 
estimated impact of the new measure is somewhat larger, faster, and substantially more 
significant than the impact of the conventional measure. (For the significant levels of 
banks and NBFIs in response to the conventional funds shocks, see Table 2.9, 2.10, and 
2.11).   
For both banks and NBFIs, although the responses of mortgages display very 
similar patterns to either the new measure shocks or the conventional funds rates shocks, 
the responses of C&I loans show that the impact of new measure is substantially 
stronger, quicker, and more statistically significant than that of the conventional 
measure for both banks and NBFIs. (For the statistically significant levels, see Table 
2.10 and 2.11). Consumer loans respond somewhat more sensitively to new measure  
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   Federal Funds Rate Shocks                  New Measure Shocks 
* Total Loans (Banks) 
        
* Total Loans (NBFIs) 
        
* C&I Loans (Banks) 
        
* C&I Loans (NBFIs) 
        
 
Figure 2.9 The Responses of Total Loans and Components of Loans to a Federal Funds 











2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of Total Loans to Cholesky










2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of Total Loans to Cholesky










2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of Total Loans to Cholesky










2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of Total Loans to Cholesky










2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of C&I Loans to Cholesky










2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of C&I Loans to Cholesky










2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of C&I Loans to Cholesky










2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Response of C&I Loans to Cholesky
One S.D. Innovation in the Romers' Shock
77 
   Federal Funds Rate Shocks                  New Measure Shocks 
* Mortgages (Banks) 
        
* Mortgages (NBFIs) 
        
* Consumer Credit (Banks) 
        
 
* Consumer Credit (NBFIs) 
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   Federal Funds Rate Shocks                  New Measure Shocks 
 * Monetary Policy Shocks 
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error t value 
1 0 0 
  
1 0 0 
 2 -0.0020 0.0007 -2.84 
 
2 0 0.0006 0.02 
3 -0.0047 0.0012 -3.92 
 
3 -0.0006 0.0010 -0.60 
4 -0.0063 0.0018 -3.53 
 
4 -0.0006 0.0013 -0.48 
5 -0.0085 0.0024 -3.52 
 
5 -0.0004 0.0016 -0.27 
6 -0.0122 0.0031 -3.99 
 
6 -0.0008 0.0019 -0.44 
7 -0.0149 0.0037 -3.98 
 
7 -0.0011 0.0022 -0.49 
8 -0.0170 0.0044 -3.86 
 
8 -0.0010 0.0024 -0.42 
9 -0.0184 0.0051 -3.62 
 
9 -0.0011 0.0026 -0.41 
10 -0.0189 0.0057 -3.32 
 
10 -0.0014 0.0028 -0.49 
11 -0.0194 0.0063 -3.10 
 
11 -0.0013 0.0029 -0.43 
12 -0.0189 0.0067 -2.82 
 
12 -0.0012 0.0031 -0.38 
13 -0.0179 0.0071 -2.51 
 
13 -0.0007 0.0032 -0.23 
14 -0.0166 0.0075 -2.23 
 
14 0.0002 0.0032 0.05 
15 -0.0151 0.0077 -1.96 
 
15 0.0008 0.0033 0.25 
16 -0.0137 0.0079 -1.72 
 
16 0.0016 0.0033 0.47 
17 -0.0120 0.0081 -1.49 
 
17 0.0026 0.0033 0.79 
18 -0.0104 0.0082 -1.27 
 
18 0.0036 0.0033 1.07 
19 -0.0090 0.0082 -1.09 
 
19 0.0044 0.0034 1.32 
20 -0.0076 0.0082 -0.93 
 
20 0.0052 0.0034 1.55 
21 -0.0064 0.0082 -0.78 
 
21 0.0058 0.0034 1.71 
22 -0.0055 0.0082 -0.67 
 
22 0.0061 0.0034 1.79 
23 -0.0046 0.0081 -0.57 
 
23 0.0062 0.0034 1.82 
24 -0.0040 0.0080 -0.49 
 
24 0.0061 0.0035 1.77 
25 -0.0035 0.0079 -0.44 
 
25 0.0058 0.0035 1.65 
26 -0.0031 0.0078 -0.40 
 
26 0.0053 0.0036 1.49 
27 -0.0029 0.0076 -0.38 
 
27 0.0046 0.0036 1.29 
28 -0.0028 0.0075 -0.38 
 
28 0.0038 0.0036 1.05 
29 -0.0028 0.0074 -0.38 
 
29 0.0029 0.0036 0.79 
30 -0.0029 0.0073 -0.40 
 
30 0.0019 0.0036 0.53 
 
Notes: The (adjusted) sample period is 1967 Q3– 1996 Q4. In each period, the t value is 
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Notes: The (adjusted) sample period is 1967 Q3– 1996 Q4. In each period, the t value is 
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Notes: The (adjusted) sample period is 1967 Q3– 1996 Q4. In each period, the t value is 




than to the conventional measure. All of these results are consistent with results 
produced from Romer and Romer (2004), who examine the relationship between their 
new measure or conventional measure and the real economy. Remember that one 
obtains the new measure by filtering the endogenous movements of the funds rate and 
anticipatory movements of the Fed from the nominal funds rate. Therefore, “[this result] 
suggests that the endogenous behavior of the funds rate and the anticipatory component 
of Federal Reserve actions may be substantial in [C&I loans], and may obscure some of 
the true relationship between monetary policy and [the loan growth]” (Romer & Romer, 
2004, p. 1056). 
 
2.6.2 Bank Lending Standards 
In addition to the employment of a new measure of monetary policy, I employ bank 
lending standards to examine the behavior of banks and NBFIs. 43 Lown and Morgan 
(2002, 2006) find that changes in lending standards are important in explaining 
variation in business loans and output; monetary policy (measured by the funds rate) 
decreases its impact on output when standards are taken into account; and monetary 
policy has little effect on lending standards.  
Lown and Morgan rationalize that the strong impact of standards may reflect the 
policymakers’ use of moral suasion to limit the volume of credit during periods of tight 
monetary policy. This is so because moral suasion was prevalent until the early 1980s. 
However, although policymakers do not employ such suasion in recent years, Lown and 
                                                          
 
43 Lown and Morgan (2006) define standards as follows: “We use “standards” to refer to any of the 
various nonprice lending terms specified in the typical bank business loan or line of credit: collateral, 
covenants, loan limits, etc. One goal here is to show that the standards series in this paper makes a 
reasonable index for the full vector of nonprice lending terms. Our concept of standards is closely tied to 
the informational frictions that occupy so much of the modern literature on credit markets” (p. 1577). 
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Morgan (2002) find that standards still have a powerful impact on loans and output 
during the post-1990 subsample. They suggest that bank lending standard may be a 
proxy for credit market imperfections; because of credit market imperfections, banks 
may tighten standards in response to exacerbation in their own or firms’ balance sheets 
that may be caused by tight monetary policy.  
If bank lending standards are a proxy for credit market imperfections―especially 
the availability of loans in credit markets―NBFI lending standards may be also a proxy 
for credit market imperfections. This is because NBFIs also deal with information 
problematic borrowers (especially small firms) who are subject to credit market 
imperfections. However, because the data of NBFI lending standards are not available, 
one can assume that NBFIs change their standards in a similar way as banks. Such an 
assumption is reasonable because both banks and NBFIs are likely to tighten their credit 
if an adverse shock hits the economy and thus worsens their own or firms’ balance 
sheets. Under this assumption, I use the bank lending standards as a substitute for 
nonbank lending standards. 
The Federal Reserve conducts a survey on the lending conditions of businesses over 
the past 3 months, pursuing qualitative information about changes in the bank lending 
practices in the U.S. credit markets. Loan officers at large U.S. banks in a sample has 
been asked the following question: “Over the past three months, how have your bank’s 
credit standards for approving for loan application for―excluding those to finance 
mergers and acquisitions―C&I loans or credit lines changed?” Respondents (i.e., 
senior loan offices at banks) can answer the questions with one of the five given choices: 
(1) Tightened considerably, (2) tightened somewhat, (3) remained basically unchanged, 
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(4) eased somewhat, and (5) eased considerably.           
 Figure 2.10 exhibits lenders’ responses to the question on standards―the net 
percent reporting tightening standards―and federal funds rate. Notice that, since the 
question was dropped from the survey between 1984 Q1 and 1990 Q1, these periods are 
excluded in the analysis. Since 1992 Q2, lenders have been asked to report standards for 
small firms and standards for larger firms separately. Following Lown and Morgan 
(2006), I use standards for larger firms as a proxy for standard for all firms because 
larger firms account for large portion of total loans. Nonetheless, the correlation 
between these two kinds of firms (0.95) shows that the choice is not so important. As 
shown in Figure 2.10, tighter standards appear to be positively correlated to tighter 



















1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Net Percentage Reporting Tightening Standards (Left)
Federal Funds Rate (Right)
Figure 2.10 Changes in C&I Loan Standards and Federal Funds Rate
Shaded areas indicate the NBER recessions
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directions, there are two stark exceptions: 1980 to 1981 and 2007 to 2008.44 In addition, 
notice that tighter lending standards and tighter monetary policy normally occur before 
recessions. 
Following the analysis of Lown and Morgan (2006), I employ the VARs that 
comprise of the following six variables: the log of real GDP (Y), the log of Consumer 
Price Index (CPI), the log of Producer Price Index (PPI), Federal Funds Rate (FFR), the 
log of real C&I loans (CI), and net percentage standards (STND).45 The VARs are made 
up of a potentially complete macro economy and credit markets, which are represented 
by the first four variables and last two variables, respectively. As in Section 1.5.2, six 
lags of each variable are used and all variables are seasonally adjusted. I estimate the 
VAR over the disjoint periods where the data on standards are available for the 
following periods: 1967 Q1 to 1983 Q4 and 1990 Q2 to 2010 Q2.  
Figure 2.11 plots selected impulse response functions from the VAR where 
variables are ordered in the following way: Yt, CPIt, PPIt, FFRt, CIt, and STNDt. The 
C&I loans of financial intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, 
respectively―are entered into the VAR. After one-standard-deviation credit standard 
shock, banks and NBFIs show very similar responses of C&I loans, GDP, the federal 
funds rate, and their own standards. The standard shock, shown in the last row and all  
                                                          
 
44 Over 1981 and 1982, while bankers report easing standards, the federal funds rate sharply rose. 
According to Lown and Morgan (2002), “[t]he consumer credit controls imposed between March and 
July 1980 may have prompted easier commercial standards to replace lost business on the consumer side” 
(p. 233). On the other hand, over 2007 and 2008, while bankers report tightening standard, the funds rate 
falls. This seems to me that since the early 2000s, changes in standards are followed by the federal funds 
rate after about a year, rather than coinciding with the funds rate.  
 
45 Rather Romer’s new measure of monetary policy, the federal funds rate is used as an indicator of 
monetary policy because we lose a great deal of sample periods from the availability of Romer’s measure 















































































































































































































































































































three columns, initially appears as a sharp, significant rise of approximately 10% on net. 
Remember that standards are measured by changes in percentage and other variables 
are measured by the level. Tightening standards accumulates for 6 quarters. Then, from 
about 7 to 21 quarters, lenders continue to ease standards in order to cancel out the 
cumulative tight standards occurred in quarters 1 through 6. 
The responses of C&I loans and GDP, and the federal funds rate are striking. All of 
these variables decline immediately and substantially in response to the standard 
shock―for both banks and NBFIs. C&I loans decline around −2.2% at its trough for 
total financial institutions: −2.6% for banks and −1.8% for NBIFs. GDP falls around 
−0.44% at its trough for total financial institutions: −0.51% for banks and −0.4% for 
NBFIs. These figures indicate that, after a standard shock, C&I loans decrease much 
more than GDP. Similarly, after tightening in standards, the federal funds rate 
immediately falls about a year and then drops a little more with a seesaw motion about 
another year; the lowest points are −0.44, −0.45, and −0.27% for total financial 
institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively. The reduction of the federal funds rate 
suggests that the Fed tries to mitigate the tight credit conditions (or tight standards) by 
decreasing the federal funds rate. Lown and Morgan (2006) describe such behavior of 
the Fed in the subsequent way: “monetary policymakers follow a “lean-against-lenders” 
strategy” (p. 1596). In addition, overall, standards have stronger impact on banks than 
on NBFIs for all of the variables (i.e., C&I loans, GDP, and the federal funds rate). 
As mentioned earlier, under the assumption that NBFIs can change their standards 
in a similar manner to banks, I have employed bank lending standards as a proxy for 
NBFI lending standards. Under this assumption, I find that, in response to a standard 
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shock, the C&I loans, GDP, and federal funds rate of NBFIs move very similarly to 
those of banks. Such evidence suggests that, if NBFIs shift their lending standards in a 
similar manner to banks, and if NBFIs reduce their C&I loans just like banks, tight 
lending standards made by NBFIs are likely to decrease output―just as tight standards 
made by banks decrease output. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
Despite a substantially growing importance of NBFIs in the financial system, the 
role of NBFIs in the monetary transmission mechanism has received much less attention. 
This research paper addresses this issue by examining how a monetary policy shock 
influences both banks and NBFIs in the monetary transmission mechanism, both 
theoretically and empirically.  
Theoretically, I provide an explanation of how monetary policy affects the financial 
condition of banks and NBFIs and then the supply of loans to intermediary-dependent 
borrowers. Tight monetary policy deteriorates the financial conditions of all 
intermediaries through the fall of their net worth (i.e., the bank capital channel). When 
all intermediaries, in turn, must turn to uninsured nondeposit funds, they will face the 
higher cost of funds because uninsured nondeposit funds reflect the credit risks, or a 
lemon premium, associated with the uninsured lending (i.e., the adverse selection 
model). Ultimately, intermediaries, which undergo a higher cost of external finance, 
respond by reducing the supply of loans to their borrowers. This explanation suggests 
that monetary policy may exert significant influence on the supply of intermediated 
loans through the medium of net worth of all participating financial intermediaries. 
90 
Empirically, I provide some evidence for this explanation, employing two different 
methods: the traditional OLS methodology and the VAR methodology. The evidence is 
largely consistent with the study’s theoretical predictions and suggests that NBFIs 
respond to a monetary policy shock in the same way as banks do; a tight monetary 
policy leads not only to a reduction in their net worth, but also to a shrinkage in the 
intermediated loans of all financial participants. Specifically, this empirical study 
strongly supports the first part of the theory, which is that NBFIs reduce their net worth 
after tightening monetary policy, presenting consistent results with two different 
methodologies – particularly the statistically significant results with 2% for the OLS 
model. On the other hand, it weakly supports the second part of the theory, which is that 
NBFIs decrease their loans in response to a monetary policy shock. That is, although 
NBFIs respond to reduce their loans in the either methodology―reporting the results by 
the negative signs of the coefficient of loans in the OLS and by negative reaction of 
impulse response function in the VAR―the results of the OLS are not statistically 
significant. In particular, this study has also investigated not only the response of 
aggregate loans, but also the response of components of loans, after a monetary 
tightening. The results show that real estate loans and consumer loans significantly 
decrease, as the theory would predict, whereas C&I loans increase. These results are 
consistent with the results produced by the previous researchers. 
A number of economists maintain that some NBFIs, particularly investment banks, 
played a major role in causing the Great Recession of the 2007, while highlighting their 
significant growth in the financial system. Subsequent to financial crisis in 2008, the 
activities of NBFIs came under increasing scrutiny and regulations and NBFIs are 
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required to meet tougher standard than before. Although such strict oversight may help 
to regulate the risky behavior of NBFIs, it has nothing to do with the monetary policy 
that we have discussed here. According to the theoretical explanation offered and some 
evidence presented here, I suggest that monetary policy may be able to influence the 
behavior of both banks and NBFIs. If so, monetary policy may have an additional 
impact on the loans provided by NBFIs in the monetary transmission mechanism. In 
particular, this study suggests a clue for the puzzle of the existing empirical findings. In 
the traditional view, “interest sensitive” components of aggregate spending encountered 
great difficulty in identifying quantitatively significant effect of traditional interest rate 
channel. By including these NBFIs within the boundaries of monetary policy, 
policymakers may be able to better understand the monetary transmission mechanism 














2.8.1 Appendix A: Determination in the Number of Lags (VAR) 
 
VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria     
Endogenous variables: LNRGDP LNCPI LNRIM_SA FFR    
Exogenous variables: C      
Date: 04/14/11   Time: 17:08     
Sample: 1954Q3 2010Q2     
Included observations: 212     
       
        Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
       
       0 -312.6660 NA   0.000233  2.987415  3.050747  3.013012 
1  1957.030  4432.330  1.36e-13 -18.27386 -17.95720 -18.14588 
2  2127.217  325.9259  3.18e-14 -19.72847  -19.15848* -19.49809 
3  2169.831  80.00009  2.47e-14 -19.97953 -19.15622  -19.64677* 
4  2187.306  32.14743  2.44e-14 -19.99345 -18.91681 -19.55830 
5  2198.508  20.18529  2.56e-14 -19.94819 -18.61822 -19.41065 
6  2230.411  56.28188   2.21e-14*  -20.09822* -18.51492 -19.45829 
7  2240.968  18.22662  2.33e-14 -20.04687 -18.21025 -19.30455 
8  2251.937  18.52168  2.45e-14 -19.99940 -17.90945 -19.15469 
9  2268.180  26.81755  2.45e-14 -20.00170 -17.65842 -19.05460 
10  2280.168  19.33886  2.56e-14 -19.96385 -17.36725 -18.91436 
11  2303.958   37.48073*  2.40e-14 -20.03734 -17.18741 -18.88547 
12  2314.667  16.46639  2.54e-14 -19.98742 -16.88416 -18.73316 
       
        
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 LR: sequential modified LR test statistic (each test at 5% level)   
 FPE: Final prediction error     
 AIC: Akaike information criterion     
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     















2.8.2 Appendix B: Determination in the Number of Lags for Net Worth (OLS)46 
 
Sample: 1954 Q3 ─ 2010 Q2 
 
 
Notes: AIC (Akaike information criterion), SIC (Schwarz information criterion), HQ (Hannan-
Quinn information criterion) 
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Notes: In the bivariate model, the net worth of financial intermediaries―total financial 
institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―is regressed against a constant, 8 lags of itself, 
and 8 lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP). In the multivariate model, 8 lags of GDP are 
added to the regression. All variables except MP take the logged form, and all variables 
including MP were differenced to the stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show 
the sum of coefficients on the lags of monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in 
parentheses. Entries in “exclusion” columns show the marginal significant level for the test 
that MP does not help forecast the net worth. *, **, and *** denote significance at 10%, 
5 %, and 1%, respectively. 
 
                                                          
 
46 AIC have chosen lag 6 as an optimum number of lag, whereas SIC and HQ have determined lag 1 
as an optimum. However, as you see the graph above, HQ shows a strong tendency to decline at lag 6 as 
well. Therefore, the results of lag 6 in net worth are reported as a benchmark. In addition, to make a 
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2.8.4 Appendix D: Determination in the Number of Lags for Loans (OLS) 
Sample: 1954Q3 2010Q2 
 
 
Notes: AIC (Akaike information criterion), SIC (Schwarz information criterion), HQ (Hannan-




























2.8.5 Appendix E: Responses of Loans (2 Lags and 6 Lags) 
A. Responses of Loans (2 Lags) 
Bivariate Model 
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Notes: In the bivariate model, aggregate loans (or components of loans) of financial 
intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―are regressed 
against a constant, 8 lags of itself, and 8 lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP). All variables 
except MP take the logged form, and all variables including MP were differenced to the 
stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show the sum of coefficients on the lags of 
monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in parentheses. Entries in “exclusion” columns 
show the marginal significant level for the test that MP does not help forecast the net worth. *, 
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Notes: In the multivariate model, aggregate loans (or components of loans) of financial 
intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―are regressed against a 
constant, 8 lags of itself, 8 lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP), and 8 lags of GDP. All 
variables except MP take the logged form, and all variables including MP were differenced to the 
stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show the sum of coefficients on the lags of 
monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in parentheses. Entries in “exclusion” columns show 
the marginal significant level for the test that MP does not help forecast the net worth. *, **, and 
*** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
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B. Responses of Loans (6 Lags) 
Bivariate Model 
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Notes: In the bivariate model, aggregate loans (or components of loans) of financial 
intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―are regressed 
against a constant, 8 lags of itself, and 8 lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP). All variables 
except MP take the logged form, and all variables including MP were differenced to the 
stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show the sum of coefficients on the lags of 
monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in parentheses. Entries in “exclusion” columns 
show the marginal significant level for the test that MP does not help forecast the net worth. *, 
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Notes: In the multivariate model, aggregate loans (or components of loans) of financial 
intermediaries―total financial institutions, banks, and NBFIs, respectively―are regressed 
against a constant, 8 lags of itself, 8 lags of a monetary policy indicator (MP), and 8 lags of GDP. 
All variables except MP take the logged form, and all variables including MP were differenced to 
the stationary form. Entries in the “β i sum” columns show the sum of coefficients on the lags of 
monetary policy indicator with the t statistics in parentheses. Entries in “exclusion” columns 
show the marginal significant level for the test that MP does not help forecast the net worth. *, 
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THE BEHAVIOR OF SMALL AND LARGE FIRMS DURING BUSINESS  
 
CYCLE EPISODES AND DURING MONETARY POLICY EPISODES:  
 




When it comes to the topic of the business cycle, economists puzzle over how a 
small adverse shock―either a real shock or a monetary shock―can produce large 
fluctuations in an economy. One of the explanations proposed by a number of 
economists is a “financial accelerator” mechanism. An adverse shock to the economy 
may be enhanced by worsening credit-market conditions while it produces interactions 
between credit-market conditions (i.e., financial factors) and real economic activities 
(i.e., real factors). Continuous changes in credit market conditions play a critical role in 
business cycle fluctuations by amplifying and propagating the effect of the initial shock 
(Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; Bernanke, Gertler, & Gilchrist, 1996; Gertler & Gilchrist, 
1993, 1994). In a standard macroeconomic theory, such changes in credit-market 
conditions play no role in business cycle fluctuations because the standard theory 
simply assumes perfect capital markets, separating financial factors from real factors. 
However, according to the financial accelerator mechanism, changes in credit-market 
conditions are essential to the propagation of business cycle because financial factors, 




the initial shock. 
In previous research, economists found some evidence of this mechanism, putting a 
special emphasis on small firms (see Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1996; 
Gertler & Gilchrist, 1993, 1994). An adverse monetary shock is found to have a 
stronger negative impact on small firms than on large firms because small firms are 
more credit-constrained than large firms after a restrictive monetary shock. For 
example, following an adverse monetary shock, small firms, which undergo more 
severe exacerbation of balance sheet conditions, are likely to encounter higher costs of 
external finances than large firms in credit markets. Moreover, since small firms may 
not be able to obtain credit elsewhere―because they do not have access to public 
markets―if they are discriminated against by banks when seeking credit, they should 
cut back on their short-term debt more than large firms. Accordingly, small firms 
should also curtail their business operations more quickly and significantly than large 
firms in the economy. 
Specifically, employing Quarterly Finance Report (QFR) data and “Romer dates” as 
an indicator of tight monetary policy, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) examine the behavior 
of small and large firms after tight monetary policy. They find that tight monetary 
policy differently affects the behavior of small and large firms; the “inventories” and 
“short-term debt” of small firms drop substantially more than those of large firms. In 
particular, after a monetary policy shock, although large firms initially increase 
inventories and short-term debt much more than small firms, after a brief period, small 
firms decrease sharply more than large firms. They interpret this result as the supporting 




inventories with short-term debt after tightening monetary policy; thus, large firms 
initially increase short-term debt more than small firms. In contrast, small firms, which 
experience difficulty accessing credit, are unable to borrow to carry inventories. 
Likewise, employing the Dun & Bradstreet Corporation data, Birch (1979) finds that 
small establishments with 100 or fewer employees accounted for 81.5% of all new jobs 
created in the U.S. during 1960-1976; large establishments with 100 or more employees 
accounted for only 18.5% of all new jobs created (Birch, 1979, Table 4-2). Employing 
the Business Employment Dynamic (BED) data, Sahin, Kitao, Cororaton, and Laiu 
(2011) find that small firms shed more jobs than large firms during the 2007-2009 
downturn. 
Recently, however, new research findings raise questions about the role of small and 
large firms during periods of tight credit conditions.1 New evidence has shown that an 
adverse macroeconomic shock (i.e., a business cycle shock) is found to have more 
serious negative effects on large firms than on small firms during period of recession. 
Large firms curtail their business operations such as employment, short-term debt, sales, 
and inventories substantially more than small firms (see Chari, Christiano, & Kehoe, 
2007; Kudlyak, Price, & Sánchez, 2010; Moscarini & Postel-Vinay, 2008, 2009, 2012). 
Particularly, Chari et al. (2007) investigate the behavior of small and large firms after a 
business cycle shock, rather than a monetary policy shock that previous research 
focused on.2 Their research is somewhat different from previous studies because other 
                                                          
 
1 Such tight credit conditions can originate from a monetary policy shock or from other shocks that 
make credit more expensive and less available. 
 
2 In earlier work, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) examine the behavior of small and large firms after a 
tight monetary shock (i.e., a Romer date), focusing recessions caused by a macroeconomic monetary 




macroeconomic shocks, not including monetary shocks, also perform an essential role 
in causing recessions―that is, recessions are created by not only monetary policy 
shocks but also “other shocks” in the economy.3 Recent research, therefore, has focused 
on business cycle episodes rather than monetary policy episodes in examining the 
behavior of small and large firms. 
In particular, Chari et al. (2007) employ the same QFR data set as Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1994) and incorporate more business cycle episodes into their analysis. After 
including more episodes, they find that the sales of small and large firms respond 
roughly the same to a business cycle shock, a different result from Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994). Furthermore, some other recent studies observe the opposite of past results. 
Using both Census Bureau’s Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS) and the BED data, 
Moscarini and Postel-Vinay (2008, 2009, 2012) find that the employment of large firms 
is more sensitive to the business cycle conditions than that of small firms. Along the 
same lines, employing the same QFR data set and methodology as Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994), Kudlyak et al. (2010) find that the sales and inventories of large firms decreased 
more than those of small firms during the recent 2007-2009 recession. 
Synthesizing empirical evidence presented so far, scholars have found different 
empirical results, depending on their data sets and methodologies. Such mixed results 
have motivated me to examine further the behavior of small and large firms. Three 
natural questions arise from these mixed results: Why do earlier findings show different 
                                                                                                                                                                          
adverse shock (i.e., the date for peak of the business cycle), concentrating recessions brought about by a 
shock other than a monetary policy shock. 
 
3  For example, “other shocks” may occur when the price of commodities or natural resources 





results from recent findings? Do such different results arise from the fact that different 
scholars use different episodes, tight policy episodes versus business cycles episodes, in 
their analysis? Do such different results arise from the fact that different scholars use 
different time periods, earlier periods versus recent periods, in their datasets?  
In my research, the empirical tests to examine the behavior of small and large firms 
are performed in two ways: (1) by different episodes, monetary policy episodes and 
business cycles episodes, and (2) by different time periods, earlier periods and recent 
periods. First, I examine the behavior of small and large firms by comparing “monetary 
policy episodes” to “business cycle episodes.” In this analysis, we presume that 
“monetary policy episodes” arise from monetary policy shocks, which are produced by 
the Federal Reserve to fight against inflation. On the other hand, “business cycle 
episodes” originate from shocks that occur outside of monetary policy and that are 
naturally produced in the economy. For our purposes, we call these other shocks 
“NBER recession shocks.” Although previous studies employ “Romer dates” as a 
measure of monetary policy shocks, this research paper uses “Adrian dates” as a 
measure of those shocks because “Romer dates” have not been updated since 1988. As 
will be explained in Section 2, Adrian and Estrella (2008) identify the “end dates for 
monetary tightening cycle” as a measure of a (tight) monetary policy shock. 4  
Additionally, this research paper uses the “dates for peaks of business cycles” as an 
indicator of business cycle shocks, following Chari et al. (2007) and Kudlyak et al. 
(2010).  
                                                          
 
4 Although this study employs “Adrian dates” rather than “Romer dates” in the analysis, it finds that 





Second, I examine the behavior of small and large firms by comparing “earlier 
periods” to “recent periods.” The data of earlier periods extend from 1960 Q1 to 1989 
Q4, 5 and the data of recent periods range from 1990 Q1 to 2011 Q2. To make use of all 
available data to date, this research paper has employed four different data sources: (1) 
the Flow of Funds, (2) the Quarterly Finance Report, (3) the Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey, and (4) the Business Employment Dynamics. In particular, among 
these four data sets, only the flow of funds data are available for both earlier periods 
and recent periods, whereas the other three data sets are on hand only in recent periods.6 
Because of the limited availability of the other three data sets, a comparison between 
earlier periods and recent periods is made by the flow of fund data.7  
By analyzing different “episodes” and different “time periods,” this research paper 
adds some more evidence to the existing literature about the role of small and large 
firms. During earlier periods, similar to what the earlier researchers found, I find that, 
after a monetary policy shock, small firms decrease their inventories, total short-term 
debt, and bank debt more than large firms, using the flow of funds data. During recent 
periods, on the other hand, I find some interesting results that support recent research by 
using the flow of funds and the QFR data. First, the behavior of large firms is, in 
general, more sensitive than that of small firms―to either a monetary policy shock or 
                                                          
 
5 I divide earlier periods and recent periods by 1990 because previous researchers conducted their 
studies before 1990 and recent scholars have done them after 1990. 
 
6 For the QFR data, although the data of earlier periods are available by purchasing them from the 
private institutions, the data of recent periods are available to the public without any cost. Thus, recent 
periods of the QFR data are used in this analysis. 
  
7 Furthermore, it is worthwhile to carefully examine the flow of funds data and the SLOOS data in 
our study since previous research does not take into account these data. Although the QFR and the BED 




an NBER recession shock. In particular, after an NBER recession shock, large firms 
sharply decrease most of their balance sheet variables―sales, total short-term debt, 
short-term bank debt, mortgages, other debt, and trade debt―more than small firms. 
However, after a restrictive monetary shock, although large firms decrease some of 
their balance sheet variables―sales, inventories, mortgages, and trade debt―more than 
small firms, they increase their short-term debt, such as total short-term debt and short-
term bank debt, more than small firms. Second, it appears that a monetary policy shock 
influences the short-term debt of firms differently than an NBER recession shock does. 
All firms increase their short-term debt after a restrictive monetary shock, whereas they 
decrease after an NBER recession shock. Furthermore, large firms increase short-term 
debt more than small firms after a monetary policy shock, and they also decrease more 
than small firms after an NBER recession shock.  
For these empirical results, some questions arise. Why does the short-term debt of 
firms increase after a tight monetary shock but decrease after an NBER recession 
shock? Why is the short-term debt of large firms more sensitive to both a monetary 
shock and an NBER recession shock than that of small firms? Some plausible 
explanations to these questions are also suggested in this paper.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes four 
different data sources and the key dates of analysis employed in this study; Section 3 
applies the method of previous researchers to the recent data set of the QFR. Section 4 
reports the empirical results of the study; Section 5 discusses two explanations as to 
why the short-term debt of large firms shows more sensitive behavior than that of small 




3.2 Data Description and Some Key Dates of Analysis 
3.2.1 Data Description 
3.2.1.1 The Flow of Funds Data 
The Federal Reserve has released the quarterly data of the flow of funds accounts of 
the United States since 1952. The flow of funds accounts are a set of financial accounts 
used to measure sources and uses of funds for the economy as a whole and by sector. 
They contain the aggregate balance sheets of each sector of the economy―i.e., a 
household sector, a nonfinancial business sector, a financial business sector, a 
government sector, and the rest of the world. “The nonfinancial business sector” 
comprises three subsectors: nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business, nonfarm 
noncorporate business, and farm business. 
In this nonfinancial business sector, “nonfarm nonfinancial corporate business” can  
 
be thought of as large firms because it involves all large private businesses that exclude  
 
farm business and financial institutions, S-corporations, and so on. On the other hand,  
 
“nonfarm noncorporate business” can be thought of as small firms because it includes  
 
somewhat small firms such as partnerships, limited liability companies, and sole  
 
proprietorships―which do not have access to capital markets and thus mainly make use  
 
of intermediated loans. Nonetheless, some of the partnerships included in “nonfarm  
 
noncorporate business” (i.e., small firms) are in fact large corporations. This is because  
 
the distinction between “nonfarm nonfinancial corporation business” and “nonfarm  
 
noncorporate business” is made simply on the basis of tax-paying method rather than  
 
according to the firm sizes. For this reason, small firms in the flow of funds data (i.e.,  
 





QFR data (i.e., below the 30th percentile in sales distribution) as described below. 
 
 
3.2.1.2 The Quarterly Finance Report Data 
The U.S. Census Bureau has released the quarterly data on the Quarterly Finance 
Report for Manufacturing, Mining, Trade, and Selected Service Industries (QFR) since 
1982. Prior to 1982, the QFR was published by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
and Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Based on a sample survey, the QFR 
publication presents the statistical data on a quarterly balance sheet and income 
statement for manufacturing, mining, trade, and selected service industries. 8, 9 
Specifically, the QFR includes estimated statements of income, retained earnings, 
balance sheets, and related financial and operating ratios for manufacturing corporations 
with the assets of $250,000 and over. The data of manufacturing corporations are 
classified by eight asset sizes. The reported size classes are made up of corporations: 
those with assets of (1) less than $5 million, (2) $5 to $10 million, (3) $10 to $25 
million, (4) $25 to 50 million, (5) $50 to $100 million, (6) $100 to $250 million, (7) 
$250 million to $1 billion, and (8) more than $1 billion. The merit of the QFR data is 
that they include relatively small firms compared to the Compustat data. While 
Compustat data cover the relatively large firms whose equities are traded in the public 
market, the QFR data covers both the publicly traded large firms and the privately held 
small firms. 
                                                          
 
8 While historical data from before 1987 Q4 are available from the private institutions by purchase, 
the data of recent periods are available to us without any cost at the U.S. Census Bureau’ internet 
Website. http://www.census.gov/econ/qfr/historic.html In this study, because of limited availability of the 
QFR data, I have only used the data set, which covers the periods from 1987 Q4 to 2011 Q3.  
 
9 The data of manufacturing industry contains information about firm sizes, while the data of mining, 
trade, and selected service industries do not include such information. Thus, only the data of the 




Following Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994), in this research, I define small firms 
as those at or below the 30th percentile in total sales distribution and large firms as 
above the 30th percentile. According to Gertler and Gilchrist (1993, 1994), the firm size 
categories of the QFR data that are constructed in nominal terms are not a desirable 
measure of firm sizes. This is because firms can drift between categories over the 
sample periods due to inflation. For more detailed explanation about the 30th percentile 
method, refer to Appendix A.10 
 
3.2.1.3 The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey 
The Federal Reserve has released the quarterly data on the Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey on Lending Practice (SLOOS) since 1964. It conducts a survey on the 
lending conditions of businesses and households over the past 3 months, pursuing 
qualitative information about changes in the bank lending practices in the U.S. credit 
markets. The respondents to the survey consist of up to approximately 60 large 
domestically chartered banks and up to 24 U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks. 
The senior loan officers at respondent banks are asked about changes in terms and 
standards of banks’ lending and about the position of business and household demand 
for loans. Usually, they are also questioned about other issues of current interest. 
In particular, three questions in the survey pay special attention to the role of small 
firms and large medium-size firms in regard to commercial and industrial loans (C&I 
loans). In this research, small firms are defined as firms with annual sales of less than 
                                                          
 
10 The simplest way to divide the data set into two size classes is to eliminate group 5 and group 6 
that may be situated in a transition area between small and large groups. Then, we can refer to groups 1, 
2, 3, and 4 as small firms and groups 7 and 8 as large firms. On the other hand, following Oliner and 
Rudebusch (1996), another way to divide the data set into two is by using the 15th percentile in capital 




$50 million, and large and medium-size firms are defined as those with annual sales of 
$50 million or more. The questions are as follows: (1) “Over the past 3 months, how 
have your bank’s credit standards for approving for C&I loans or credit lines to large 
and medium-size firms and small firms changed?”; (2) “For applications for C&I loans 
from large and medium-size firms and small firms that your bank currently is willing to 
approve, how have the terms of those loans―with respect to spread between loan rates 
and banks’ costs of funds―changed over the past 3 months?”; (3) “Apart from normal 
seasonal variation, how has demand for C&I from large and medium-size firms and 
small firms changed over the past 3 months?”11 
 
3.2.1.4 The Business Employment Dynamics Data  
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has released the quarterly data on Business 
Employment Dynamics (BED) since 1992. The BED keeps track of components of the 
quarterly net employment change (job flows) such as gross job gains and gross jog 
losses in the private sector of the U.S economy. Such components of the net 
employment change help us to understand the underlying dynamics of the U.S. job 
market. The data to construct the statistics of gross job gains and losses are obtained 
from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW). The QCEW extracts 
data from unemployment insurance (UI) records in 98% of nonfarm payroll business, 
where all employers who are subject to State unemployment insurance (UI) laws are 
required to submit quarterly reports about their employment and wages. 
                                                          
 
11 The data for first two questions have been available since 1990 Q2 and the data for third question 
have been available since 1991 Q4. The data release can be downloaded today at the Federal Reserve’s 




Gross job gains and gross job losses data are also available for 9 firm sizes. These 
firm sizes are classified according to the number of employees: size class 1 (1 to 4 
employees), size class 2 (5 to 9 employees), size class 3 (10 to 19 employees), size class 
4 (20 to 49 employees), size class 5 (50 to 99 employees), size class 6 (100 to 249 
employees), size class 7 (250 to 499 employees), size class 8 (500 to 999 employees), 
and size class 9 (1000 or more employees). Because dividing the data set into small and 
large firms can be an issue that may affect empirical results, I aggregate those 
categories into small firms versus larger firms in three different ways: (1) 1 to 49 
employees and 50 and more employees, (2) 1 to 99 employees and 100 or more 
employees, and (3) 1 to 499 employees and 500 or more employees.  
 
3.2.2 Some Key Dates of Analysis 
A monetary policy shock is an important source of disturbance that influences 
aggregate demand, and it can trigger recessions. However, not only a monetary policy 
shock but also “other shocks”―what we call business cycle shocks or NBER recession 
shocks―are disturbances that influence aggregate demand, and they can contribute to 
recessions as well.  
To examine the behaviors of small and large firms by different episodes, our first 
step is to identify monetary policy shocks and business cycle shocks. Following Chari et 
al. (2007), I have used the “dates of business cycle peaks” as an indicator of business 
cycle shocks. The dates of business cycle peaks can be easily identified because the 
beginning dates of the recessions, which are announced by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), are widely accepted and used. However, identifying the 




economists. Following Romer and Romer (1989), previous research frequently had used 
“Romer dates” as an indicator of monetary policy shocks. Yet, Romer dates are not 
updated since 1988. Recently, however, Adrian and Estrella (2008) have provided the 
“end dates for monetary tightening cycles,” which can be used as a measure of 
monetary policy. In this analysis, therefore, I have employed Adrian dates as an 
indicator of monetary policy shocks. 
 
3.2.2.1 Dates of Business Cycle Peaks 
Figure 3.1 reports the result of de-trended U.S. GDP over 5 decades. The log of 
seasonally adjusted U.S. GDP is filtered by using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) method to 
remove the trend, following Chari et al. (2007). The shaded areas are NBER recessions 
and indicate the starting dates (i.e., peaks of business cycles) and end dates (i.e., troughs 
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Figure 3.1 Log Deviation of U.S. GDP from HP Trend




In this empirical analysis, I have used the starting dates of NBER recessions as a 
measure of business cycle shocks in causing recessions. As shown in Figure 3.1, the 
starting dates of NBER recessions  are 1960 Q2, 1969 Q4, 1973 Q4, 1980 Q1, 1980 Q1, 
1981 Q3, 1990 Q3, 2001 Q1, and 2007 Q4. The starting dates of NBER recessions are 
usually observed a few quarters after “CCK dates” of business cycle peaks, which are 
named after Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2007). CCK dates of business cycle peaks 
are 1960 Q1, 1966 Q1, 1969 Q1, 1973 Q2, 1978 Q4, 1981 Q1, 1990 Q1, 2000 Q2, and 
2000 Q4. Chari et. al (2007) used these CCK dates as a measure of business cycle 
shocks in their analysis. In this study, only the results of NBER dates are reported 
because the results produced from “CCK dates of business cycle peaks” are not 
materially different from results from NBER dates. 
 
3.2.2.2 Dates of Monetary Policy Shocks 
Figure 3.2 shows two different types of monetary policy shocks: Romer dates and 
Adrian dates. Romer and Romer (1989) carefully read the past minutes of the Federal 
Open Market Committees (FOMC) and picked out the beginning dates of restrictive 
monetary policy that were considered (exogenous) monetary policy shocks to fight 
against inflation. These “Romer dates” are the vertical dotted lines in Figure 3.2: 1968 
Q4, 1974 Q2, 1978 Q3, 1979 Q4, and 1988 Q4. 
“Adrian dates” are also used to identify monetary policy shocks. These “Adrian 
dates” are the vertical solid lines in Figure 3.2: 1966 Q4, 1969 Q3, 1971 Q3, 1973 Q3, 
1974 Q3, 1980 Q2, 1981 Q2, 1984 Q3, 1989 Q1, 1995 Q3, 2000 Q3, and 2006 Q3. 
Because “Romer dates” have not existed since 1990, “Adrian dates” are employed for 






dates of monetary tightening cycles” from 1955 to 2007. They defined the “end dates of 
monetary tightening cycles” in the following manner: 
We consider tightening cycles since 1955 and assume a cycle ends when either one 
of these criteria is met: (1) the federal funds rate is higher than at any time from 12 
months before to 9 months after and is at least 50 basis points higher than at the 
beginning of this period, or (2) the federal funds rate is higher than at any time from 
6 months before to 6 months after and is 150 basis points higher than the average at 
these endpoints. (Adrian & Estrella, 2009, p. 1) 
 
There is a difference between “Romer dates” and “Adrian dates” when we consider 
the timing of monetary policy shocks. As shown in Figure 3.2, “Romer dates” are 
identified when the federal funds rate was increasing over the course of the upturn of 
the federal funds rate cycles, whereas “Adrian dates” are identified when the federal 
funds rate has reached its highest point, i.e., peaks of the federal funds rate. “Romer 
dates” can be considered the beginning dates of restrictive monetary policy because the 
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Figure 3.2 Effective Federal Funds Rate
Vertical dotted lines indicate Romer Dates; Vertical solid lines indicate Adrian Dates;




of unemployment. “Adrian dates” can be considered the end dates of restrictive 
monetary policy because the Federal Reserve terminated its restrictive monetary policy 
by reducing the interest rate shortly. From 1960 Q1 to 1980 Q4, Adrian and Estrell 
(2009) tend to identify more occurrence of restrictive monetary policy than Romer and 
Romer (1989). Nonetheless, the beginning dates of restrictive monetary policy (i.e., 
Romer dates) overall agree with the chronology of the end dates of restrictive monetary 
policy (i.e., Adrian dates). In Figure 3.2, we can see that “Romer dates” are directly 
followed by “Adrian dates,” with an exception that two consecutive Romer dates (i.e., 
1978 Q3 and 1979 Q4) are matched with one Adrian date (i.e., 1980 Q2). 
 
3.3 Applying the Method of Previous Researchers to the  
Recent Data of the QFR 
This section describes the procedure of data transformation to reproduce the results 
of previous research. In this explanation of the data, I focus on the QFR data rather than 
the flow of funds data. This is because, while the flow of funds data provide two 
separate variables for small and large firms (i.e., nonfarm nonfinancial corporate 
business and nonfarm noncorporate business) without requiring us to construct two 
variables, the QFR data require us to construct the data to produce the variables for 
small versus large firms. 
Following the method of Gertlter and Gilchrist (1994), as discussed in Section 3, I 
construct each variable of small and large firms that are based on the 30th percentile of 
total sales distribution. Then, I deseasonalize the data. Figure 3.3 shows the growth 
rates of sales for small versus large firms. Since the data take the log-differenced form 






growth rate of sales. In this graph, we notice that the sales growth rates of large firms 
fluctuate apparently more than those of small firms―especially in the neighborhood of 
1998 and 2007. 
By accumulating the growth rates in Figure 3.3 of small and large firms, we arrive 
at the results in Figure 3.4. After setting the initial condition to zero, Figure 3.4 shows 
the cumulative growth rates of small and large firm sales. While large firms show the 
upward trend of 2 decades―increasing by 80% from the initial point to the end point 
―small firms show the somewhat downward trend, decreasing by 40% from the initial 
point to the end point. 12 
                                                          
 
12 It is somewhat surprising that small firms show a declining pattern of behavior over time. One 
possible explanation is related to the characteristics of a manufacturing industry in the QFR data. 
Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (2008) suggest that there are different growth industrial structures and growth 
patterns between new and mature industries. A new industry grows fast and comprises a large share of 
employment growth because many new (and thus small) firms enter and exist in the industry. Conversely, 
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By removing the trends in Figure 3.4 of two size groups, we produce Figure 3.5. 
That is, Figure 3.5 displays the deviation (of cumulative growth rates) of the sales from 
the trend after Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter is applied to each group of firms. In Figure 
3.5, notice that, in the 2 most recent decades, the sales of large firms show more of a 
fluctuating pattern than those of small firms.13  
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) investigate the behavior of small and large firms’ sales 
by producing a worm chart (Figure II). The worm chart draws the log deviation of small 
and large firms’ sales from their respective value at the dates of tight monetary policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
out and a greater number of large firms survive in the industry. According to their suggestion, we can 
reason that, because the manufacturing industry is a mature industry where the role of small firms 
continues to decrease, small firms may exhibit such a declining pattern. 
 
13 To check the robustness of the result, I divided the data in two different ways. First, I used the 
nominal cutoff of eight groups that are made according to the nominal asset sizes. That is, small firms are 
the aggregation of groups 1 to 4 and large firms are aggregation of groups 7 and 8. Second, following 
Oliner and Rudebusch (1995), I used the 15th percentiles in capital stock distribution, instead of the 30th 
percentile in sales distribution. All results show that large firms are more volatile than small firms during 
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Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2007) reproduce Gertler and Gilchrist’s (1994) worm 
chart, employing a business cycle shock instead of a monetary policy shock. Following 
the method of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (2007), I 
investigate the sales of small and large firms after either a business cycle shock or a 
monetary policy shock. Therefore, the cumulative growth rates of small and large firms’ 
sales in Figure 3.5 are normalized by zero at the date of a monetary policy shock or at 
the date of a business cycle peak. Then, we can produce a worm chart in the same 
manner as previous research. 
Figure 3.6 shows the sales of small and large firms after NBER recession shocks of 
recent periods: 1990 Q3, 2001 Q1, and 2007 Q4. The vertical axis indicates the 
cumulative growth rates of sales, and the horizontal axis indicates the time periods. 
After an NBER recession shock, on average, the sales of large firms reduce 
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Figure 3.6 Sales of Small and Large Firms After an NBER Recession Shock 
 
than those of small firms. In particular, after an NBER recession shock of 2007 Q4, 
small firms reduce their sales by 20%, whereas large firms reduce by 30%. Figure 3.7 
exhibits the sales of small and large firms after monetary policy shocks of recent 
periods: 1995 Q2, 2000 Q3, and 2006 Q3. Particularly, after a monetary policy shock of 
2003 Q3, large firms reduce their sales substantially more than small firms. Yet, after a 
monetary policy shock of 2006 Q3, large firms increase substantially more than small 
firms for a period of 6 quarters and then decrease sharply more than small firms.  
Figure 3.8 shows the average sales of small and large firms after an NBER recession 
shock or a monetary policy shock. On average, the sales of small firms are compared to 
those of large firms. During recent periods, large firms decrease their sales substantially 
more than small firms after either an NBER recession shock or a monetary policy shock. 
Such sensitive behavior of large firms (during recent periods) is different from the 
findings of Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) (during earlier periods), whose study shows 
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Figure 3.8 Average Sales of Small and Large Firms After Either an NBER  
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3.4 Empirical Results 
This section examines the behavior of the aggregate data in some balance sheet 
variables (sales, inventories, trade debt, and total short-term debt) and the behavior of 
the components of aggregate debt (bank debt, mortgages, commercial papers and other 
debt). 14, 15 By using these variables, the behavior of small and large firms is explored by 
different episodes, business cycle episodes and monetary policy episodes, and by 
different periods, earlier periods and recent periods. 
I report empirical results by different episodes. Empirical results of each episode 
cover the comparison of small and large firms’ behavior between earlier periods (1960 
Q1─1989 Q4) and recent periods (1990 Q1─2011 Q3).16 In particular, the comparison 
of these two periods is made based on the flow of funds data because only the flow of 
funds data are available for this long historical time period (1960 Q1─2011 Q3) among 
four data sets described in Section 2―the flow of funds data, the QFR data, the SLOOS 
data, and BED data. 
 
3.4.1 The Responses of Small Versus Large Firms to the NBER Recessions 
I examine the behavior of small and large firms during business cycle episodes by 
using four different sources of data: the flow of funds data, the Quarterly Finance 
                                                          
 
14 Total short-term debt includes short-term bank debt, commercial papers, and short-term other debt 
excluding trade debt.  
 
15 The QFR data provide the components of short-term debt (i.e., short-term bank debt, commercial 
paper, and short-term other debt) and component of long-term debt (i.e., long-term bank debt and long-
term other debt), while the flow of funds data provide only components of aggregate debt without the 
distinction between short-term and long-term debt (i.e., bank debt, mortgages, commercial papers and 
other debt). 
 
16 Earlier periods start in 1960 Q1 because the data for total short-term debt are only available from 




Report (QFR) data, the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) data, and the 
Business Employment Dynamics (BED) data. The results are reported in the order of 
data sets. 
 
3.4.1.1 The Flow of Funds Data and the QFR Data 
Employing the flow of funds data and the QFR data, Figure 3.9 shows the average 
changes in some balance sheet variables and in components of aggregate debt after an 
NBER recession shock. In particular, Figure 3.9 exhibits the outcome of the same 
exercise of the previous Figure 3.6 and 3.7 in terms of some balance sheet variables and 
the components of aggregate debt. For parsimony, I report only the average behavior of 
small and large firms after an NBER recession shock, as in Figure 3.8. 
Employing the flow of funds data, the first two columns in Figure 3.9 show the 
average behavior of small and large firms during earlier periods (pre-1990 periods) and 
recent periods (post-1990 periods). Employing the QFR data, the third column shows 
the average behavior of small and large firms during recent periods (post-1990 periods). 
I report partly the results of “sales,” “short-term bank debt,” and “mortgages” because 
these variable are available only either for the flow of fund data or for the QFR data. 
During recent periods in the QFR data (the third column), the sales of large firms 
decrease drastically more than those of small firms after an NBER recession shock. For 
a period of 6 quarters after an NBER recession shock, the sales of large firms decline by 
roughly 15%, but small firms decline by roughly 10%. During earlier periods in the 
flow of funds data (the first column), the inventories of small and large firms show 
somewhat different responses after an NBER recession shock. Large firms tend to 



























    
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   























   
   
















   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
















































































    
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








































    
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   









































    
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   







































    
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
  
   
















However, during recent periods in the flow of funds and the QFR data (second and third 
columns), the inventories of small and large firms show almost the same responses after 
an NBER recession shock. For a period of 6 quarters after an NBER recession shock, 
both small and large firms decrease their inventories by roughly 10%. 
During earlier periods in the flow of funds data (the first column), the total short-
term debt of small and large firms exhibits somewhat similar responses after an NBER 
recession shock. Both small and large firms slowly decrease their total short-term debt 
in a similar way by less than 10%. Yet, during recent periods in the flow of funds and 
the QFR data (the second and third columns), the total short-term debt of large firms 
drops substantially more than that of small firms. In particular, in the flow of funds data, 
large firms reduce their total short-term debt by roughly 18% for a period of 10 quarters 
after an NBER recession, but small firms reduce it by 10%. Such substantial reduction 
of short-term debt in large firms is more pronounced in the QFR data than in the flow of 
funds data. In the QFR data, large firms decline their total short-term debt by roughly 
25% for a period of 10 quarters after an NBER recession shock, but small firms reduce 
it by roughly 5%.17 
The components of aggregate debt exhibit a similar pattern to total short-term debt, 
depending on different time periods. During earlier periods, both small and large firms 
reduce total short-term debt comparably, whereas during recent periods, large firms 
reduce total short-term debt substantially more than small firms. Likewise, during 
earlier periods, both small and large firms, in general, similarly reduce the components 
                                                          
 
17 During recent periods, such substantial reduction of large firms is more clearly shown in short-
term bank debt of the QFR data. Large firms decrease short-term bank debt by about 45%, but small 




of aggregate debt, while during recent periods, large firms reduce the components of 
aggregate debt substantially more than small firms.  
During earlier periods in the flow of funds data (the first column), the components 
of aggregate debt show somewhat similar responses after an NBER recession shock. 
The bank debt of small firms decreases slightly more than that of large firms; the 
mortgages and other debt of small firms decrease slightly less than those of large firms. 
However, during recent periods in the flow of funds data and the QFR data (the second 
and third column), the components of short-term debt shows that the bank loans, 
mortgages and other debt of large firms―except the other debt of the QFR 
data―decrease substantially more than those of small firms after an NBER recession. 
When the components of aggregate debt during earlier periods are compared to 
those during recent periods in the flow of funds data (the first and second columns), the 
bank loan, mortgages, commercial papers, and other debt of large firms during recent 
periods (the second column) decrease substantially more than those of large firms 
during earlier periods (the first column). In particular, the commercial papers of large 
firms decrease during recent periods considerably more than during earlier periods. For 
a period of 8 quarters after an NBER recession shock, large firms reduce the 
commercial papers by around 5% during earlier periods, but reduce them by around 35% 
during recent periods.  
During recent periods (the second and third columns), when the flow of funds data 
are compared to the QFR data for all applicable variables, all variables except other 
debt (i.e., inventories, total short-term debt, bank debt, commercial and trade debt) 




than small firms. The other debt of small firms shows somewhat different behavior 
between the flow of funds and the QFR data.18 The trade debt of large firms decreases 
more than that of small firms in all datasets and in all different periods (the first, second, 
and third columns). 
The main finding is that during recent periods, in general, some balance sheet 
variables and components of aggregate debt in large firms decrease substantially more 
than those of small firms after an NBER recession shock. In particular, total short-term 
debt reflects this phenomenon very well. The declining pattern of total short-term debt 
in large firms is more pronounced in the QFR data than in the flow of funds data.  
 
3.4.1.2 The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey Data 
The Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey (SLOOS) data are other sources of data 
we can use to examine the behavior of small and large firms. As stated in Section 2, the 
Federal Reserve conducts surveys to find out how the senior loan officers (at each 
respondent banks) feel about their lending practices―such as changes in the standards 
and terms of bank loans―in the credit market over the past 3 months. For the questions 
that examine banks’ lending standards and banks’ lending terms,19 respondents (i.e., 
                                                          
 
18 The different behavior of other debt in small firms―between the flow of funds and the QFR data 
during recent periods―may result from the somewhat different characteristics of other debt in each set of 
the flow of funds and the QFR data. Other debt is defined as the residual of total debt after subtracting the 
components of debt from the total debt in each set of data. Because the components of debt in the flow of 
fund data are different from those in the QFR, other debt in the flow of funds data is different from that in 
the QFR data. In the flow of funds, other debt includes foreign debt, debt from saving institutions and 
credit unions, finance companies and so on (Federal Reserve, 2000). However, short-term other debt in 
the QFR data includes mortgages, nonbank financial institutions’ debt, and so forth. Notice that 
mortgages are categorized as other debt in the QFR, whereas they are not categorized as other debt in the 
flow of funds data. 
 
19 To reiterate, the question about banks’ lending standards is “How have your credit standards for 
C&I loans to small firms and large and medium-size firms changed over the past 3 months?” The 




senior loan officers at banks) can answer the questions with one of the five given 
choices: (1) Tightened considerably, (2) tightened somewhat, (3) remained basically 
unchanged, (4) eased somewhat, and (5) eased considerably. Also, for the question 
about the state of business demand for loans,20 respondents can answer the questions 
with one of the five given options: (1) Substantially stronger, (2) moderately stronger, 
(3) about the same, (4) moderately weaker, and (5) substantially weaker.   
Figure 3.10 shows the net percentage of domestic respondents that report a 
tightening of loan standards for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. The net 
percentage tightening here is defined as the number of loan officers reporting tightening 
standards (“tightened considerably” or “tightened somewhat”) minus the number  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
medium-sized firms―with respect to spread of loan rates over banks’ costs of funds―changed over the 
past 3 months?” 
 
20  The question about the state of business demand for loans is “Apart from normal seasonal 
variation, how has demand for C&I loans from large and medium-size firms and small firms changed 
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Figure 3.10 Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents
Tightening Standards for C&I Loans




reporting easing (“eased considerably” or “eased somewhat”) divided by the total 
number reporting. Although a tightening of loan standards in “small firms” and “large 
and medium-size firms” tends to rise and fall in a similar way over the sample periods, 
senior loan officers report that they increase their loan standards to large and medium-
size firms more than to small firms during all three NBER recessions. In particular, 
during the 2001 recession, banks increased their standards to large and medium-size 
firms substantially more than to small firms. Yet, during the recessions of 1990 to 1991 
and of 2007 to 2009, they increased to large and medium-size firms slightly more than 
to small firms.   
Figure 3.11 shows the net percentage of domestic respondents that report an 
increase in loan spreads between loan rates and banks’ cost of funds for C&I loans. A 
wider spread of loan rates over cost of funds indicates that a bank tightens its lending 
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Figure 3.11 Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents Increasing
Spreads of Loan Rates over Banks' Cost of Funds




Similarly, the net percentage spreads are defined as the number of loan officers 
reporting an increase in loan spreads (“tightened considerably” or “tightened 
somewhat”) minus the number reporting an decrease in loan spreads (“eased 
considerably” or “eased somewhat”) divided by the total number reporting. Increases or 
decreases in loan spreads to large and medium-size firms are noticeably more volatile 
than the correspondence to small firms over the business cycles. Such different 
fluctuations suggest that during a contraction, banks increase their loan spreads to large 
and medium-size firms substantially more than to small firms; during an expansion, 
they also decrease to large and medium-size firms significantly more than to small 
firms. While banks increased very similarly their loan spreads between these two kinds 
of firms during the recession of 2007 to 2009, they nevertheless increased their loan 
spreads to large and medium-size firms considerably more than to small firms during 
the recession of 1990 to 1991 and the 2001 recession.  
Figure 3.12 shows the net percentage of domestic respondents that report a stronger 
demand of businesses for C&I loans. Likewise, the net percentage demand is defined as 
the number of loan officers reporting a stronger demand of business (“substantially 
stronger” or “moderately stronger”) minus the number reporting a weaker demand of 
business (“substantially weaker” or “moderately weaker”) divided by the total number 
reporting. We can observe a similar pattern in loan demand of businesses from what 
happen to the banks’ lending standards and terms. A stronger loan demand to large and 
medium-size firms tends to fluctuate more than the equivalence to small firms over the 
sample periods. Such variations suggest that during a contraction, large and medium-






they decrease their demand for credit more than small firms. In particular, banks 
perceive that “small firms” and “large and medium-size firms” decrease very 
comparably their demand during the recession of 2007 to 2009, but banks perceive that 
large and medium-size firms decrease their demand significantly more than small firms 
during the 2001 recession―the data of the 1990 recession are not available in this net 
percentage demand. 
 
3.2.1.3 The Business Employment Dynamics Data  
The BED data also can be used to examine the behavior of small and large firms in 
terms of employment. Although Birch (1979) finds that small businesses account for a 
particularly large share of new jobs created in the U.S economy (reporting that 
establishments with 100 or fewer employees create 81.5% of net new jobs between 
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Figure 3.12 Net Percentage of Domestic Respondents
Reporting Stronger Demand for C&I Loans




his finding is somewhat overestimated for the role of small firms in job creation. 
Armington and Odle (1982) find that, when they classify business sizes by the number 
of employees working for firms (i.e., a firm basis) rather than the number of employees 
working at each location (i.e., an establishment basis), 21  firms with 100 or fewer 
employees generate only 39% of net jobs between 1978 and 1980. Brown, Hamilton, 
and Medoff (1990) find that 40% of jobs possessed by small businesses in 1980 had 
disappeared after 6 years, which implies that small businesses tend to produce short-
lived jobs. They claim that small businesses are not responsible for such a large share of 
jobs when we pay attention to jobs that are not short-lived. Furthermore, Davis, 
Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1998) criticize Birch’s methodology of classifying businesses 
into size categories because Birch’s approach produces an upward bias in the 
contribution of small firms to job growth. They point out that, when Birch uses base-
year employment in the denominator in the calculation of job growth rate, the base-year 
employment leads to a statistical pitfall, which indicates that employment growth is 
stemming from small firms. This is known as the “regression fallacy” or “regression-to-
the-mean” bias. 
To deal with some of the problems described above, the BED begins providing the 
data of business size categories in a different way. Business sizes are classified by the 
firm level (instead of the establishment level), and an alternative method, known as “a 
dynamic-sizing method,” is used (instead of the base-year method) when the BED 
classifies businesses into size classes. In addition to providing more accurate data, the 
                                                          
 
21 “An establishment is typically defined as an economic unit, such as a factory or store, which 
produces goods and provides services. An establishment is a physical location and is engaged in one, or 
predominantly one, type of economic activity. In contrast, a firm is defined as an aggregation of 




BED also provides the decomposition data of net employment growth, which allow us 
to understand the dynamics of the job market in more depth. In the quarterly BED data 
series, the net employment change is decomposed mainly into “gross job gains” and 
“gross job losses.” Gross job gains are divided furthermore into business openings and 
expansions. Gross job losses are divided additionally into business closings and 
contractions. 
Based on the BED data from 1992 Q2 to 2011 Q4, Table 3.1 displays the quarterly 
average of gross job gains, gross job losses, and net changes by firm sizes. The job 
gains, job losses, and net changes are reported basically in three different ways: level 
(panel A), share (panel B), and growth rate (panel C). As shown in panel A, the 
employment level data show that the economy, on average, created a total of 251,000 
jobs each quarter over the sample periods. Such employment increase is the net result of 
two factors: the jobs created by business openings and expansions and the jobs lost by 
business closings and contractions. Opening and expanding businesses created an 
average of 6.3 million jobs each quarter, whereas closing and contracting businesses 
lost an average of 6.1 million jobs. Each of these figures is much large than the net 
employment figures, 251,000. These statistics indicate the substantial number of job 
churning that happens in the U.S economy every quarter. 
More specifically, as to gross job gains, employment expanding businesses 
increased by an average of 5.3 million jobs per quarter, and employment opening 
businesses increased by an average of 1 million jobs. Expanding businesses, 
consequently, account for about 84% of gross job gains each quarter (5.3 million 




Table 3.1 Average Quarterly Level, Share, and Growth Rate of Gross Job Gains and 
Gross Job Losses by Firm Size (seasonally adjusted, 1992 Q3 to 2011 Q4) 
 
 Size Classes (Number of Employees) 
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A. Level (in Thousand) 
Gross Job Gains 944 739 761 904 572 612 369 302 1,130 6,333 ― 
 
Expansions 379 573 643 809 533 586 359 296 1,122 5,301 ― 
 
Openings. 565 166 117 95 39 26 10 6 8 1,032 ― 
Gross Job Losses 925 727 743 874 547 578 347 285 1,058 6,082 ― 
 
Contractions 389 569 630 779 505 546 333 276 1,049 5,075 ― 
 
Closings 536 158 113 95 42 32 14 8 10 1,007 ― 
Net Change 19 13 18 30 25 34 22 17 72 251 ― 
 
B. Share (Percent of the Categories) 1 
Gross Job Gains 15 12 12 14 9 10 6 5 18 100 ― 
 
Expansions 7 11 12 15 10 11 7 6 21 100 ― 
 
Openings 55 16 11 9 4 3 1 1 1 100 ― 
Gross Job Losses 15 12 12 14 9 9 6 5 17 100 ― 
 
Contractions 8 11 12 15 10 11 7 5 21 100 ― 
 
Closings 53 16 11 9 4 3 1 1 1 100 ― 
Net Change 8 5 7 12 10 14 9 7 29 100 ― 
Cumulative Share 
of Net Change 8 13 20 32 42 56 64 71 100 ― ― 
 
C. Growth Rate (Percent of Total Employment) 2 
Gross Job Gains 17.3 11.3 9.4 7.7 6.5 5.5 4.8 4.2 2.9 ― 7.7 
 
Expansions 6.9 8.8 7.9 6.9 6 5.3 4.7 4.1 2.9 ― 5.9 
 
Openings 10.3 2.5 1.4 0.8 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0 ― 1.8 
Gross Job Losses 16.8 11.1 9.1 7.4 6.1 5.1 4.5 3.9 2.7 ― 7.4 
 
Contractions 7.1 8.7 7.7 6.6 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 2.6 ― 5.7 
 
Closings 9.8 2.4 1.4 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 ― 1.7 
Net Change 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 ― 0.3 
 
1 Share measures the percent of the categories―i.e., gross job gains, expansions, contractions etc.― 
represented by each firm class. 
2 Growth rate measures the gross job gains, gross job losses, expansions, openings, contractions and 
openings as a percentage of average of the previous and current total employment. 
†Source: An author' calculations based on Bureau of Labor Statistics' Business Employment Dynamics 





million jobs/6.3 million jobs)―on average over the sample period. On the other hand, 
regarding gross job losses, employment contracting businesses decreased by an average 
of 5.1 million jobs, and employment closing businesses decreased by an average of 1 
million jobs. Contracting businesses, hence, account for about 84% of gross job losses, 
and closing businesses account for the residual about 16%―on average over the sample 
period. These statistics indicate that it is expanding and contracting businesses that 
constitute a majority of gross job gains and losses in the labor market, not opening and 
closing businesses.   
As previously reported, the economy has experienced gross job gains, averaging a 
gain of 6.3 million jobs each quarter. A natural question arises: “Which firm size group 
accounts for the most job gains?” Panel B answers this question. Firms with fewer than 
50 employees contributed an average of 53% of gross job gains (15+12+12+14), and 
firms with fewer than 100 employees contributed 62% (53+9). On the other hand, the 
economy has experienced gross job losses, averaging a loss of 6.1 million jobs each 
quarter. Firms with fewer than 50 employees had a 53% share of gross job losses 
(15+12+12+14), and firms with fewer than 100 employees had a 62% share of gross job 
losses (53+9). Subtracting gross job losses from gross job gains produces an average net 
gain of 251,000 jobs. Firms with fewer than 50 employees contributed about 32% of 
average net job change, and firms with fewer than 100 employees contributed 42%. To 
understand whether small firms create more jobs than large firms, it is required to 
compare the share of small firms in total job creation to the share of their total 
employment. The comparison of these two shares reveals that the share of these firms in 




than 50 employees made up 30% of total employment (but contributed 32% of net job 
creation), and firms with fewer than 100 employees made up 37% (but contributed 
42%)―the share of total employment is not shown in Table 3.1. 22 These statistics 
suggest that small firms contributed a larger share of new jobs over the past 2 
decades23―nonetheless, a larger share of their new jobs is still open to question over 
the phase of the business cycle, especially during a recession.  
The very large firms, those with 1000 or more employees, made up 18% of gross 
job gains, the highest share among the nine size firms. The next largest share appears 
with the size class 1 to 4 employees, with 15% of gross job gains. These two size 
groups also had the largest quarterly share of gross job losses, 17% and 15%, 
respectively. The business openings and closings took place mostly in smaller size 
groups. In the size class of 1 to 4 employees, the average share of gross job gains was 
55% each quarter, and the average share of gross job losses was 53%. Notice that this 
share decreases as firm size increases. 
As shown in panel C, the growth rates show that the economy has experienced 
about 7.7% of average gross job gain rate and about 7.4% of average gross job loss rate 
over the sample periods. These figures mean that the jobs created by opening and 
expanding businesses account for average 7.7% of the total number of jobs during a 
quarter; similarly, the job lost by closing and contracting businesses comprise average 
                                                          
 
22 The share of total employment (not shown in Table 3.1) is based on the establishment level, not the 
firm level, from the data of Business Dynamic Statistics (BDS).  
 
23 Brown et al. (1990) suggest that we should not conclude from this result―the larger contribution 
of small firms to new jobs―that small firms grow faster than larger ones. Indeed, the mortality rate for 
small firms is much higher than that of large firms. Such high mortality rate influences the faster growth 
rates of small firms among survivors. “If calculation [of growth rate] is extended to include all firms 
existing in the initial year, and not just those that survived, small businesses declined faster than large 




7.4% of total number of jobs. The difference of 3% between these two statistics is an 
average of net employment growth rate during a quarter. In this analysis, we will pay 
special attention to the net employment growth measured as a rate, rather than an 
employment level, because using an employment growth rate permits us to compare 
changes in the behavior of small and large firms more reasonably. To understand better 
the underlying dynamics of the net employment growth rate, we need to turn to the 
components of the net employment growth measured as rates―a gross job gains rate 
and a gross job losses rate. 
Figure 3.13 shows gross job gain (job creation) rates and gross job loss (job 
destruction) rates between small and larger firms. In this graph, small firms are defined 
as firms with 1 to 49 employees, and large firms are defined as those with 50 or 
more.24, 25 Over the past 2 decades, we can see a striking difference of job creation rates 
and destruction rates between small and large firms. Both the job creation rates and job 
destruction rates of small firms are very high, ranging from 9 to 13%. In contrast, these 
two statistics of large firms are somewhat low, ranging from 3 to 6%. Such a different 
tendency suggests that small firms create and also destruct jobs at a fast rate, while large 
firms create and also destruct jobs at a slow rate.26 Because an important statistic we  
                                                          
24 I report only the results produced by this definition of small and large firms because other two 
definitions―which indicate small firms as those with 1 to 99 employees and those with 1 to 499 
employees―produce similar results.  
 
25 Job gain rates are measured by averaging the job gain rates of each size classes of small and large 
firms according to the definition of each group of firms. For example, when small firms are defined firms 
with 1 to 49, I first calculate the job gain rates of each of the first four size classes. Then, I divide the sum 
of the job gain rates of these four size classes by 4, i.e., (the rate of size class 1 + of size class 2 + of size 
class 3 + of size class 4)/4.   
 
26 Although I did not report expansion rates, contraction rates, opening rates, and closing rates, the 
behavior of these components reflects a pattern of job creation rates and job destruction rates between 






must focus on is the difference between job creation rates and destruction rates, this 
leads us to investigate net job creation rates, a more accurate measure of job creation in 
the economy. 
Figure 3.14 shows the behavior of both the net job creation (levels) and the net job 
creation rate between small and large firms from 1992 Q3 to 2011 Q4. To examine the 
behavior of small and large firms more thoroughly in terms of net job creation, small 
and larger firms are defined in three different ways, as stated in Section 2: (1) small 
firms are a group that hires 1 to 49 employees, and larger firms are a group that hires 50 
or more employees; (2) small firms are a group that hires 1 to 99 employees, and larger 
firms are a group that hires 100 or more employees; and (3) small firms are a group that 
hires 1 to 499 employees, and larger firms are a group that hires 500 or more employees. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
existing large firms do; small firms tend to open and close their businesses at a greater rate than large 








1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010
1 to 49: Gross Job Gain Rate
1 to 49: Gross Job Loss Rate
50 or more: Gross Job Gain Rate
50 or more: Gross Job Loss Rate
Figure 3.13 Gross Job Gain Rates and Gross Job Loss Rates



















































































































































Panel A in Figure 3.14 displays the “net job creation” measured as an employment 
level. In the first two definitions of small and large firms (the first two columns), the net 
job creation of larger firms is more volatile than that of small firms during 2001 
recession and the 2007-2009 recession. Yet, in the third definition (the third column), 
the situation is reversed; the net job creation of small firms is more variable than that of 
large firms, particularly when we look at the 2007-2009 recession. This is partly 
because, I believe, when the net job creation is measured by the employment level, the 
fluctuations of small firms tend to change depending on how we classify small firms. 
For example, if small firms are defined to include more firm size classes, they are likely 
to show more net change in employment levels due to an increase in their population. 
To address this issue, panel B in Figure 3.14 displays net job creation rates, rather 
than the employment level. Net job creation rates compare the contribution of job 
creation between small and large firms more accurately because they show a portion of 
the total number of jobs. As in Section 2, the growth rates of net job creation are 
reported hereafter I remove a trend from cumulative growth rates by using Hodric-
Prescott (HP) filter. Notice that, when net job creation rates are used in panel B, the 
difference of the behavior between small and large firms is less dramatic than when the 
net job creation (levels) are used in panel A. During the 2001 recession, the net job 
creation rates of larger firms are somewhat more volatile than those of small firms in all 
three definitions of small and large firms. Yet, during the 2007-2009 recession, the net 
job creation rates of small firms are slightly more variable than those of larger firms in 




and the 2007-2008 recessions more closely, the cumulative growth rates of net job 
creation are normalized by zero at the start date of the NBER recession, as in Section 2.  
Figure 3.15 shows that, during the 2001 recession, the net job creation of large firms 
decreased substantially more than that of small firms in all three definitions (the left 
three columns). These results are consistent with the results produced from the SLOOS 
data set. Remember that senior loan officers report that, during the 2001 recession, they 
increased their loan standards and loan spreads to large and medium-size firms 
substantially more than to small firms (Figure 3.10 and 3.11) and that they also 
perceived large and medium-size firms increase their loan demand significantly more 
than small firms (Figure 3.12).  On the other hand, during the 2007 to 2009 recession, 
the net job creation of small firms declines almost to the same extent as that of large 
firms (the first two columns in the right) or decrease slightly more than that of large 
firms (the bottom right column). These outcomes are also generally consistent with the 
outcomes produced from the SLOOS data. Recall that senior loan officers report that, 
during the 2007-2009 recession, they increased their loan standards and loan spreads to 
a very similar degree between small and large and medium-size firms or increased these 
two elements to large and medium-size firms slightly more than small firms (Figure 
3.10 and 3.11), and that they see these two kinds of firms decrease their loan demand to 




























































































































































3.4.2 The Responses of Small Versus Large Firms to Monetary Policy 
3.4.2.1 The Flow of Funds Data and the QFR Data 
I examine the behavior of small and large firms during monetary policy episodes by 
using two different sources of data: the flow of funds data and the Quarterly Finance 
Report (QFR) data. In this analysis, two types of monetary policy shocks―“Romer 
dates” and “Adrian dates”―are used. As mentioned in Section 2, “Romer dates” are 
available only for earlier periods (pre-1990 periods) while “Adrian dates” are available 
for long historical sample periods (1960 Q1 – 2011 Q3). Although I have employed two 
types of monetary policy shocks, only the results produced by using “Adrian dates” are 
reported in this subsection. This is because “Adrian dates” allow us to make a 
comparison between earlier periods and recent periods. Nonetheless, the results 
produced by using “Romer dates” are also reported in Appendix C. 
Employing the flow of funds data and the QFR data, Figure 3.16 shows the average 
changes in some balance sheet variables (sales, inventories, trade debt and total short- 
term debt) and in components of aggregate debt (bank debt, mortgages, commercial 
papers, and other debt) after a tight monetary policy shock. I also report only the 
average behavior of small and large firms after a tight monetary shock. Employing the 
flow of funds data, the first two columns show the average behavior of small and large 
firms during earlier periods (pre-1990 periods) and recent periods (post-1990 periods). 
Employing the QFR data, the third column shows the average behavior of small and 
large firms during recent periods (post-1990 periods). In addition, I report partly the 
results of “sales,” “short-term bank debt,” and “mortgages” for either the flow of funds 



























    
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   























































































    
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   








































    
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   










































    
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   







































    
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
    


















During recent periods in the QFR data (the third column), the sales of small firms 
hover around zero up to 8 quarters after a monetary policy shock and afterward start to 
decline; the sales of large firms begin to decline slightly after a monetary policy shock 
and then recover until 8 quarters have passed. Finally, they decline sharply. In 
particular, the sales of small and large firms in Figure 3.16 exhibit a very similar pattern 
to the sales of small and large firms in Figure 3.9, which are produced after an NBER 
recession shock. Just as large firms decrease sales substantially more than small firms 
after an NBER recession shock, their sales decrease significantly more than small firms 
after a monetary policy shock. However, a monetary policy shock has a weaker impact 
on the sales of small and larger firms than an NBER recession shock. During earlier 
periods in the flow of funds data (the first column), the inventories of small firms drop 
slightly more than those of large firms. Yet, during recent periods in the flow of funds 
and the QFR data (second and third columns), this pattern tends to change; large firms 
decrease their inventories more than small firms. 
During earlier periods in the flow of funds data (the first column), the total short-
term debt of small and large firms behaves similarly after a monetary policy shock, 
showing virtually flat-shaped responses. Yet, during recent periods in the flow of funds 
and the QFR data (the second and third column), both small and large firms tend to 
increase their total short-term debt after a monetary policy shock. The total short-term 
debt of small and large firms shows a rising-and-falling pattern (an inverse U shape) 




produced from past research.27 In particular, recent periods of those two data sets reveal 
that, after a monetary policy shock, large firms increase their total short-term debt 
somewhat more than small firms. Such behavior of large firms is more pronounced in 
the QFR data than in the flow of funds data.  
The components of aggregate debt do not show a consistent pattern after a monetary 
policy shock. During recent periods, bank debt and other debt of small and large firms 
display a rising-and-falling pattern in the flow of fund data (the second column), but 
they show an ambiguous behavior in the QFR data (the third column). Similarly, it is 
very difficult to find a consistent pattern in the other components of aggregate debt.  
During earlier periods in the flow of funds data (the first column), the trade debt of 
large firms tends to decrease slightly more than that of small firms. During recent 
periods in the flow of funds data (the second column), large firms decrease their trade 
debt immediately after a monetary policy shock, but small firms are initially unaffected 
and start to increase slightly after 5 quarters. During recent periods in the QFR data (the 
                                                          
 
27 Employing the QFR data, Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) find that after tightening monetary policy, 
the behavior of total short-term debt mirrors the behavior of inventories for small and large firms. 
Following tight monetary policy, large firms tend to increase both inventories and total short-term debt, 
whereas small firms tend to decrease both inventories and total short-term debt. Gertler and Gilchrist 
interpreted these results as support for the notion that large firms may borrow total short-term debt more 
than small firms to smooth the impact of a recession―at the time that the need for external finances rises 
to carry inventory accumulations. Gertler and Gilchrist’s interpretation works well during earlier periods. 
In other words, the inventories and bank debt of large firms increase more than those of small firms 
during earlier periods in the flow of funds data (the first column). 
 
Although Gertler and Gilchrist’s interpretation works well in the earlier-period flow of funds data, it 
does not fit into the recent-period flow of funds and QFR data. During recent periods, I find that the 
short-term debt of large firms increases more than that of small firms, consistent with Gertler and 
Gilchrist’ (1994) findings. However, the inventories of large firms tend to decrease, not increase, whereas 
the inventories of small firms sharply increase or are unaffected for some periods. The question is “Why 
do large firms still increase total short-term debt in spite of a decrease in their inventories?” One possible 
explanation is that, since large firms experience the decline in sales (the first row) and thus a decline in 





third column), small and large firms show a similar response; they hover around zero 
until 6 quarters and afterward begin to decline. 
The main finding is that, during recent periods, the total short-term debt of small 
and large firms tends to increase after a monetary policy shock. In particular, large firms 
increase their total short-term debt more than small firms. Such behavior of large firms 
is shown more clearly in the short-term bank debt of the QFR data. Moreover, during 
recent periods, some balance sheet variables and components of debt of larger firms 
generally show more sensitive behavior than those of small firms following a monetary 
policy shock. 
When the NBER recession episodes (in Figure 3.9) are compared to the tight 
monetary episodes (in Figure 3.16), an NBER recession shock shows a substantially 
stronger impact on the behavior of firms than a monetary policy shock. During the 
NBER recession episodes, the behavior of firms is usually captured in the vertical axis 
that ranges from 1 to –2. During tight monetary episodes, the behavior of firms is 
typically captured in the vertical axis that ranges from 1 to –1. In addition, during recent 
periods, when the flow of funds data are compared to the QFR data for the total short-
term debt and (short-term) bank debt, large firms show much more sensitive behavior 
than small firms, as shown in Figure 3.9 and 3.16.  
 
3.4.3 Is a Monetary Policy Shock Different from an NBER  
Recession Shock? 
Figure 3.17 and 3.18―which are extracted from Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.16, 
respectively―show the average changes in “total short-term debt” and “short-term bank 



























    
   
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






   
















   
   
   

















   
   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

























































































    
   
   











   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   






















   
   
















   
   

















   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   



































































comparison of these results suggests that a monetary policy shock is somewhat different 
from an NBER recession shock in that it affects a short-term financing pattern of firms 
differently in recent periods. As shown in Figure 3.17 and 3.18, in recent periods (the 
second and the third column), both small and large firms tend to decrease total short-
term debt and short-term bank debt after an NBER recession shock, while they tend to 
increase these debts after a monetary policy shock.28 In particular, it is important to 
notice that large firms show much more sensitive behavior than small firms―after 
either an NBER recession shock or a monetary policy shock. Large firms decrease 
short-term bank debt substantially more than small firms after an NBER recession 
shock; likewise, they increase short-term bank debt significantly more than small firms 
after a monetary policy shock. 
More specifically, by comparing the behavior of “the QFR data” to the behavior of 
the “Flow of Funds data” (the second versus the third column), we can observe that the 
excess sensitivity of large firms is more pronounced in the QFR data than in the flow of 
funds data―after either an NBER recession shock or a monetary policy shock. 
Furthermore, examining only the QFR (the third column) allows us to compare the 
behavior of “total short-term debt” and the behavior of “short-term bank debt” after 
each kind of shock―i.e., the comparison of the first and the second row in the third 
column. It is interesting to note that such excess sensitivity of large firms is even more 
pronounced in short-term bank debt than in total short-term debt. That is, after an 
NBER recession shock, a comparison between the total short-term debt and the short-
term bank debt (in the third column of Figure 3.17) shows that, for large firms, the 
                                                          
 
28 In the earlier periods, on the other hand, either small or large firms are practically unaffected or 




trough of short-term bank debt is two times as deep as the trough of total short-term 
debt: −0.45 in short-term bank debt and −0.27 in total short-term debt. On the other 
hand, after a monetary policy shock, a comparison between total short-term debt and 
short-term bank debt (in the third column of Figure 3.18) shows that, for large firms, the 
peak of short term bank debt is four times as tall as the peak of total short-term debt: 
0.27 for short-term bank debt and 0.07 for total short-term debt. From these empirical 
results, several critical questions arise: 
• Why do small and large firms tend to decrease total short-term debt and short-
term bank debt after an NBER recession shock?  
• Why do small and large firms tend to increase total short-term debt and short-
term bank debt after a monetary policy shock?  
• Furthermore, why do large firms show more sensitive responses (than small 
firms) to either an NBER recession shock or a monetary policy shock in recent 
periods?  
This research paper provides some responses to these three questions. The first and 
second questions will be answered by examining the aggregate behavior of small and 
large firms.29 The third question will be answered by accounting for the disaggregate 
behavior of firms. For the first and second questions, a plausible explanation will be 
illustrated in this section. For the third question, a more detailed explanation will be 
further illustrated in the subsequent section. 
For these first two questions, the use and the availability of “bank lines of credit,” 
which has been more commonly used in recent years, provides one possible explanation 
                                                          
 
29 In this case, the explanation focuses on the aggregate behavior of firms because both kinds of firms 




for the responses of firms’ short-term financing to be different between a monetary 
policy shock and an NBER recession shock. Because lines of credit can be used as a 
source of liquidity to some borrowers in times of financial difficulties, a different short-
term financing pattern of borrowers may reflect the different ability of borrowers to 
draw down their credit lines. The borrowers’ ability to draw down their lines, in turn, 
depends on the financial conditions of borrowers at a time when either an NBER 
recession shock or a monetary policy shock arises.  
The basic idea suggested in this paper is that, after an NBER recession shock, if 
borrowers experience a severe deterioration of their financial conditions (over a 
downturn), they may not be able to draw on their credit lines; such limitation of credit 
lines may generate a decreasing pattern of short-term finances. However, after a 
monetary policy shock, if borrowers undergo a somewhat weak exacerbation of their 
financial conditions (over an upturn) and still maintain strong financial condition,30 they 
may be able to draw down their credit lines; such drawdown of credit lines may create 
an increasing pattern of short-term finance. More detailed explanations concerning this 
basic idea will be demonstrated in the following subsections. 
 
3.4.3.1 Lines of Credit 
In credit line contracts, lenders promise that they will lend up to a certain amount of 
money within a certain period of time at a predetermined variable rate, the overall 
interest rate on credit lines. It is known that the predetermined rate consists mainly of a 
borrower-specific risk premium―usually called a fixed markup―and a floating market 
                                                          
 





interest rate, such as a prime rate and LIBOR (Melnik & Plaut, 1986; Shockley & 
Thakor, 1997). For example, suppose that a lender allows a borrower to take down its 
balances at a 1% fixed markup (i.e., a risk premium) over a floating prime rate (i.e., a 
market rate)―i.e., prime plus 1%. In this contract, although the overall interest rate on 
the credit line is variable over time, it is important to note that a borrower-specific risk 
premium is fixed during a period of the contract. Such a fixed risk premium shelters 
borrowers from increases in interest rates, which might be triggered either by the 
deterioration of a borrower’s credit quality or by an increase in spread in market-wide 
risk. In particular, say a borrower is locked into a fixed borrower-specific risk premium 
in credit lines (e.g., prime plus 1%), and a lender is obligated to lend someday at that 
rate. In this situation, let’s consider what happens if the borrower’s own spot market 
risk premium increases (e.g., prime plus 2%) due to the financial crisis of 2008, for 
example. Typical borrowers, in such a situation, would be expected to draw down their 
credit line if they needed some external finance, because the interest rate on their credit 
line is lower than what would be available in the spot credit market.  
Although lines of credit are the prearranged loans settled between lenders and 
borrowers, credit-line contracts usually contain “financial covenants” and “contingency 
clauses” that limit the ability of borrowers to draw down their lines. In financial 
covenants, borrowing under lines of credit is required to maintain financial ratios, such 
as cash flow, coverage, liquidity, and other covenants that are all specified in the initial 
credit contracts (Sufi, 2009). The violations of financial covenants allow lenders to 
withhold the prearranged credit lines from borrowers or to renegotiate the credit lines 




contain a Material Adverse Change (MAC) clause, even if they are infrequently 
invoked. If the credit quality of borrowers deteriorates significantly for some reason, 
such contingent clause allows lenders to restrict an amount of borrowing under lines of 
credit (Shockley & Thakor, 1997). 
 
3.4.3.2 A Monetary Shock and the Availability of Credit Lines 
As discussed above, the ability of borrowers to draw down their lines is conditional 
on the obedience of financial covenants and contingency clauses, which in turn are 
directly linked into the financial conditions of borrowers. As a result, it is reasonable to 
claim that the use and the availability of credit lines will be determined by the 
borrowers’ financial conditions. Most importantly, the financial conditions of the 
borrowers may differ (1) at a time when an NBER recession shock occurs and (2) at a 
time when a monetary policy shock occurs.  
The financial conditions of borrowers are likely to be somewhat strong at a time 
when a monetary policy shock arises. This is because borrowers may be able to create 
enough cash flow from their operations in order to cover debt services during the late 
expansion―especially at the somewhat early stage of the late expansion, as shown in 
Figure 3.19.31, 32 More specifically, in the expansion phase of the business cycle, a 
positive productivity shock to the economy propagates the business cycle when it has  
                                                          
 
31 According to Sinai (1978), the financial cycle can be categorized into phases analogous to the 
business cycle of Recovery, Peak, Slump or Recession, and Trough. The financial cycle has showed 
stages termed Accumulation, developing financial instability or the Precrunch period, Crunch, and 
Reliqefication. The stage of the financial cycle and the business cycle resemble each other as follows: 
Recovery (Reliqefication and Accumulation), Boom (Accumulation and Precrunch period), Peak 





           
Figure 3.19 Timing of a Monetary Policy Shock and an NBER Recession Shock 
 
been amplified by the continuous improvement of the borrowers’ financial conditions. 
According to Bernanke and Gertler (1989), an increase in productivity (i.e., a small 
shock) enhances the cash flow and balance sheet positions of borrowers in current 
periods. In turn, an improvement of borrowers’ financial positions can contribute to a 
lower cost of external finances in subsequent periods. Such lower cost in the following 
periods extends the expansions, as borrowers are motivated to invest continuously (even 
after an initial productivity shock has disappeared).33 The underlying idea that a small 
shock can be amplified by influencing the credit-market conditions is called the 
“financial accelerator” theory. This theory can be applied to any positive shock that 
                                                                                                                                                                          
32 In Sinai’s nomenclature, the “Precrunch period” in the financial cycle―an ongoing tight monetary 
policy falls into this Precrunch period―occurs between “Recovery” and “Peak” in the real business 
cycle, more specifically at the “late expansion” and “boom.” 
 
33 An increase in productivity is likely to be accomplished by events “such as new inventions, new 
industries, development of new sources, and opening of new land or new market” (Fisher, 1933, p. 348).  
Fisher (1933) suggests that such events may create new investment opportunities for a greater prospective 
profit (in addition to an increase in productivity), so that they play an important role as a starter of the 




improves borrowers’ cash flows or balance sheet conditions. In particular, the financial 
accelerator theory helps to explain how borrowers’ financial conditions (initiated by 
such a positive shock) become stronger and healthier as the business cycle 
expands―especially through the feedback effects on financial conditions, the cost of 
external finance, and investment spending. It is likely that borrowers face a virtuous 
circle of improving financial conditions, falling costs of external finance, and rising 
investment spending in the early and middle expansion, as shown in Figure 3.19.34 
However, as the economy becomes overheated during the late expansion, demand 
for credits may outstrip the ability of lenders to supply credit at moderate rates; what is 
more, demand for credit may further increase with accelerating inflation (Eckstein & 
Sinai, 1986). Accordingly, when the liquidity squeeze takes place, borrowers may find 
that external finances become less obtainable and available but at higher rates. Although 
interest rates rise continuously during the late expansion, these rising rates may not fully 
discourage demand for credit. During the upturn of the business cycle, firms may still 
expect continuous future profits because of a strong aggregate demand, or they may 
need more credits because of accelerating inflation. At some point in time, the Fed is 
likely to adopt a restrictive monetary policy when it has been highly disturbed by 
noticeable signs of a boom―particularly when the Fed identifies the economy to grow 
substantially beyond its trend and such economic growth may extraordinarily push up 
inflation. Because an important objective of monetary policy is to maintain price 
stability, the Fed may decide to slow down accelerating inflation by raising interest 
rates. This response is most likely to happen at the somewhat early stage of the late 
                                                          
 
34 At the same time, the optimism and overconfidence of borrowers about good business prospects 




expansion, as shown in Figure 3.19, when the financial conditions of borrowers are still 
robust to some extent.                 
 Although a restrictive monetary policy affects borrowers’ financial conditions 
unfavorably to some degree, most borrowers, who may still maintain strong financial 
conditions, are likely to remain compliant with financial covenants and contingency 
clauses. Such compliance of financial contracts allows borrowers to draw down their 
credit lines when loan demands increase. More specifically, suppose that the Fed 
decides to sharply increase the interest rate. After tightening monetary policy, when the 
borrowers’ financial positions become deteriorated to some extent, borrowers may 
observe that their risk premiums in spot markets increase sharply, but their prearranged 
risk premiums in credit lines do not change. In other words, they know that their risk 
premiums in spot markets would be higher than their prearranged risk premiums in 
credit lines. In this situation, borrowers are likely to make use of their credit lines after a 
tight monetary policy because their credit lines are available on more pleasing terms 
than spot market loans. 35 
 
3.4.3.3 An NBER Recession Shock and the Availability of Credit Lines 
The financial conditions of borrowers are likely to be vulnerable at a time when an 
NBER recession shock arises. This is because borrowers may not be able to create 
enough cash flow from their operations to cover full-blown debt services in the late 
expansion―especially at the very end of the late expansion, the peak of the business 
                                                          
 
35  Particularly, it is important to note that after tightening monetary policy, although borrowers’ net 
cash flows from their operations become decreased, their cash flow receipts from operations may still 





cycle, as shown in Figure 3.19. 36  More specifically, during the early and middle 
expansion, continuing enhancement in borrowers’ financial conditions may allow 
borrowers to build their indebtedness constantly; during the late expansion, the 
continually rising demand for credit (as a result of accelerating inflation during a boom) 
increases the intensity of borrowers’ indebtedness more severely. 37 In the situation 
where debtors become intensely indebted, at some point in time, the Fed (identifying 
the economy as overheated) may start to raise interest rates. A continuous and gradually 
tighter monetary policy is likely to exacerbate borrowers’ financial conditions more and 
more to some extent, reducing borrowers’ net cash flow. In particular, as interest rates 
sharply rise over time, the financial conditions of borrowers―which were somewhat 
robust at a time when tight monetary policy began―become increasingly weakened. At 
the same time, the cash flow payments due to swelling debts may catch up with the cash 
flow receipts from their operations. As borrowers’ net cash flows become reduced, 
more debtors are continuously forced to issue new debts or to sell their financial assets 
to raise funds that should be used to pay off their maturing debts―i.e., refinancing their 
positions. In this situation, it is important to notice that, because some borrowers can 
still increase their indebtedness by drawing down their credit lines even after an 
ongoing tight monetary policy, their financial positions become increasingly more 
strained than others’ financial positions. Consequently, as the volume of indebtedness 
increases and net cash flow decreases rapidly at the very end of the late expansion, the 
financial conditions of borrowers may become extremely vulnerable to small 
                                                          
36 In the nomenclature of Sinai (1978), “Crunch” in the financial cycle corresponds to the “Peak” and 
“very early stage of downturn” in the real business cycle.  
 
37 Simultaneously, interest rates may start to rise naturally in the late expansion before the Fed’s 




disruptions in the economy.                
 As suggested by Eckstein and Sinai (1986) and Bernanke et al. (1996), borrowers 
tend to be financially overreached and hence “vulnerable” at the cyclical peaks. When 
the business cycle approaches the upper turning point, borrowers are likely to be very 
susceptible to the disruptions of either financial or real markets―i.e., at the cyclical 
peaks.38 Such disruptions to the economy may come from either “external shocks” or 
“endogenous developments” in the business cycle. For example, external shocks are a 
variety of events, such as the swing to a federal budget in 1960, the auto strike of 1970, 
the oil price hike of 1973-74, the collapse of the dot-com bubble in 2001, the collapse of 
the housing bubble in 2008, etc. Endogenous developments arise when debtors cannot 
refinance their maturing debts at some point (because of lenders’ concerns about 
borrowers’ over-indebtedness) or when an economic expansion naturally ends in the 
process of a business cycle. 
When the financial structure becomes enormously fragile at the very late stage of 
the expansion, a small disruption of the market (i.e., an NBER recession shock) may 
lead to a severe recession in conjunction with the outbreaks of other ensuing full-grown 
events―such as collapses of financial institutions or widely increasing defaults and 
failures of businesses, sharply falling asset prices, severe cutbacks in spending (due to 
increasing pessimism), increasingly prevalent credit rationing, and an inapt continuous 
monetary tightening.39, 40 Such multiple and simultaneous, or a series of, bad events are 
                                                          
 
38  When borrowers’ over-indebtedness has substantially increased at the very late stage of the 
expansion (close to a cyclical peak), lenders of credit may have full-blown pessimism and skepticism 
about borrowers’ “solvency” or “creditworthiness,” and thereby may stand ready to withdraw their credits 





likely to deteriorate borrowers’ financial conditions to a large extent, reducing 
borrowers’ net cash flow substantially.41 At this moment, the cash flow outlays from 
debts may exceed the cash flow receipts from operations by a significant amount. At the 
onset of a recession, therefore, as many borrowers’ net cash flow suddenly changes 
from a positive to negative number, borrowers may not be able to issue new debt―by 
using credit lines or other financial methods―at a time when the need for new debt is 
most acute. At this time, borrowers may not be able to draw down their credit lines 
because they may violate financial covenants and contingent clauses due to their weaker 
financial conditions. Likewise, in other financial instruments, borrowers may not be 
able to renew their existing loans, such as commercial papers or bank loans, with the 
same reason.  
 
3.4.3.4 Summary  
To sum up, a monetary shock may deteriorate borrowers’ financial conditions to a 
lesser extent, reducing their cash flow slightly, when an economy experiences the 
upturn of the business cycle. In this circumstance, because borrowers with somewhat 
strong financial conditions do not violate financial covenants and contingency clauses, 
                                                                                                                                                                          
39 Credit crunches or financial crises have been considered and examined by Fisher (1933), Minsky 
(1975, 1977), Wojnilower (1980), Sinai (1976, 1978) and Eckstein and Sinai (1986). Fisher, Minsky, and 
Sinai consider such eruptions of events endogenous processes normally produced in the economy―a 
derivative of the real cycle that arises concurrently.  
 
40 Eckstein and Sinai (1986) introduce the business cycle with five stages that consider the coincident 
and interdependent behavior of real and financial markets: (1) recovery/expansion; (2) boom; (3) 
precrunch period/crunch; (4) recession/decline; and (5) reliquefication. They include a “credit 
crunch”―which is usually triggered by a tight monetary policy of a central bank―in the standard stages 
of the business cycle because every recession since the mid-1950s was preceded and caused by a credit 
crunch.  
 
41  Such multiple and simultaneous, or a series of, events may create a massive ripple effect 
throughout the entire economy, when changes in borrowers’ financial conditions amplify and propagate 




they may be able to draw down their lines. On the other hand, an NBER recession shock 
may exacerbate a firm’s financial condition to a great extent, reducing its cash flow 
substantially, when the financial structure is extremely fragile at the cyclical peak 
(owing to borrowers’ over-indebtedness). In this situation, because borrowers with very 
weak financial conditions violate financial covenants and contingency clauses, they 
may not able to draw down their lines. The next section will provide some plausible 
explanations for the third question described above. 
 
3.5 Why Do Large Firms Show Much More Sensitive Behavior of  
Short-Term Debt in Response to an Adverse Shock?  
In the previous section, the empirical results of post-1990 periods indicate that, after 
a monetary policy shock, large firms increase short-term debt substantially more than 
small firms; however, after an NBER recession shock, they decrease short-term debt 
significantly more than small firms. Such excessively sensitive behavior of large firms 
suggests that firms may have been affected by new or different economic forces during 
post-1990 periods. If so, what are the explanations for such findings? This section will 
discuss two possible explanations (of why large firms respond more sensitively to an 
adverse shock): (1) the financial conditions of borrowers, and (2) the benefits of lending 
relationships. I suggest that the former mainly justifies the excessively sensitive 
behavior of large firms in response to a monetary policy shock, whereas the latter 
mainly rationalizes such behavior of large firms in response to an NBER recession 
shock. However, the former can be applicable to the sensitive behavior of large firms in 





3.5.1 Financial Conditions of Borrowers 
One possible explanation is related to the financial conditions of borrowers. The 
financial conditions of large firms may be different from those of small firms over the 
business cycle―especially at a time when a monetary policy shock or an NBER 
recession shock arises. In other words, large firms are likely to have stronger balance 
sheet conditions than small firms at a time when a monetary policy shock occurs; in 
contrast, they are likely to have weaker balance sheet conditions than small firms at a 
time when an NBER recession shock occurs. Such stronger or weaker financial 
conditions of large firms may play an important role in determining the availability of 
their short-term debts―either after a monetary policy shock or an NBER recession 
shock.  
According to this explanation, the financial conditions of borrowers can be 
measured in terms of the collateralizable net worth of borrowers. Borrowers’ 
collateralizable net worth includes net financial assets, tangible physical assets, and 
current and future expected cash flows that may be pledged as collateral (Gertler & 
Gilchrist, 1993). A number of researchers propose that borrowers’ collateralizable net 
worth plays a critical role in lowering the cost of external finance (Bernanke & Gertler, 
1989; Gertler & Gilchrist, 1993; Gertler & Hubbard, 1989). The greater the level of 
borrowers’ collateralizable net worth, the smaller the potential conflict of interest with 
lenders. This is because borrowers can offer more collateral to lenders, making the 
expected cost of external finance low. In fact, it should be noted that firms’ net worth 
tends to be procyclical, and the cost of external finance is inversely related to firms’ net 




decreases the cost of external finance, and it becomes easier to borrow. However, 
during a contraction, where firms’ net worth tends to fall, their falling net worth 
increases the cost of external finance, and it becomes more difficult to borrow. 
Furthermore, a number of empirical findings suggest that the financial conditions of 
large firms are more procyclical than those of small firms over the business cycle. 
Specifically, the sales and employment of large firms are more sensitive to the business 
cycle than those of small firms during recent periods of data set (see Chari et al., 2007; 
Kudlyak et al., 2010, for sales and see Moscarini & Postel-Vinay, 2008, 2009, 2012; 
Kliesen & Maués, 2011, for employment). These findings suggest that the net worth of 
large firms may swell during an expansion or shrink during a contraction at a faster rate 
than that of small firms.42 For example, if large firms increase their employment and 
sales more than small firms over the course of an expansion, they may be able to 
generate more profits, thereby adding the profits to their net worth in subsequent 
periods. The opposite is true during a contraction. Therefore, over the course of an 
expansion, the net worth of large firms may rise at a faster rate than the net worth of 
small firms, making the financial conditions of large firms stronger. By contrast, over 
the course of a contraction, large firms’ net worth may fall at a faster rate than small 
firms’ net worth, making the financial conditions of large firms weaker. 
Shifting from the financial conditions of firms over the business cycle to a moment 
of “shock,” let’s consider the short-term debt of small and large firms after a tight 
                                                          
 
42 Using the QFR data, I have also examined the net worth and sales of small and large firm. 
Interestingly, the net worth and sales of large firms are more volatile than those of small firms, as shown 
the graphs in Appendix D. Unlike other available data sets such as Compustat, the flow of funds data, 
according to Gertler and Gilchrist (1994), the QFR includes a great deal of nontraded companies. 
“Nontraded firms dominate the lower tier of the size distribution in our sample. Thus, we believe that the 
vast majority of companies in our small firm sample would be considered likely to be constrained, using 




monetary policy shock. At a time when a monetary policy shock arises, we would 
expect that, to the extent that net worth is more procyclical for large firms, the financial 
conditions of large firms are substantially stronger than those of small firms. In this 
situation, a sharp rise in an interest rate (as a result of a tight monetary policy shock) is 
likely to affect the financial conditions of small firms more adversely than those of large 
firms. This is so because a financial accelerator, which operates through the fluctuation 
of borrowers’ net worth, is more applicable to small firms that have weaker financial 
conditions. 43 In particular, following a tight monetary policy shock, most small firms, 
which undergo the severe exacerbation of their financial conditions and do not maintain 
robust financial conditions, may be unable to make use of short-term debt from 
banks―especially bank lines of credit. In contrast, most large firms, which experience 
the moderate deterioration of their financial conditions and thus maintain still strong 
financial conditions, may be able to make use of short-term debt from banks and 
financial markets. More specifically, we should put an emphasis on the availability of 
credit lines after a monetary policy shock because credit lines are considered a major 
source of short-term finance.44 After a monetary policy shock, most small firms may be 
unable to draw down their credit lines because they have violated cash flow-based 
financial covenants due to low cash flows.45 Yet, after a monetary policy shock, most 
                                                          
 
43 In a financial accelerator effect, a monetary policy shock may worsen the financial conditions of 
small firms―those who have weaker financial conditions―more strongly than others. Therefore, since 
small firms (with lower net worth) must face a higher external finance premium, lower credit availability, 
and lesser investment, they contribute to the macroeconomic downturn more significantly.  
 
44 According to Melnik and Plaut (1986), credit lines (or loan commitments) account for 70% of 
commercial and industrial loans in the United States. The share of credit lines in commercial and 





large firms may be able to draw down their credit lines because they have complied 
with cash flow-based financial covenants due to still sustained cash flows. 
As discussed earlier, the Fed is likely to adopt a restrictive monetary policy when an 
economy grows too rapidly. During such periods, the economy pushes beyond its trend, 
which causes inflation rates to increase to uncomfortable levels. At a particular point in 
time, a sustained and increasingly tighter monetary policy may reverse the relative 
financial conditions between small and large firms. Namely, the financial conditions of 
large firms―which were previously stronger than those of small firms at the time of a 
monetary policy shock―are now weaker than those of small firms at the time of an 
NBER recession shock. Why does this happen? Such a reversal of financial conditions 
may result from an environment of continuously and gradually rising interest rates. A 
sustained and gradually tighter monetary policy may influence a “burden of debt 
services” between two types of firms to a different degree. Because large firms are 
usually more highly indebted than small firms during an expansion, the burden of debt 
service is likely to be considerably greater for large firms over time.46  For example, the 
lower cost of debt (resulting from the procyclicality of borrowers’ net worth) may allow 
borrowers to build up a large amount of debt during an expansion. Such a buildup of 
debt may not be considered a serious problem to borrowers until a certain point is 
reached. As the Fed starts to increase interest rates continuously and gradually, such 
                                                                                                                                                                          
45 Also, many small firms cannot consider credit lines as a source of a short-term finance because 
they do not own the credit-line contracts with banks. Morgan (1990) finds that the share of loans made 
under credit lines tends to increase from about 33%, 56%, 70%, and 80%, as the size of loans 
increases―ranging from under $100,0000; $100,000 to $500,000; $500,000 to $1 million; and $l million 
to more. If small firms are correlated with the smaller size of loans, this evidence supports that small 
firms are less likely to own credit-line contracts with banks.  
 
46 According to the manufacturing firm data in QFR from 1987 Q4 to 2011 Q3, large firms’ leverage 




large amounts of debt may serve to increase the burden of debt services, which is 
particularly a big concern to large firms.47 Since the burden of debt services grows at a 
faster pace for large firms, this may make the financial conditions of large firms much 
more fragile over time―especially when a greater portion of cash flows or profits are 
used to service their existing debt. 
Additionally, let’s consider the short-term debt of small and large firms after an 
NBER recession shock. At a time when an NBER recession shock arises, we would 
expect that, to the extent that a burden of debt service swells more quickly for large 
firms after a continuing tighter policy, the financial conditions of large firms are more 
vulnerable than those of small firms. In this condition, an NBER recession shock is 
likely to affect the financial conditions of large firms more harmfully than those of 
small firms. This is so because the financial accelerator effect is more likely to operate 
through large firms that have more fragile financial conditions. 48 , 49  In particular, 
following an NEBR recession shock, most large firms, which undergo substantially 
severe deterioration of financial conditions and do not have a close relationship with 
financial intermediaries, may be forced to cut back short-term debt from banks and the 
                                                          
 
47 As has been stated, even after a tight monetary policy shock, large firms (with still robust financial 
conditions) may continue to surge amounts of debts―either by utilizing their credit lines from banks or 
by issuing commercial papers from the financial markets. This may contribute to increase the burden of 
debt service more rapidly.  
 
48  Similarly, in a financial accelerator, an NBER recession shock may exacerbate the financial 
conditions of large firms that have weaker financial conditions―rather than small firms―more strongly. 
Here, the logic is the same as a monetary policy shock.  
   
49 Here, “financial factors” (credit constraint) explain the different behavior of small and large firms. 
However, “nonfinancial factors” can also explain the different behavior of the two kinds of firms after an 
NBER recession shock. One possibility is that large firms are concentrated on more greatly in cyclical 
industries. Another is that large firms may face lower demand for credit than small firms in some 




financial markets sharply. 50 Notably, the sharply declining short-term debt of large 
firms may be closely associated with the characteristic of large firms that depend 
greatly on short-term debt (such as commercial papers) in the financial markets. 
Because borrowers’ balance sheet conditions are readily available at any time to the 
public, lenders in the financial markets may be able to withdraw their short-term loans 
immediately―after they obtain bad news, for example. In any case, most small firms, 
which experience less severe exacerbation of financial conditions but do have a close 
relationship with financial intermediaries, may be compelled to diminish short-term 
debts from banks to a lesser extent. In regard to the availability of credit lines, both 
small and large firms may be unable to make use of credit lines after an NBER 
recession shock. This is because continuously and gradually increasing interest rates 
may change an overall financial structure from robust to fragile borrowing conditions, 
when it comes to the neighborhood of an upper turning point. Accordingly, both small 
and large firms that breach a cash flow-based financial covenant may not be able to 
draw down their lines. 
 
3.5.2 Benefits of Lending Relationships 
The other possible explanation―of why large firms respond more sensitively to an 
adverse shock to their short-term debts―is related to the benefits of lending 
relationships, close ties between firms and financial intermediaries. A number of 
empirical studies find that small firms with longer banking relationships are likely to 
have greater availability of credit, and pay a lower cost of credit, and are less likely to 
pledge collateral (see Petersen & Rajan, 1994, 1995, for the availability of credit and 
                                                          
 




see Berger & Udell, 1995, for the price of credit and collateral requirements). This 
evidence suggests that, during periods of tight credit, small firms with close ties to 
financial intermediaries are much more likely to obtain credit compared to large firms 
without such ties. During periods of financial difficulty, most small firms, which benefit 
from close relationships, may experience sluggish debt reduction, whereas most large 
firms, which do not derive benefit from relationships, may suffer from severe debt 
reduction. 
On one hand, small firms may want to maintain a close relationship with financial 
intermediaries because maintaining a relationship is beneficial to them―especially in a 
situation when they cannot directly borrow from financial markets (due to the 
asymmetric information problems between borrowers and lenders). Lenders in public 
markets may be unwilling to provide credit to small firms because they have much more 
information about the prospects of their projects than lenders. Since small firms, in this 
way, pose severe asymmetric information problems in credit markets, financial 
intermediaries play an important role in overcoming information problems. In other 
words, financial intermediaries gather information about borrowers’ ability to meet their 
financial obligations through a continuous interaction―for example, by way of 
monitoring borrowers and offering financial services to them.  
Over the course of lending relationships, financial intermediaries may be able to 
develop their own expertise in understanding borrowers’ financial needs and problems. 
By maintaining such relationships, as will be explained later, small firms may be able to 
build up “good reputation.” The reputation may be used to help small firms smoothly 




encountering financial difficulty during periods of tight credit, small firms may have a 
greater likelihood that they can obtain new loans or renew their existing loans rather 
than be cut off from financial intermediaries. Most small firms, which do not have many 
alternative sources of funds and will hopefully be continuously financed in times of 
financial difficulty, are more cooperative at building up a relationship with financial 
intermediaries. For example, they are willing to pay for premiums or service fees of 
screening, monitoring, and financial services to intermediaries. 
On the other hand, financial intermediaries may want to maintain a close 
relationship with small firms because such a relationship is beneficial to them as well. 
Financial intermediaries, according to Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989), 
Petersen and Rajan (1995), Rajan (1992), and Sharpe (1990), can benefit from 
monopoly power over years of lending because of the private information 51  they 
generate and because of the search costs borrowers incur. If the information that is 
produced by the relationships is durable and is not transferable to other lenders (private 
information), and if borrowers incur costs while searching for more favorable loan 
terms (search costs), financial intermediaries can exert monopoly power over the 
borrowers. According to this view, at an initial stage, monopolistic lenders charge 
                                                          
 
51 Financial intermediaries may have an incentive to produce private information on small firms, 
which is called “soft” information. This private information is valuable to financial intermediaries 
because they can extract profits from such information in future transactions with small firms. In contrast, 
financial intermediaries may have little incentive to produce private information on large firms because 
this information is relatively less valuable to financial intermediaries due to the publicly available 
information about large firms. More specifically, there is very little likelihood that financial 
intermediaries will be able to extract profits from such private information in their transactions with large 
firms. Large firms, which generally borrow not only from financial intermediaries but also from the open 
markets directly, are obligated to disclose information about their management of firms (such as 
accounting information and credit ratings) to the public. This information is called “hard” information, 
and it is verifiable or is based on relatively objective criteria such as financial ratios, collateral ratios, and 
credit scores. Since financial intermediaries know that the “hard” information of large firms is always 
available at a low cost, they may have little incentive to produce costly private information (see Petersen, 




lower-than-competitive rates to lure clients and to establish a relationship while only 
incurring current short-term losses. However, at a later stage, they charge higher-than-
competitive rates to recover the previous short-term losses and thus reap future 
monopolistic profits52―especially when some mechanism locks clients into the current 
relationship.53 The relationship has been built on the belief that the short-term losses 
generated initially (by lenders) are offset by the expected profits extracted later over the 
life of lending.  
This type of relationship is beneficial to monopolistic lenders for the following 
reasons. First, at the initial stage, monopolistic lenders have the chance to open up new 
relationships with small firms, while they are offering lower interest rates than 
competitive lenders would offer. These lower interest rates also may mitigate the 
adverse selection and the moral hazard problem of firms because higher interest rates 
are likely to drive away safer firms (the adverse selection problem) or persuade them to 
choose risky projects (the moral hazard problem). Second, at the later stage, 
monopolistic lenders can produce much higher profits when they charge higher-than-
competitive rates. This is so because monopolistic lenders, who have accumulated 
private information through the relationships with borrowers, can reduce loan rates by 
                                                          
 
52 It is important to note that, although monopolistic lenders charge higher-than competitive rates, 
they may reduce interest rates over time. Monopolistic lenders reduce interest rates more slowly than 
lenders in competitive markets. Therefore, we would expect interest rates of monopolistic markets to fall 
more slowly than those of competitive markets. 
 
53 Such a “holdup” problem of a relationship occurs because the borrowers’ search costs for finding 
other lenders, who have ability to handle their needs, are likely to be high―especially when the market 
has few lenders. This holdup problem does not last forever. In Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia’s (1989) 
model, the longevity of the relationship increases the likelihood that the borrower will switch to other 
lenders and consequently reduces the remaining expected length of the relationship. That is, they show 
that “the expected remaining duration of a lender-client relationship is decreasing in the existing length of 
the relationship. Thus, clients that have been with a particular lender longer will be more likely to leave 




less than the true decline in loan rates that competitive lenders would charge at the later 
stage. 
Since maintaining a close relationship is beneficial to both small firms and financial 
intermediaries, as described in the previous two paragraphs, financial intermediaries are 
more willing to help small firms than large firms during recessions. For this reason, 
small firms may experience a more sluggish decrease of loans than large firms when the 
economy goes into recessions. In particular, financial intermediaries may want to lend a 
hand to small firms during recessions because of the sunk costs they have previously 
incurred and because of the monopolistic profits they will enjoy in the future.  
First, financial intermediaries may have already incurred sunk costs to overcome 
asymmetric information problems, while committing a great deal of resources to 
understand the small firms’ businesses. At the outset of the relationship, intermediaries 
have previously made payments for the high costs of screening and monitoring small 
firms. Over the long-term relationship, they develop the best knowledge of the ins and 
outs of firms’ financial conditions through good and bad times. If they reject small 
firms during a recession, they know that they will lose the customers they have invested 
in up front. Second, as discussed earlier, since financial intermediaries have monopoly 
power over small firms (owing to their private information and the firms’ search costs), 
they may think that, if they help small firms in times of financial difficulty today, they 
can extract monopoly profits tomorrow from the investment (Greenbaum et al., 1989; 
Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). For this reason, during periods of 
recessions, financial intermediaries are more willing to extend loans to small firms, 




happens to small firms, large firms may experience a more rapid decline of loans than 
small firms during recessions because of a loose relationship with financial 
intermediaries. If financial intermediaries overcome information problems and ease 
credit constraint during firms’ financial difficulty, why do large firms choose to weaken 
a relationship with financial intermediaries? The answer should be that there are 
compensating benefits when large firms borrow directly from public markets or there 
are costs when they maintain the relationship with financial intermediaries. Switching 
from financial intermediaries to public markets, large firms may be able to sidestep two 
problems associated with financial intermediaries: the intermediaries’ monitoring costs 
and their monopoly power.  
First, large firms may want to avoid the monitoring costs of financial intermediaries. 
Small firms, which pose severe moral hazard problems, may be willing to pay the 
monitoring costs of financial intermediaries because intermediated loans are the only 
source of credit they can rely on in that financial intermediaries alone are well suited to 
deal with their moral hazard problems. However, large firms, which pose mild moral 
hazard problems, may feel the monitoring costs of financial intermediaries 
unnecessary― particularly when they can resort to an alternative source of credits in 
public markets. 
Diamond (1991) suggests a “life cycle” of a firm’s borrowing in the following way. 
A new firm that poses severe moral hazard problems may initially borrow from 
financial intermediaries because its moral hazard problem can be mitigated by the 
monitoring of financial intermediaries. Yet, the same firm that has obtained good 




over time may later borrow directly from public markets because reputation alone can 
take care of moral hazard problems and consequently eliminate the need for 
monitoring.54 According to Diamond (1991), during the life cycle of a firm’ borrowing, 
large firms are likely to be the firms that may have accumulated “reputation capital” 
through a long-term relationship with financial intermediaries. Since such large firms 
have more reputation capital to lose when they take a risky action (i.e., less moral 
hazard problems), they may not need to incur the costs of monitoring associated with 
intermediated loans.55 
Second, in addition to elusion from monitoring costs, large firms may also want to 
avoid the monopoly power of financial intermediaries. As discussed earlier, in a 
situation where financial intermediaries have the monopoly power, they may be able to 
extract big monopoly profits later by demanding higher interest rates than the 
competitive rates. To reduce such monopoly power, large firms may want to diversify 
their sources of funds. One way is that large firms borrow directly from public markets 
when they are large enough to bear the costs of issuing the public debt. By using public 
markets, they would acquire not only more discretion over investment decisions and 
production but also more bargaining power in negotiation with financial intermediaries. 
In any case, since maintaining a relationship with financial intermediaries would be 
costly for large firms owing to the intermediaries’ monitoring costs and monopoly 
power, large firms may choose to weaken their relationship with financial 
                                                          
 
54  That is, a firm’s reputation capital obtained through intermediaries’ monitoring will serve to 
predict the behavior of the firm in public markets in the absence of monitoring. 
 
55 By contrast, since small firms have not yet established enough reputation through intermediaries’ 
monitoring, they have less “reputation capital” to lose when they take a risk action (i.e., severe moral 
hazard problem). Accordingly, small firms, who have a lack of access to public markets due to moral 




intermediaries by borrowing directly from financial markets. When this relationship is 
loose, they may have more difficulty acquiring credits during periods of recessions and 
they experience more rapid reduction of loans than small firms. 
 
3.5.3 Summary 
This section provides why large firms show more sensitive behavior of short-term 
debt either after a monetary policy shock or after an NBER recession shock. The main 
theme is as follows. After a monetary policy shock, small firms may be more credit 
constrained than large firms because small firms undergo more severe exacerbation of 
their balance sheet conditions than large firms.56 Small firms, who experience more 
serious deterioration of financial conditions, may be prohibited from drawing down 
banks’ lines of credit―which become increasingly important as a source of liquidity. In 
contrast, large firms, who experience the weak exacerbation of financial conditions, 
may still be allowed to use their credit lines, expanding more short-term debt―at the 
time demand for loans increases. Therefore, the availability of credit lines explains why 
large firms increase short-term debt more than small firms following a monetary 
tightening.  
On the other hand, after an NBER recession shock, large firms may be more credit 
constrained than small firms because they have more vulnerable financial conditions 
than small firms―at a time when NBER recession shock arises. Although large firms 
had stronger financial conditions than small firms at the time of a monetary shock, large 
                                                          
 
56 Some evidence suggests that the financial conditions of large firms are more procyclical than that 
of small firms (see Chari et al., 2007, for sales and see Moscarini & Postel-Vinay, 2008, 2009, 2012, for 
employment). If so, the financial conditions of large firms are stronger than those of small firms when 
tight monetary policy arises. Because a monetary tightening is likely to occur when the economy is strong, 




firms may have weaker financial conditions at the time of an NBER recession shock. 
Because large firms tend to be more highly leveraged than small firms during an 
expansion, a sustained and increasingly tighter monetary policy may deteriorate the 
financial conditions of large firms more rapidly than that of small firms. For this reason, 
after an NBER recession shock, most large firms, who undergo more severe 
deterioration of financial conditions, find it hard to obtain credit more than small firms. 
In addition to their weaker financial conditions, large firms may face more difficulty in 
obtaining credit because they have looser relationships with intermediaries than small 
firms. After an NBER recession shock, small firms with a close tie with financial 
intermediaries may benefit from the relationship lending at the time of financial 
difficulty, whereas large firms without such close ties may suffer from the decline of 
loans more harshly. Therefore, the borrowers’ financial conditions and lending 
relationship with lenders help us understand why large firms decrease short-term debt 
more than small firms.  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
Previous research, particularly the credit channel of monetary policy, finds that 
small firms are more credit-constrained than large firms after a tight monetary shock. 
Small firms, according to this channel, play a special role in the monetary transmission 
mechanism. Recently, however, a large number of researchers find that large firms are 
more sensitive to a business cycle shock than small firms in terms of sales, inventories, 
short-term debt, and employment. Why does the recent research find somewhat 
different results from the previous ones? Do large firms, rather than small firms, play a 




issues, I examine the behavior of small and large firms in two ways: (1) by different 
episodes, a monetary policy shock and an NBER recession shock and (2) by different 
periods, earlier periods and recent periods. 
First, by examining the behavior of small and larger firms by different episodes, I 
find that a monetary policy and an NBER recession shock differently affect firms’ short-
term financing behavior. During recent periods, while firms increase their short-term 
debt after a tight monetary policy shock, they decrease after an NBER recession shock. 
What is more, large firms exhibit much more sensitive behavior in their short-term debt 
than small firms to the two kinds of shocks. That is, after a contractionary monetary 
policy shock, large firms increase their short-term debt more than small firms; however, 
after an NBER recession shock, large firms decrease more than small firms. 
These findings suggest that small firms are likely to be more credit-constrained after 
a monetary policy shock, whereas large firms are likely to be more credit-constrained 
after an NBER recession shock. If so, as in the balance sheet channel theme, a financial 
accelerator mechanism may operate through small firms that are financially more 
constrained after a contractionary monetary shock. On the other hand, the financial 
accelerator mechanism may operate through large firms that are financially more credit-
constrained after an NBER recession shock. In both ways, a small adverse shock may 
be amplified through each credit-constrained firms, ultimately diminishing output in the 
economy.  
Second, by examining the behavior of small and large firms by different periods, I 
find some empirical results that are consistent with previous research (earlier periods) 




more sensitive in some of balance sheet variables to either a monetary policy shock or 
an NBER recession shock, which is in line with previous studies. In particular, small 
firms diminish their inventories, total short-term debt, and bank debt more than large 
firms to these two kinds of shocks. This finding suggests that small firms are more 
credit-constrained than large firms.57 During recent periods, however, large firms are 
more sensitive in most balance sheet variables to either a monetary policy shock or an 
NBER recession shock, which support recent research. In particular, large firms are 
more responsive than small firms to both kinds of shocks in their sales, total short-term 
debt, short-term bank debt, mortgages, other debt, and trade debt.58 After an NBER 
recession shock, large firms substantially decrease more than small firms in all of those 
variables. Yet, after a monetary policy shock, large firms show somewhat similar 
behavior with small firms in some variables such as bank debt and mortgages even if 
they are generally more sensitive than small firms.  
One interesting result is that, after a monetary policy shock, all firms decrease their 
short-term debt during earlier periods, but they increase during recent periods. The 
evidence suggests that, after a monetary policy shock, firms’ ability to raise short-term 
debt appears to have increased in recent periods. Furthermore, following a 
contractionary monetary policy shock, small firms decrease their short-term debt more 
than large firms during earlier periods; in contrast, large firms increase more than small 
firms during recent periods. Although those results seem to be contradictory, they are 
                                                          
 
57 However, for other variables such as mortgages, other debt, and trade debt, large firms decline 
more than small firms after either a monetary shock or an NBER recession shock. 
 
58 For bank loans, large firms are more sensitive to an NBER recession shock, whereas they exhibit 
very similar behavior with small firms to a monetary shock. For inventories, larger firms show very 
similar response with small firms to an NBER recession shock, but the sensitivity of firms is 




consistent in that small firms continue to be more credit-constrained than large 
firms―at the time when demand for loans increases. For example, during earlier 
periods, small firms, which are credit-constrained more than large firm, experience 
more severe decline of short-term debt. Similarly, during recent periods, small firms 
financially constrained more may be able to obtain less short-term debt. 
For the evidence described above, I propose some explanation of why large firms 
are more sensitive in their short-term borrowing either to monetary policy or an NBER 
recession shock. A monetary shock differently affects firms’ short-term debt than an 
NBER recession shock does, depending on the firms’ financial conditions which change 
over the business cycle. First, firms’ financial conditions may be somewhat strong at a 
time when a tight monetary shock arises. This is because a monetary tightening usually 
occurs when the economy is strong. Thus, firms’ demand for loans still increases when 
interest rates rise. During an expansion, if large firms have a stronger financial 
condition than small firms, large firms may be able to easily finance short-term debt 
more than small firms. Second, firms’ financial conditions may be very weak at a time 
when an NBER recession shock arises. This is because, to the extent that firms tend to 
increase their leverage during an expansion, a gradually and increasingly tighter 
monetary policy adversely affects firms’ financial conditions. If large firms are more 
leveraged than small firms―in fact, they are according to the QFR data―their financial 
condition might be more fragile than those of small firms to an adverse shock in the 
economy. After an NBER recession shock, large firms may experience more severe 






3.7.1 Appendix A: Creating Time Series for the Small Firm Group59 
The QFR provides the financial data on eight asset sizes, grouped by assets sizes: 
the asset of 1) less than $5 million, 2) $5 to $10 million, 3) $10 to $25 million, 4) $25 to 
50 million, 5) $50 to $100 million, 6) $100 to $250 million, 7) $250 million to $1 
billion, and 8) more than $1 billion. One difficulty in using the QFR data is that the size 
categories are constructed in nominal terms. Therefore, inflation causes firms to drift 
between categories. To control for the inflation drift, following Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1994), I define small firms as those at or below the 30th percentile in sale distribution 
and large firms as above the 30th percentile. The specific procedure I used is as follows. 
1. Identify the “marginal size class” with respect to sales. When we are adding up 
the class sizes by starting with the smallest firm class, marginal size class is the final 
one that contains the 30th percentile of nominal sales for that period. I cumulate each 
increasingly larger firm class until I reach 30% of total sales. After that, I define the 
upper bound of small firms as the cumulated aggregation that includes the marginal size 
class, which is denoted by CU(γ)―i.e., γ = 30%. CU(γ) includes γ+ωU percent of total 
sales―i.e., γ (30%) plus ωU (the amount exceeding upper 30%) where ωU > 0.  
2. At the same time, I define the lower bound of small firms as the cumulated 
aggregation that excludes the marginal size class, which is denoted by CL(γ). CL(γ) 
includes γ−ωL percent of total sales―i.e., γ (30%) minus ωL (the amount that falls short 
of 30%) where ωL > 0.  
                                                          
 
59 In this Appendix A, I only explain the procedures to create time series for small firms. To create 




3. Now, I identify the sale-based weight to separate small firms from the dataset. 
The weight in upper bound, CU(γ), is ωL/ (ωU +ωL) and the weight in lower bound, 
CL(γ), is ωU/( ωU +ωL). For example, let γ =30, and assume that CU(γ) includes 31% of 
total sales and CL(γ) includes 27% of total sales; in this illustration, ωU =1 and ωL =3 60 
so that a weight of CU(γ) is 3/4 and a weight of CL(γ) is 1/4. By using this weighted 
average, we can assign the bigger weight to CU(γ) because it approaches to the 30% of 
total sales more closely than CL(γ) does.  
4. Such sale-based weight can be applied to the growth rate of other series we 
examine―for example, inventories and short-term debts. In other words, we compute 
the growth rates of other series (i.e., inventories and short-term debts) in small firms as 
a weighted average of other series growth in CU(γ) and CL(γ). For instance, in the 
previous example, the growth rate of inventories for small firms is 3/4 * g + 1/4 * s, 
where g is the growth rate associated with CU(γ) of inventories and s is the growth rate 
associated with CL(γ) of inventories. Here, the basic idea is that we apply the sale-based 
weight to the other series in order to find the growth of other series in small firms.  
5. We can get the initial value for small firms. The initial level for other series was 
taken to be a weighted average of their value in CU(γ) and CL(γ), where the weights are 
the same as those defined above.  
6. Cumulate up to achieve the level series.  
 
 
                                                          
 
60  The amount exceeding 30% in the upper bound is equal to 1, ωU =1 because CU(γ) = γ+ωU  (i.e., 
31=30+ωU); similarly, the amount falling short of 30% in the lower bound is equal to 3, ωL =3, because 




3.7.2 Appendix B: Cumulative Growth Rates of Sales after HP Filtering  
















88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Small firms (Below 15 percentile of capital stocks distribution)
Large firms (Above 15 percentile of capital stocks distribution)
Cumulative Growth Rates of Sales After HP Filtering









88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10
Small firms (Group 1 to 4)
Large firms (Group 7 to 8)





3.7.3 Appendix C: Average Changes in Inventories, Total Short-term Debt, 
Components of Aggregate Debt and Trade Debt Around Romer Dates 
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3.7.5 Appendix D: The Behavior of Net Worth Between Small and Large Firms 
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What are the mechanisms through which monetary policy influences the economy? 
How can the open market operations of only a few billion dollars have such large and 
persistent effects on aggregate spending? Can a small change in the federal funds rate 
make such a large difference for investment and consumption in interest sensitive 
sectors? The conventional interest-rate story had faced great difficulty in answering 
these questions because estimating the interest-rate effect alone was too moderate to 
explain such large impacts of monetary policy. Although a number of economists have 
searched for other possible explanations in part by considering the credit effects of 
monetary policy, they neglect the role of NBFIs in the credit-market analysis. 
Furthermore, in contrast to the view of the credit channel, which asserts that small firms 
are more adversely affected after tightening monetary policy (see Gertler & Gilchrist, 
1991, 1993, 1994), recent research finds that large firms are more adversely affected 
after business cycle shocks in terms of employment, sales, and short-term debt. (see 
Moscarini & Postel-Vinay, 2008, 2009, 2012, for employment; see also Chari, 
Christiano & Kehoe, 2007; Kudlyak, Price & Sánchez, 2010, for sales and short-term 
debt) Such new findings raise questions about the roles of small and large firms during 
periods of tight credit. 
My research addresses these issues by examining the behavior of lenders (i.e., 
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financial firms) and borrowers (i.e., nonfinancial firms). Chapter 2 examined the lenders’ 
side, the behavior of NBFIs, to answer the question of whether NBFIs behave in a 
similar way as banks after monetary tightening. Despite a substantially growing 
importance of NBFIs in the financial system, NBFIs are not treated in the monetary 
transmission mechanism because they are not subject to reserve requirement. However, 
to the extent that, like banks, NBFIs are well suited to deal with information 
problematic borrowers and provide credit to such borrowers, the credit effects asserted 
by the credit channel theory may extend to NBFIs. That is, tight monetary policy may 
reduce the willingness of the loan supply of NBFIs in the same way as banks if tight 
monetary policy worsens NBFIs’ balance sheet conditions, which in turn constrain 
NBFIs’ ability to raise funds. These possibilities are theoretically justified by the bank 
capital channel theme (Van den Heuvel, 2002, 2007) and adverse selection model (Stein, 
1998). Under this reasoning, I empirically find that the net worth of banks and NBFIs 
declined in response to tight monetary policy; on top of that, banks and NBFIs all 
reduce the loan supply as well. These results suggest that the credit channel theme can 
reasonably extend to NBFIs; consequently, just like banks, NBFIs may contribute to the 
reduction of output in response to monetary tightening. 
Chapter 3 examined the borrowers’ side, especially the behavior of small and large 
firms to answer the question of whether a monetary policy shock is different from a 
business cycle shock. Does each different shock affect the behavior of small and large 
firms differently? Employing the post-1990 subsample data, the comparison of small 
and large firms’ behaviors reveals the following two pieces of evidence: (1) following a 
tight monetary shock, the short-term debt of large firms increases more than that of 
198 
small firms; (2) following a business cycle shock, on the other hand, the short-term debt 
of large firms decreases more than that of small firms. Why do large firms show more 
sensitive behavior than small firms to each different shock? One possible explanation is 
linked to the borrowers’ financial conditions over business cycles―particularly at a 
time when each different shock arises. If large firms have stronger financial conditions 
than small firms at a time when a tight monetary shock arises1―and there is good 
evidence to suggest that they do―the large firms’ ability to obtain credit is greater than 
that of small firms. So, large firms may be able to increase short-term debt more than 
small firms. Therefore, the first evidence suggests that small firms are more credit 
constrained after a monetary policy shock. Likewise, if large firms have weaker 
financial conditions than small firms at a time when a business cycle shock arises, the 
large firms’ ability to acquire credit is less than that of small firms. Therefore, the 
second bit of evidence suggests that large firms are more credit constrained after a 
business cycle shock. Taken together, the evidence presented here implies that 
following a monetary policy shock, small firms may play a special role in credit 
markets during tight credit conditions, whereas following a business cycle shock, large 
firms may play a unique role in credit markets during recessions.  
My research contributes to the literature of monetary transmission mechanism 
mainly in the subsequent manner. First, just like banks, NBFIs reduce the net worth and 
the loan supply in response to contractionary monetary policy. This evidence suggests 
that NBFIs are one possible factor that leads to the substantial decline of output and that 
NBFIs provide a possible explanation for existing puzzles. Second, during the pre-1990 
                                                          
 
1 Because the Fed is likely to conduct tight monetary policy when the economy grows too fast, the 
firms’ demand for credit may still increase during expansion. 
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periods, following tight monetary policy, small firms decrease bank debt more than 
large firms, which is consistent with previous research. I confirm in part that during 
earlier periods, small firms are more credit constrained than large firms when the 
Federal Reserve policy tightens. During the post-1990s periods, however, following 
tight monetary policy, large firms increase short-term debt more than small firms, 
particularly when need for external funds may be increasing. This evidence suggests 
that small firms continue to be credit-constrained more than large firms; small firms 
keep bearing the brunt of credit crunches caused by tight monetary policy.2  
In spite of my research contribution to the existing literature, my research does not 
resolve an identification problem―i.e., the issue of deciding whether the volume of 
credit reduction arises from the supply side or from the demand side. In other words, I 
interpret the results of this research in terms of the credit channel theory that stresses the 
supply-driven mechanism. In particular, I assume that tight monetary policy influences 
the willingness of loan supply of other private lenders as well as banks; the fall of the 
loan supply, in turn, reduces output through intermediary dependent borrowers 
(especially small firms). However, the same results can be interpreted by the 
conventional demand-driven mechanism. The observed fall of loans may reflect a 
decline of demand for credit rather than a decline of supply of credit. Disentangling the 
identification problem by incorporating NBFIs into the general framework would be an 
interesting area in future research.              
 In addition to disentanglement of the identification problem, there are some fruitful 
                                                          
 
2 A business cycle shock is different from a tight monetary shock in that a business cycle shock 
influences the behavior of large firms more adversely than small firms during the recession. As 
mentioned previously, in the post-1990 subsample, after a business cycle shock, large firms decrease their 
short-term debt more than small firms during recessions. 
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areas for future research. One promising research area is related to lines of credit, which 
have become more widely used as a source of firms’ credit. It would be interesting to 
evaluate whether the small firm effect is closely tied to differential access to the lines of 
credit. As shown in Chapter 3, large firms increase their short-term debt more than 
small firms in response to contractionary monetary policy. Such sensitive behavior of 
large firms might be associated with the use and availability of credit lines. Another 
promising research area is associated with behavior of fund managers (such as mutual 
funds, pension funds, and hedge funds) in the monetary transmission mechanism. It also 
would be interesting to assess how monetary policy influences the behavior of funds 
managers and how their behavior influences ultimate output. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
over the postwar period, the assets of mutual funds and pension funds have grown very 
rapidly. There is a possible link between monetary policy and output through changes in 
the behavior of fund managers, if monetary policy can influence the behavior of fund 
managers. Although fund managers do not directly provide credit to firms, they can 
indirectly influence firms’ investment decisions through changes in financial asset 
prices. Further researches in these areas may allow us to better understand monetary 
transmission mechanisms. They thereby inform us as to what policymakers should do to 
reduce large fluctuations of aggregate output and inflation.    
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